

INDIA QUARTERLY

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
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FOOD POLICY AND POLITICS IN BANGLADESH*

By MARCUS FRANDA**

BANGLADESH is *sui generis*, if only because it is so poor and so over populated relative to food production that it forces one to ask the question, "How can any country get into the predicament of a Bangladesh?" The answer to such a question involves exploration into a number of complexities, including cultural patterns, political realities, economic changes, policy choices, and a multitude of historical events. A useful focus for inquiry is the food distribution system, which lies at the core of the nation's poverty. What are the political determinants of food production? To what extent and in what ways have national political and economic policies affected the nutritional levels of the poorest of the poor? How do present-day food policies compare with those of the past in terms of improving nutritional levels for the poorest segments of the population?

HISTORICAL FACTORS AFFECTING POVERTY

In a remarkable paper that has, to my knowledge, never been published, Dr. Akhter Hameed Khan has traced the history of the food problem in what is now Bangladesh, from the time of the Great Famine of 1943 up until the division of Pakistan in 1971.¹ Khan is in an especially good position to understand the mechanics of famine and food scarcity in Bengal because he was a government officer in the famine areas in 1943, a relief worker in the Khulna famine in 1951, a district officer during the days of community development and land reform in the 1950s and 1960s, and the founder of the heralded Comilla Academy of Rural Development. He argues that the 1943 famine was a major historical turning-point in Bengal because it seriously diminished the Britishers' "proud confidence" in their ability to govern, and it resulted from factors that are "still either patently active or merely dormant." Moreover, Khan insists, the policies born out of the trauma of 1943 "were scrupulously followed for more than two decades and have not yet been discarded."

The Great Famine of 1943 Man-made

Britishers, Bengalis and outside observers now agree that the 1943 famine was entirely man-made, the result of a wartime decision to upset traditional patterns of food production and distribution in order to prevent conquest of India by the Japanese. In early 1942 the Japanese had struck Asia like

*Paper to be presented at the Conference on Politics of Food, sponsored by the Pakistan Agricultural Research Institute at Islamabad, Pakistan, in September 1981.

**Dr. Franda is an Associate of the American Universities Field Staff, New York.

a "military tornado"—crippling the Royal Navy, overpowering the British in Malaya and Burma, looming like dark clouds over India's eastern borders. As a precaution against a potential enemy landing in the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, the British decided to pursue what was called a "denial policy"—i.e. to remove carts, boats, rice supplies and other necessities from the southern districts of Bengal in order to "deny" these to the invaders. As Khan points out, the Japanese escaped the hardships intended for them by not arriving, but unprecedented suffering took place among Bengali farmers, fishermen, carters, boatmen, rice merchants, and, most of all, rice eaters.

The areas of the 1943 "denial policy" were historically surplus rice areas, where grain merchants (*biparis*) purchased surplus rice after the big harvests (in January, February and March) and then sold it to other *biparis* in Dacca during the rainy season (June, July and August). One key variable in the distribution system was the annual flooding of the rivers, which enabled boats to take the rice to markets in Dacca and other over populated districts once the monsoon spate had risen high enough. By seizing all boats and carts, the British prevented rice from moving very easily into Dacca, with the result that a scarcity mentality set in, hoarding intensified, and prices soared. Bengali farmers were delighted when they found that prices were moving upward every week, and they quickly decided that they would wait before selling, sell in small quantities, and watch the market. Khan points out, "never before had Bengali farmers seen such favourable trends or possessed such holding capacity."

Within a few months, the "denial policy" had brought unprecedented affluence to hundreds of thousands of people—farmers, *biparis*, merchants, or anyone else who could store rice—and pitiful destitution to millions of others. Khan describes a big farmer who could not tell the police inspector after a 1943 burglary how many currency notes had been stolen because he did not know the extent of his new wealth. On the other side, Khan says, "I met many buyers—artisans, labourers, tenants—who had sold all their belongings to buy their daily rice."

Food Distribution Network Not a Force for Equality

The 1943 famine was publicly blamed on a series of chronic factors that were undoubtedly present in Bengal but were not the trigger causes of the immediate food scarcity. Production had not kept pace with population growth, the historic Bengali "safety valve" of imported food from Burma during periods of acute scarcity had not been working; and the increasing salinity of previously fertile land in the southern districts was beginning to be a problem. The reaction of the British, and later the Pakistanis, was to invest large amounts in attempts to increase agricultural production, and to intervene on a massive scale in an attempt to rearrange food distribution networks. For the first time in Bengal, five

interventionist measures of government became prominent, and all five have remained as salient features of food policy up until the present time. These are : (1) control of food prices; (2) control of the foodgrains trade; (3) control of movement of foodgrains; (4) government procurement of food; and (5) rationing.

Since 1943, the State—whether it was under the British, the Pakistanis, or independent Bangladeshi governments—has conceived of itself as the custodian of foodgrain consumers, and especially city-dwellers. Whenever there has been the slightest hint of scarcity, the Government has moved in to fix ceiling prices to consumers, to restrict the amount of profits that can be made from foodgrains, and to prevent hoarding. Surplus districts have occasionally been cordoned off by policemen and the military, who are at those times supposed to allow only small handfuls of grain to move legally between districts without government permission. The Government itself has undertaken large-scale “procurement” of foodgrains, with the declared intention of supplanting old traders and providing fairer prices. The rationing system has always publicly promised constant prices and stocks, but has blatantly been structured to favour the six largest cities. Unlike the middle-class and rural poor, even low income urban consumers have generally been able to get cheap food, although first priorities for rationed food supplies have gone, by law, to the army, the police and the bureaucracy.

Every available study indicates that government intervention in the distribution of foodgrains in Bengal has not been a force for equality.² Rations have gone primarily to the better-off, and for the rest have been unreliable, inadequate and of poor quality. Price controls have generated a black market that has favoured the rich. Procurement and price controls have served as disincentives to growers, who have resented the fact that their interests have been sacrificed for the sake of the town-dwellers. Attempts at control of the foodgrains trade has given birth to unprecedented corruption and smuggling, with all records of dishonesty in other sectors of the economy being surpassed by those of government officials and police assigned to control grain movement.

Food Production Does Not Keep Pace with Population Growth

Poverty in Bangladesh has been intensified by a number of other factors. Primary among them is a massive population growth that has resulted from exceptional improvements in public health in this century, with no corresponding improvements in industrial or agricultural productivity. Overall annual population growth rates have risen from an average of just over one per cent in the 1940s to more than two per cent in the 1950s and more than three per cent in the 1970s. A plethora of recent studies indicate that there is some support for control of family size and spacing of children in Bangladesh, and especially among mothers who have already had

a number of pregnancies, but that the economics of poverty—essentially, the necessity for large numbers of hands, to improve the likelihood that some of them will be productive enough to sustain the family—still persists.³

Partition Exodus of Hindu Landlords Aggravates Poverty

A second factor intensifying poverty in Bangladesh was the large-scale Hindu-Muslim riots during the years of partition, which, when coupled with the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, led to the exodus of more than 4 million Hindu landlords (*zamindars* and *jotedars*), moneylenders, school teachers, government officials, and other elites between 1947 and 1954. These were the people who had run East Bengal—who had built and maintained the embankments (*bheris*) against floods, constructed large tanks (*pukurs*) and lakes for irrigation water, or had financed and supervised the reclamation of old silted riverbeds as the massive rivers of Bengal inexorably shifted course over the years. Without the *zamindars* and *jotedars* the *bheris* were not maintained, new *pukurs* were not dug, and the silted up rivulets and canals were not re-excavated. Pakistani military and administrative officers during their years in power (1947-1971), tried to take the place of the old authority figures of East Bengal by launching dozens of government programmes designed to supply irrigation water, but the Pakistanis ultimately proved illegitimate in the eyes of Bengalis, and Bangladesh was born as a consequence of the only successful civil war in this century.

The Liberation War and Subsequent Domestic Turbulence Disrupts Achieved Gains

The liberation war, along with a series of disruptions before and since, have interfered with whatever slight gains may have been made in food production. As is indicated in Table I, foodgrain output over the past four decades has generally not kept pace with population increases, but there have been certain periods (particularly in the first decade—the 1960s—and during the last few years), when there have been spurts of growth. Not surprisingly, these have corresponded with periods of relative calm and stability in the countryside.

During the 1950s, food production was severely hampered by the flight of Hindu landlords and capital to India, and by the resulting insecurity within Bangladesh as the Muslim peasantry fought over tenuous rights to the lands abandoned by the Hindu *zamindars*. Every communal riot in the late 1940s and early 1950s enhanced the nervousness of the elite Hindus of East Bengal, causing them to steadily shift their assets out of Pakistan and into India. The same riots fractured community structures in the villages of East Bengal, making it difficult (and often impossible) for anyone

TABLE I

COMPARISONS OF FOODGRAIN PRODUCTION WITH POPULATION, BANGLADESH, 1949-1981

(in millions of tons)

	Population Size	Year	Rice	Wheat	Total Food- grains
112%	42 million	1949-50	7.5	—	7.5
	55 million	1959-66	8.5	0.2	8.7
	70 million	1969-70	11.7	0.5	12.2
	89 million	1979-86	12.5	0.8	13.3
	91 million	1980-81 (projected estimates)	13.9	1.3	15.2

Source : Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh and its predecessors, as quoted in Haroun er Rashid, *Geography of Bangladesh* (Dacca: University Press Limited, 1977), pp. 242, 247; and in interviews with Dr. A.K.M. Ghulam Rabbani, Secretary of the Statistics Division, and with Dr. Charles Antholt and Stephen French of AID-Dacca, all in November/December 1980.

to muster enough authority to maintain the kinds of public works necessary for productive agriculture. A poorly implemented land reform—ostensibly abolishing all intermediaries, fixing ceilings at 33 acres, and giving occupancy rights to tenants—enhanced conflicts within village communities, to the detriment of productive enterprise.⁴

For a short time in the early and mid-1960s, it seemed as though a long-term agricultural boom was underway, in both East and West Pakistan, but this proved to be a temporary phenomenon. Concessional foodgrain imports from the United States emboldened the Pakistan Government to relax procurement and controls, and to otherwise remove disincentives to production. Positive incentives were introduced in the shape of subsidies for fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation water, seeds, tubewells and machinery. Ceiling prices for food crops were replaced by floor prices. Counterpart funds were generously provided for rural infrastructure. Large-scale projects were initiated for water control, village roads, drainage and irrigation, rural employment, and many other aspects of rural development. But all these activities were not fully tested during the days of a united Pakistan, if only because they were interrupted by so many occasions of domestic dissension.

These are solid indications that the nascent beginnings of a "green revolution" in Bangladesh have widened the gap between the better-off and worse-off segments of the population, but a more salient feature of the rural scene is the way in which almost all productive activities have been constantly interrupted by the devastations of war and civil strife. The introduction of the new technology in agriculture was seriously retarded in the late 1960s by the build-up to the 1971 civil war, beginning with the general disenchantment (rural and urban) against the rulers of united Pakistan after their embarrassment at the hands of India in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The migration—primarily from rural areas—of 9.7 million political refugees to India in 1971, and then back again to Bangladesh in 1972, was the culmination of a series of upheavals accompanying the independence movement, which seriously affected agricultural production. The gory aftermath of the liberation war has continued through the three coups of 1975 and the numerous unsuccessful coup attempts of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Not only were crops not sown or maintained or harvested during the years of actual turmoil, the war years have left a legacy of land disputes about who has seized who's land when, or who is entitled to it now that so-and-so has returned from India or West Pakistan and so-and-so remains in India or West Pakistan, or whether such-and-such political party or government was legitimate in promulgating particular pieces of legislation or ordinances to deal with rural conflict and development. In the eyes of many rural dwellers, there has been so much disorder, so much bloodshed and so many changes (or attempted changes) of government during the past decade that it is now impossible to live a harmonious existence. Stories abound of individuals or families gaining vast amounts of wealth from abandoned land or possessions, or from the spillover of the large international relief and development presence in Bangladesh, but these are more than balanced by stories of those who have lost everything—often in the short space of a few minutes, hours or days—through the ravages of civil war and domestic turbulence of the most extreme kind.⁵

WHO ARE THE POOREST?

People are poor for different reasons. The landless in the rural areas and the unemployed squatters in the cities (most of whom are the landless from the countryside), are unquestionably the most miserable in Bangladesh, but nutritional surveys indicate that 60 to 80 per cent of the Bangladesh population is undernourished or malnourished, depending on definitions. Small holding peasants and underemployed urban unskilled labourers are poor by any standards, but they are not always poor in the sense of having nothing. Small holding peasants have at least a homestead; many day labourers in the cities come from homes in slums rather than straight off the pavement. In general, the urban unemployed tend to be a bit better off than the rural landless because food rations usually reach the poor in

the cities long before they get to the most impoverished villagers.

A large percentage of the landless in Bangladesh are from the minority Hindu community (now probably 10 per cent or so of the population), the remnants of the former ruling community of East Bengal. Detailed studies of the Hindu community are not available, but the impression of community leaders and observers is that most Hindus, while woefully poor, are still a cut above the poorest. Perhaps because they are discriminated against, they tend to band together in community solidarity. Although the bulk of the Hindus are landless, they tend to dominate in certain low-level service occupations—as barbers, washermen, fishermen, potmakers, artisans and carpenters. As a community, it is the tribal population which fits much more universally among the poorest than do the Hindus, but the tribal population accounts for less than one per cent of the population (approximately 700,000 people in 1981).

In talking to the poor, one gets the impression that their poverty is caused primarily by changes in family fortunes, flooding and the shifting of rivers. According to Muslim law, each son gets one share and each daughter a half-share of a father's wealth, so that land can become terribly divided in a generation or two. Certain categories of the unfortunate—widows, lepers, the diseased and maimed—tend to be most neglected by families and least employable. Their position in society becomes particularly appalling when a major flood or a shift in the course of a river destroys their home or community, or washes away whatever little wealth they may have accumulated. It is now estimated by the government that more than 30 per cent of the people of Bangladesh have had their homes and possessions washed away by floods at some point during the past 10 years, while, during the same period, more than 10 per cent of the population has had their lands seriously rendered less fertile by inundations of sand and silt.

Most studies of poverty in Bangladesh focus on the rural landless, with the percentages of those categorized as landless ranging up to 59 or 60 per cent of the total population if one includes those who claim ownership to less than one acre. The most authoritative recent study, by Jannuzi and Peach in 1977, indicates that 59.4 per cent of the rural population claims (ownership rights to less than 1 acre, and 83.3 per cent claim) such rights to less than 3 acres. At the same time, the most fortunate 1.16 per cent of the rural population controls just slightly more than 15 per cent of the land, and the wealthiest 16.7 per cent of the population controls exactly two-thirds of the land. (See Table II)⁶

Among villagers themselves, Thorp has found that “the possession and use of 6 acres or more seems indisputably to constitute a person as a ‘rich man,’ and potentially a ‘big man’ in rural society.”⁷ At a step below that, a person owning 3-6 acres is conceived by villagers to be “in a position to improve his situation if the combination of circumstances involved in producing a crop and marketing it are all in his favor.” Thorp also argues, quite appropriately it seems to me, that “although it is empirically justifiable to

TABLE II
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL OWNED LAND IN RURAL BANGLADESH¹

Number of Acres	Number of Households	Percent of Total	Number of Persons	Percent of Total	Area (Acres)	Percent of Total
Zero	1,767,334	14.69	8,081,266	11.59	—	—
0.01-1.00	5,375,887	44.68	27,561,648	39.54	1,733,223	8.33
1.01-2.00	1,830,170	15.21	10,821,861	15.53	2,660,128	12.78
2.01-3.00	1,045,072	8.69	6,706,826	9.62	2,556,850	12.28
3.01-4.00	621,105	5.16	4,438,188	6.37	2,141,713	10.29
4.01-5.00	370,799	3.08	2,811,716	4.03	1,651,046	7.93
5.01-6.00	253,414	2.11	2,027,653	2.91	1,375,463	6.61
6.01-7.00	173,661	1.44	1,520,481	2.18	1,123,908	5.40
7.01-8.00	110,825	0.92	963,593	1.38	827,971	3.98
8.01-9.00	94,944	0.79	835,505	1.20	803,505	3.86
9.01-10.00	66,979	0.56	581,056	0.83	636,690	3.06
10.01-11.00	60,764	0.51	568,972	0.82	634,253	3.05
11.01-12.00	38,668	0.32	378,394	0.54	444,383	2.14
12.01-13.00	36,251	0.30	358,024	0.51	451,674	2.17
13.01-14.00	25,894	0.22	276,200	0.40	350,779	1.69
14.01-15.00	19,679	0.16	215,091	0.31	285,006	1.37
Over 15.00	95,790	1.16	1,556,732	2.23	3,137,282	15.07
TOTALS ¹	12,031,272	100.00	69,703,206	100.00	20,813,879	100.00

¹Components may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source : F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach, *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside* (Bangladesh Mission, Agency for International Development, Dacca, 1979), p. 120.

categorize...farmers who possess less than 2/3 acre as functionally landless... this categorization is (not) culturally justifiable." Jannuzi and Peach, like Thorp and other analysts of rural Bengal, distinguish (see Table III) between those who own no land at all (Landless-I), those who own only a homestead plot (Landless-II), and those who claim ownership to less than a half acre (Landless-III). In Thorp's words, "To possess only a homestead plot makes a considerable difference in the perception a person has of himself and in the perceptions his neighbors have of him....Having been shown these small plots by a number of very proud possessors when I went out to the fields with them, I cannot be satisfied with categorizing them as 'landless'."

Those in the bottom 8-11 per cent of Bangladesh rural society, who have no claim to any land whatsoever, are the truly "landless" in terms of their own cultural conceptions and the perceptions of their peers. In Thorp's terms, they cannot "go out to their fields" because they have no fields. "They

TABLE III
LANDLESSNESS IN RURAL BANGLADESH

	<i>Number of Households</i>	<i>Percent of Total</i>	<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total</i>
Landless-I	1,311,570	11.07	5,884,927	8.13
Landless-II	3,385,733	32.79	18,703,472	27.10
Landless-III	1,811,276	15.29	9,538,436	13.82

Definitions :

A *Landless-I* household is a rural household that claims ownership of no land, either homestead or other land.

A *Landless-II* household is a rural household that does not claim ownership of any land other than homestead land. Such a household may claim ownership to homestead land.

A *Landless-III* household is a rural household that claims ownership to some land other than the homestead, but no more than 0.5 acres of land other than the homestead. Such a household may claim ownership to homestead land. Thus, the sum of landless-II and landless-III households equals the total number of households which claim to own 0.5 acres or less of land other than homestead land.

Source : *Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh*, by F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach (Agency for International Development, Washington: 1977), p. xxii.

do not have even the security of their own green vegetable garden or fruit bearing tree near their dwelling. Their residence... is at the pleasure of some other householder. They are the powerless in rural Bangladeshi society."

While peasants with small homesteads or with plots of less than a half-acre are undoubtedly somewhat better off than those with no land whatsoever, all three of these categories of peasants would be considered by most outsiders to be quite desperately poor. Indeed, estimates of the poor in Bangladesh range up to 80 and 90 per cent of the population, and especially if one includes the unemployed in the towns, unskilled workers, and other city slum dwellers. Urban analysts will often argue that statistics on urban poverty, which invariably show higher per capita incomes and more amenities for the urban poor than for the rural landless, are misleading. In this view, the degrading conditions of city slum living make for a less desirable "quality of life" than one finds in even the most wretched rural conditions. This factor alone provides the basis for the usual explanations of the relatively slow rate of rural-urban migration in Bangladesh, with the urban population still accounting for less than 10 per cent of the total population.

Antiquated Agrarian Structure Major Impediment to Improvement

Perhaps the most important point to be made about the poor in rural Bangladesh is not the extent of their landlessness, but rather the antiquated nature of their agrarian structure. As Jannuzi and Peach have so ably documented, the agrarian structure of Bangladesh "constitutes the major impediment to the implementation of a range of rural development programs that (might otherwise) promote economic growth within an environment of social justice."⁸ In this view, even land redistribution in Bangladesh would not be meaningful, either for increased production or redistribution of wealth, unless it were accompanied by a change in the agrarian structure. That structure is characterized by landlordism of the type that has prevailed in Bengal for the last few centuries and continues into the 1980s, despite recent attempts at change.

At the heart of Bangladesh's agrarian structure is the *malik* (landlord), whose holdings, rights and prerogatives today are nowhere nearly as great as were those of the old Hindu *zamindars* or *jotedars* of East Bengal. Nonetheless, modern *maliks* are still divorced from direct agricultural operations, and particularly those operations of low status that involve what are perceived to be dirty or menial tasks. To this extent, modern *maliks* are still absentee or non-cultivating landholders, even though several levels of subinfeudation have been abolished and landed estates severely reduced in size.

As landholders, modern *maliks* attempt to minimize the assumption of personal risk in connection with agricultural operations. They typically sublet their lands in order to limit their direct responsibility, either for providing agricultural inputs or for assuming a share of the costs of such inputs used in cultivation by others on their land. In the words of Jannuzi and Peach, "This means in practice that the lessor (sharecropper) has customarily assumed all of the risks and most, if not always all, of the costs of production. No matter how much or how little the sharecropper produces, the *maliks* are guaranteed at least fifty per cent of the product."⁹

Because of the gap between the landed and non-landed, many scholars, politicians and administrators have tried to conceive of Bangladesh in terms of socio-economic classes, or, in the case of the large number of small Marxist-left parties in Bangladesh, to promote "class solidarity" among the poor. Such attempts have run straight up against what Peter Bertocci calls "structural fragmentation" among the poor—i.e. atomized occupational structures and other factors that stifle the growth of class solidarity and consciousness by virtue of the variation in disparate interests and, therefore, the diverse group identities they engender.¹⁰ One major study indicates that, among the lowest 44 per cent of the rural population in terms of landlessness or relative landlessness, 12 per cent—almost a quarter—engage in petty trade as a primary (and 6 per cent as a secondary) source of income, while 8 per cent depend on menial occupations as their basis for subsistence and many others

work in non-agricultural food production areas (e.g. fishing, 12 per cent).¹¹ As Bertocci points out, this "suggests a multiplicity of individual links into the institutional framework of the rural economy, the nature of which has been virtually unstudied."

Even among those landless who depend primarily or secondarily on field labour as their source of income, there are important differences. Migrant labourers—who travel away from their homes in search of work on a seasonal basis—have been shown to drive down agricultural labour wages generally, in direct competition with landless labourers who are locally resident.¹² Further differences exist between landless labourers who have established or maintained traditional patron-client relationships with a *malik*, and other labourers—whether resident or migrant—who are paid strictly on a cash basis and who tend to denigrate patron-client ties.

Among those with land, there are also large numbers of fundamental differences that separate them, including family size, quality of land, efficiency of cultivation, adoption of new techniques, availability of credit and other inputs, and so forth. Jannuzi and Peach found that those farmers who owned the mean or larger amounts of land tended to rent or sharecrop it out to others, while those who owned less than the mean tended to rent or sharecrop additional land from others in order to make ends meet. Bertocci has identified a number of patterns where *maliks* with amounts of land below the mean would take in land one season and give it out the next, and he has found at least two studies which indicate that rates of indebtedness (including mortgaging of one's land) are higher for "surplus" farmers than for "subsistence" farmers.¹³

Cross-cutting all of these socio-economic divisions are a number of moral precepts and cultural models that promote interpersonal and inter-group factionalism over class conflict. One of these is implicit in the personal struggle between *takdir*, which refers to "the predestined limits and potentialities bestowed by Allah on each individual life," and *takbir*, the "obligation of each individual to realize via maximum effort the fulness of one's given potentialities."¹⁴ In discussing these two moral precepts, Bertocci identifies a "widely accepted belief that one's capacity to maximize attainment of one's (especially economic) goals is intimately linked to the degree one is successful in attaching oneself to persons who are powerful and prestigious." It is not difficult to see how such a belief promotes inter-personal and inter-group factionalism of the type so often identified with Bangladesh countryside. Bertocci also suggests that the the Bengali Muslim peasant's conception of what is "justice", the distribution of power and prestige, or, conversely, what is "exploitation" or "abuse of power," is radically divergent from the conceptions of Western (or even urban Bangladeshi) class analysts.

In talking with people in Bangladesh, it quickly becomes clear that a majority will classify itself as being among the poorest of the poor, although numerous segments of that majority will seriously question whether other segments should be so classified. This is partly because rewards and subsidies

have recently been introduced for those who can qualify for various categories of poverty, but it is also the result of genuine feelings among many people that they have been put upon in recent years, or that their life situation has positively declined relative to what it was before or what it was for their ancestors. It is also clear that there has been a great deal of mobility, both upward and downward, within Bangladeshi society recently, with millions of people losing all or most of their wealth in the succession of floods, famines, wars and civil strife that have battered this part of the world during the last four decades.¹⁵ The contrast between those who have lost and gained is especially striking because the losers have plummeted into the depths of the poorest anywhere in the world, while the gainers have been, almost invariably, poorer Muslims who have, for the first time in the history of this traditionally Hindu-dominated region, acquired considerable degrees of wealth, influence and power.

Nutritional Levels—An Ideal Tool for Identification

Perhaps the surest way of identifying the poorest segments of the population is by focusing on nutrition levels. Fortunately, in Bangladesh there have been two excellent nutrition surveys—in 1962-64 and in 1975-76—which make it possible to compare nutrition over time and in great depth.¹⁶ The results of the surveys indicate that both average dietary intake and a average calorie intake have decreased for the entire population by an average of 9 per cent each, from levels that were already unsatisfactory at the time of the first survey. The first survey indicated that 45 per cent of all rural families had calorie intakes below a recommended daily minimum of 2,120 calories. In the second survey, this percentage had ballooned to 59 per cent of rural families.

Consumption of foodgrains declined by 9 per cent between 1962 and 1975, even though massive imports of wheat maintained and enhanced consumption levels of that commodity (wheat is the only major category of food that is being consumed in greater quantities now than it was in 1962). Bangladesh is still the fourth largest producer of rice in the world, but rice production has failed to keep up with population growth, with the result that per capita consumption of rice has been steadily declining over the past two decades. Consumption of meat, potatoes, pulses and fish have also declined noticeably during the past twenty years.

The consequences of lack of proper nutrition are not difficult to see in Bangladesh. More than 80 per cent of children of ages 0-5 suffer from malnutrition (a state of ill health) or under-nutrition (meaning that they are less robust or have less vigour, strength or reserve than they would otherwise). A similar percentage of children ages 0-11 are found to be stunted (62 per cent), or wasted (4 per cent), or both stunted and wasted (12 per cent). Almost a million Bangladeshis suffer from night blindness due to vitamin A deficiency, and vitamin A deficiency is also the major cause of total blindness, which

has afflicted people in Bangladesh to a greater extent than elsewhere. Seventy per cent of the population—more than 63 million people—are anaemic; 82 per cent of the children below 5 years of age do not have the minimum acceptable level of haemoglobin in their blood; and numerous others suffer from such nutrition-deficiency related diseases as Xerosis conjunctivae, Bitot's spot, angular stomatitis, angular scars, marasmus or Kwashiorkor.

Nutritional levels and habits correlate quite positively and strikingly with income. As incomes increase, consumption of all foods other than vegetables—and especially cereals, pulses, fish and milk—increases. The fact that consumption of vegetables does not increase is an indication that vegetables are not a prestigious food item in Bangladesh, a matter that is of considerable concern to nutritionists in the country. An astounding finding from the 1975-76 nutrition survey (p. 132) is that *every member of every single family owning less than three acres of land was deficient in its intake of calories, calcium, vitamin A, riboflavin and vitamin C*. Overall, the relationships between different indices of socio-economic status with nutrients are more or less the same as their relationships with food groups.

Variations in nutritional levels are often a seasonal phenomenon, and are clearly related to food prices and availability. A major study done over a number of years at a factory town called Companyganj indicated that levels of nutritional status will routinely dip drastically in August, just before the summer rice harvest, but will then bounce back if the harvest is bountiful.¹⁷ The same study also found a correlation between the price of rice and the death rate, with the incidence of deaths rising rapidly and in quick response to increases in rice prices. A major mapping project by Bruce Currey of the East-West Center in Hawaii has identified areas "liable" and "very liable" to famine, with the major factors contributing to such liability being identified, in order of importance, as flooding, drought, population pressure, food deficit, lack of alternative employment, low crop yields, poor land transport, river erosion, cyclone risks, and maldistribution of agricultural inputs. According to Currey's analysis, the first five factors of those listed above account for over 70 per cent of the composite index of famine liability.¹⁸

Not all malnutrition or under-nutrition, of course, is related to economic status. Indeed, there is a great deal of room in Bangladesh for health education among all socio-economic segments of the population, and especially as regards the rearing of children under 5 years of age. There is a common belief throughout the country that the colostrum—the first milk—is not good for the child, a belief that could not be at greater variance with scientific findings.¹⁹ Because of this belief, parents of newborn babies will commonly withhold milk from the newborn for 24-48 hours. Even health workers will often take the colostrum and dispose it of, while recommending that the baby receive water and honey, a practice that at once exposes children to unsanitary water and deprives them of the nutritional benefits of the first milk.

A second source of under-nourishment throughout Bangladesh is the

widespread practice of providing supplementary foods only at the age of 15-18 months, at which time a baby is quickly and completely weaned. Some degree of nutrition is assured by the fact that 98 per cent of Bangladesh's mothers breast feed, but tremendous gains in nutritional levels could be made if supplemental foods (simple fruits, vegetables, carbohydrates) were introduced in tiny quantities around 4-6 months of age, progressing to a full diet by 18 months, with a delay in the weaning process until the age of 18-24 months.

A third cultural source of undernourishment is related to treatment of diarrhoea; the common practice in Bangladesh is to withhold food and liquids from sufferers of diarrhoea until stools are firm and infrequent. This practice is extremely detrimental—often resulting in death to a diarrhoeal child—because body fluids are not replaced. Parents argue that they do not want to give food and liquids because this makes stools runny and more frequent, but doctors recommend re-hydration solutions—commonly a salt, sugar and water mixture—which helps provide nutrition and absorption of needed salts. Health studies in Bangladesh reveal that the major causes of death in the first few years of life are related to neo-natal tetanus, diarrhoea, pneumonia, and measles, with all of these becoming the more serious to the extent that a child is malnourished by insufficient food and calorie intake. A series of studies surveyed by Lawrence Marum has suggested that economic factors do outweigh cultural factors in producing malnourishment and undernourishment, but Marum nevertheless concludes that attention to educational and cultural factors might well mitigate some of the harsher effects of economic hardship.²⁰

PUBLIC FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SAFEGUARDS GOVERNMENT-EMPLOYEE INTERESTS

Throughout the 1970s, Bangladesh never really had a coherent food policy. There was an expansion of the public food distribution system (PFDS), but this was not a planned expansion, nor was it a sign of anything other than a failure to make significant gains in food production. During the latter half of the 1970s, the PFDS handled almost twice as much foodgrain as during the latter half of the 1960s. At present, 13-15 per cent of all foodgrain consumed in the country pass through this system, which employs more people than any other government department. A full quarter of the population (23 million people) is served by it in one form or another, and it requires for its maintenance 1.8 million tons of foodgrains each year.²¹ In recent years, 75 per cent of the foodgrains in the system have been imported and financed by concessional aid.

The PFDS in Bangladesh was not designed to feed the poor. Its major purpose is, and has always been, to provide government workers, the police, the military, and other "priority" sectors with payment in kind, as a means of protecting them against the erosive effects on their real income of seasonal

and year-to-year fluctuations in food prices. The highest priority within the system is a category called Statutory Rationing (SR), which goes to about two-thirds of the residents of the six major cities (Dacca, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Narayanganj and Rangamati). Almost everyone residing in these cities is entitled to a ration card, but food is distributed first to certain "priority categories," in both urban and rural areas, which include members of the armed services, the police, all government employees, students, and employees of large companies. In 1980, these categories (SR, 23 per cent and priority categories 31 per cent) accounted for a total of 54 per cent of food distribution through the PFDS.²²

Aside from the six largest cities, the rest of the country is served by what is known as modified rationing (MR), and by Food-For-Work (FFW) and relief programmes. Residents in the rural areas are classified into four income categories (A,B,C,D), with those in the lowest, tax-free income category (A) usually being favoured in the administrative rules of distribution. In fact, however, MR, FFW and relief programmes are all administered at the local level, and every single study that has been done indicates that much of the grain allotted to local officials for MR, FFW and relief is sold for personal profit.²³ Local Union Council leaders will record that they have distributed a large amount of grain in MR areas when in fact they have distributed much less; they will use faulty scales and weighing methods that err dramatically in their favour; and they will pay workers for moving a small amount of earth under Food-For-Work schemes, but will report to government that much greater amounts have been moved. In addition to these, there are many other ploys that are commonly used to divert PFDS grains into the private sector.

In recent years, Food-For-Work programmes have acquired a reputation for greater honesty than some of the older relief schemes, primarily because international agencies have established elaborate procedures for measuring the amount of earth to be moved before the initiation of a canal-digging or road-building project, and then measuring the amount actually moved after the project's completion. FFW projects run by CARE are known to be particularly well-administered, with CARE officials commonly paying local project leaders fewer foodgrains than claimed because of shortfalls in amounts of earth actually moved. This manner of proceeding contrasts sharply with older relief and ration programmes in Bangladesh, which are typically viewed as little more than political patronage pure and simple.

There is an anti-corruption wing of the Food Ministry which is supposed to check instances of foodgrain diversion and misuse of ration cards, but it has thus far been ineffective. President Ziaur Rahman himself admits that there is unquestionably more corruption now than when he first came to power five years ago, but he argues that this is a "fact of life" which results from the large-scale influx of foreign food and money.²⁴ Zia and the major leaders of all other political parties in Bangladesh are convinced that the nation needs more rather than less foreign aid.

In a country where filial and fraternal solidarity are highly valued, it is often difficult to distinguish close kinship networks from corruption.²⁵ Then too, even without considering kinship, identification of corrupt acts is often elusive. There is disagreement, for example, about whether provosts in university dormitories are guilty of corruption when they buy large amounts of wheat with ration cards and then sell wheat on the open market because, they claim, students will not eat wheat products. A well-known story in Dacca involves a case filed by the anti-corruption wing against a prominent social worker who had 50 ration cards. The social worker got the case withdrawn on the argument that so many people came to see her because of her fame as a social worker—this blind man, that beggar, this well-wisher, that friend—that she needed to buy large amounts of food to entertain them. Being a social worker, she successfully argued, she could not afford that much food without ration cards.

Once grain has been diverted from the PFDS into private hands, it will often be held and sold only after scarcity conditions develop and prices rise. In this way, the public distribution system—as it operates on the ground—actually punishes the rural poor rather than helping them. Recent figures also indicate that the rationing system is increasingly being skewed against the urban poor. This is so in large part because the Government has stopped issuing ration cards to people moving into SR areas after 1974, except in cases of public employees being transferred into these areas. Since the vast majority of the migrants into the six largest cities are rural poor looking for jobs, the new regulations have effectively increased the proportion of the subsidized ration going to upper income groups.

While there has been a great deal of talk in recent years about the need for food self-sufficiency and rapid agricultural growth in Bangladesh, these priorities have not been reflected in government budgets. A December 1979 World Bank Report found that the share of agriculture and rural development in Bangladesh plans had declined from 33 per cent to 17 per cent between 1973 and 1979.²⁶ During the same period, private sector investment in agriculture was practically non-existent. The Bangladesh Government itself estimates that less than 20 per cent of total development expenditure has gone to agriculture since independence. It also estimates that the average rural resident receives 28 pounds of foodgrain per year through various forms of public distribution, including Food-For-Work, MR and relief, compared with 321 pounds per year for each ration card holder in the SR cities.

A FOOD STRATEGY FOR THE EIGHTIES

The World Bank, the Aid Bangladesh Consortium and other international donors have exerted increasing pressure on the Bangladesh Government in recent years to put more money into agriculture, and to either do away with the rationing system entirely or re-structure it in such a way that it favours the poor. These pressures have become the more intense in the early 1980s

as world food supplies have failed to keep up with demand, and as traditional concessional suppliers have found new commercial foodgrain markets. In early 1980, American diplomats in Dacca officially informed the Bangladesh Government that it could not count on American concessional food supplies in the future.

Infrastructure for New Bureaucratic Controls Created

Bangladesh has responded with the formation of a new inner-Cabinet National Committee on Food (NCF), which sits once a fortnight or so and reviews the food situation. The NCF consists of the Ministers of Food, Relief, Agriculture, Shipping, Transport, and so forth, and is chaired by President Ziaur Rahman. There has also been established a Planning and Monitoring Unit within the Planning Commission, which deals primarily with food-related issues. Both the NCF and leaders of the Planning Commission Monitoring Unit meet occasionally with an Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Food, which is headed by the Food Minister and includes a number of Members of Parliament. The Advisory Committee is supposed to represent the interests of farmers, consumers, and other concerned segments of society. Aside from these bureaucratic committees and some political parties (discussed below), the public in Bangladesh is not really represented in decision-making in the food policy area. There are no citizens' committees of any consequence that can reach to the inner councils of government.

Food Security Plan Launched

In collaboration with aid donors, the NCF formulated (in August 1980) a Food Security Plan, which outlined a number of areas where the Government and the aid donors are in substantial agreement. The Plan envisages a gradual reduction in the importance of the ration shops, movement towards an open market system in such a way as to require government intervention only at times of extreme scarcity or surplus, and provision of price supports and other incentives to agricultural producers. Publicly, President Zia has established woefully unrealistic five-year goals to abolish the rationing system entirely and double food production.

Some indication of the sincerity of the Government in its efforts to move away from rationing was indicated in May 1980, when a number of measures were promulgated to equalize ration shop prices with those prevailing in the open market. Total shares of food available to any one person in the ration shops was diminished from $3\frac{1}{2}$ shares to 3 shares, with two-thirds of the new rations being provided in wheat and only one-third in rice (previously, wheat and rice were available on a 50-50 basis; wheat is still considered to be much less desirable than rice). Prices on rationed items (which include salt, sugar, edible oils and other foods, as well as foodgrains) were significantly raised in May 1980, to the point where they then provided only a

15 per cent average subsidy when contrasted with open market prices, as opposed to a 70 per cent subsidy before May 1980.

It is important to point out that the May 1980 tightening of ration shop prices was undertaken at a time when food surpluses in independent Bangladesh were approaching an all-time high, owing largely to a coincidence of large-scale foodgrain imports and several good rice harvests during the year 1980. However, foodgrain imports are still plentiful because the government was expecting relatively poor harvests in 1980; the fact that harvests have been so bountiful (primarily because of excellent weather conditions) has left the government with an embarrassing surplus that cannot be adequately stored. In early 1981 large-scale building programmes for public food storage warehouses have been undertaken; subsidies are being provided to builders of food storage areas in the private sector; government is renting out school-buildings, private homes and numerous other structures for rice storage, and a number of proposals to export rice are being seriously considered.

Both the Bangladesh Government and the international agencies are convinced that the only hope for a viable Bangladesh economy is to increase the output of food sufficiently to generate an export surplus and establish a grain reserve within Bangladesh. As Faaland and Parkinson have pointed out, if Bangladesh were routinely exporting food, "a bad crop could be accommodated by reducing exports and the problem moved to other people who ought to be able to buy elsewhere."²⁷ A reserve of 1-2 million tons of grain would enable the country's leaders to provide their own emergency relief in times of scarcity, would allow them to better control prices and otherwise counter the moves of private hoarders and speculators and would offer some hope of insulating food prices in Bangladesh from the vagaries of the international market.

In pursuance of an "export and grain reserve" strategy, Ziaur Rahman's Government has, for the first time in independent Bangladesh, increased the procurement price of foodgrains to the point where it now constitutes an attractive support price, and the Food Ministry is furiously trying to procure as much grain as possible for government warehouses. The government can presently store about one million tons of grain at a maximum, but the quality of that storage space is highly variable, with perhaps as much as half of it being either temporary or downright inadequate. A crash programme is being funded by international donors (led by the Japanese) to provide additional storage for about 200,000 tons of grain by summer 1981, and plans are being made for open-storage—on platforms, covered with plastic and tarps—at eight or nine old World War II airports. Food Ministry officials estimate that they might obtain as much as 300,000 tons of storage capacity from new open-storage plus rental of school buildings and other structures.

On the export front, the Bangladesh Government is negotiating with India to repay a previous loan of 150,000 tons of rice in kind, and is also seriously considering three other export possibilities. One is to export rice

and import wheat at cheaper prices. A second is to produce some very high grade aromatic rice which the Gulf and Middle East nations are currently purchasing at \$500 per ton, with the idea of exporting these in return for imports of ordinary rice at \$200 per ton in bad years. The third possibility is to export low-grade rice, of which Bangladesh has a great deal, primarily to African countries like Senegal, which prefer the low-grades (Senegal, for example, prefers 80 per cent "brokens" when it buys on international markets whereas in the US consumable rice is usually 20 per cent "brokens").

Problems of an "Export and Grain Reserve" Strategy

The difficulty with the export market, of course, is that it is a terribly complex business, and one in which Bangladesh has no experience. Saleable rice for international markets has to be maintained at certain standards of moisture content, shipped free from foreign material, exported on schedule, and guarded against pilferage and damage at both ends of a transaction. If rice were exported from Bangladesh today, it would have to go through the big international grain companies, on foreign ships. Even then, it would take at least a few years for the government to re-structure its production and marketing habits, its transportation networks, banks and port facilities before it was geared up to any kind of significant amounts of exportable grains.

There are many other pitfalls in the path of an "export and grain reserve" strategy. It is entirely dependent on a high support price to producers and large-scale procurement by the government, but both of these are terribly expensive for the government to maintain over a prolonged period. During the coming year, for example, there is a real question whether the Bangladesh Government will have enough currency—and especially in the right places at the right times—to buy the large amounts of grain it intends to purchase. If the Government falls short of its procurement targets, or fails to maintain high prices to producers, consumer prices will invariably fall below ration shop prices, ration offtakes will dry up completely, and the government will be left with enormous stocks rotting in warehouses. This would throw the market completely out of control and permanently damage the credibility of Zia's Government in future foodgrain transactions.

Many of Bangladesh's food strategy problems result from its lack of insularity from the economies of India and the rest of the world. If Bangladesh were to develop an exportable food surplus and a grain reserve, for example, it would inevitably be tempting for government officials and the private trade to smuggle some of that surplus into food-deficit areas in India at times of scarcity, along time-tested food smuggling routes of the past. There are even greater problems associated with the attempts to get agricultural inputs to Bangladesh farmers, as was demonstrated in 1980, when a major Bangladesh Government effort to provide a significant fertilizer subsidy to Bangladesh farmers had to be abandoned because

much of the subsidized fertilizer was finding its way into black markets across the border with India.

To the extent that the government does successfully maintain high support prices, procures at unprecedented rates, creates an export surplus, and accumulates a domestic grain reserve, it will most likely favour larger and medium-sized farmers at the expense of the landless poor.²⁸ Government spokesmen argue that this is not necessarily the case because more than 80 per cent of the rural population is involved in production of grains and even small farmers are forced to sell rice when the bulk of the paddy comes in during the Aman harvest (December-January). Without adequate storage, and heavily in debt for his agricultural inputs, the small farmer customarily sells much of his crop for much-needed cash immediately after the Aman harvest, and then is forced to buy rice during the "hunger months" preceding the next Aman. If government could enter the market with high support prices immediately after the Aman comes in and then sell it cheaply just before the next Aman, the argument goes, it could undoubtedly benefit the small farmer. Landless or predominantly landless labour would be benefited, government spokesmen say, by a general increase in production and by greater use of high-yielding varieties, which require more labour than the older varieties for productivity.

What makes arguments like those above questionable in the aggregate is the mounting pace of unemployment in the Bangladesh countryside as a consequence of unprecedented population growth and burgeoning age cadres among teenagers. According to the most reliable estimates, an increase in agricultural production to 20 million tons of foodgrains in five years would produce 1 million new jobs in the agricultural sector, but there would still be a net increase of unemployed or under-employed in the rural areas of an additional 3 million people during this five-year period. Under these circumstances, most experts anticipate that increases in agricultural production will benefit those with land, that more and more of the smaller landed will become employees of the larger landed, wages will remain low, major returns will go to inputs, and the position of the poorest rural dwellers will continue to recede. This is all the more likely to happen if the Ziaur Rahman Government enthusiastically pursues plans to promote a "privatization" of agriculture, permitting the big producers to purchase inputs off the shelf and to otherwise act without the restraints of previous bureaucratic controls.

A number of individuals and organizations in Bangladesh have been working with Secretary of Agriculture Obaidullah Khan to initiate experiments that would provide non-land assets to the landless, organized into service co-operatives that could enable their members to earn a decent standard of living.²⁹ Prototypes of such co-operatives have already been organized by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Proshika (a Canadian-funded voluntary association), around tubewell pumps, with co-operatives of the landless operating the pumps and supplying irrigation water (for a fee) to the landed. One expert, who prefers not to

be identified, envisages the possibility of 20-30 landless pump co-operatives of this type eventually forming a "union" or "federation," which might in turn generate an agro-business, or be used for political purposes and self-protection. Acknowledging the enormous problems involved in sustaining such groups, he suggests that co-operatives built around non-land assets is a "vision" that provides one of the few real possibilities for absorbing the massive waves of rural unemployment that can be expected in Bangladesh over the next few decades.

President Ziaur Rahman's solution to the rural unemployment problem has been a series of massive public works projects—building roads and embankments, digging canals, or re-excavating old silted up rivers—in an effort to put people to work in productive activities without enormous government investments. Zia himself travels out to the rural areas (usually by helicopter) at least 15 days a month; the purpose of most of his visits being the inauguration of a canal-digging project or some other public works effort. In the northern parts of the country, most of these voluntary activities are designed to provide irrigation water, either by digging canals directly to fields or by excavating canals that can be used to store water for low-lift pumps. In the southern regions—and especially in the districts of Noakhali and Purnea—Zia's public works programmes have consisted primarily of what is known as *polderization*, a Dutch term for reclamation of low-lying lands by the building of embankments and other flood control measures.

What Zia is clearly trying to do is to provide from above the necessary authority and legitimacy structures to generate enough labour for completion of large public works that have been neglected for several decades. The major impact of his large-scale voluntary projects, however, is not to provide paid employment to the poor, since there are no wages involved in these schemes. The immediate beneficiaries of Zia's voluntary canal-digging schemes are the landed, who now get water or flood protection that was not previously available. In some cases the landed will voluntarily provide some food or cash to voluntary labourers involved in these schemes, but in most instances gains for the poor are expected to come solely from the increased agricultural activity that becomes possible once a canal is re-excavated or an embankment built. A reflection of the widespread cynicism about voluntary schemes (which should be distinguished from Food-For-Work and other public works projects where labourers are paid) was a comment by one day labourer in Mymensingh :

The people who have always dug these canals are the same—they are my ancestors. It is a question of how the others are going to convince us to do the work. My grandfather used to get rice and comfort from the *zamindar*. I get only a few taka per day during the harvesting season. This is not enough to buy food for my family. Now the government is asking me to volunteer my labour. But how are we supposed to work all day when we have no food?

FOOD POLICY AND THE OPPOSITION

Marxist Leftist Parties Disagree Over Role of the Poor

The only political parties in Bangladesh that have done any extensive work among the poorest of the poor, or have tried to mobilize them behind a fairly thorough re-structuring of society, have been a few relatively minor Marxist-Left parties, the most notable among them being the Jatiya Samaj-tantrik Dal (JSD). But these parties, like all political parties in Bangladesh, are funded by businessmen and led by the educated urban middle class.³⁰ The JSD was perhaps the most prominent party that contained a hard core of dedicated students who frequently went out to rural areas to mobilize the poorest segments of the population, but in late 1980, the party became hopelessly divided on ideological lines, with both factions becoming seriously demoralized about the possibilities of rural change. Neither faction—nor any other significant Marxist or Communist party in Bangladesh today—believes that the poorest 30 or 40 per cent of the population can lead a future revolution, although they disagree about the extent to which the poorest segments might at some stage be brought in behind other leadership as a revolutionary force.

Bangladesh National Party Concentrates on the Creation of New Rural Institutions

President Ziaur Rahman is reported to have proposed a substantive agrarian reform when he first came to power in 1975, in the hope that he might be able to build a mass rural base, but this idea was opposed by his key political advisors at the time. Zia's own Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is made up, almost exclusively, of people from middle and upper-class backgrounds, with ex-military officers and ex-bureaucrats assuming major roles in leadership positions. Since the consolidation of his rule a few years ago, Zia and the BNP have concentrated on the creation of new rural institutions—clustered around Gram Sarkars (village councils) and a Village Defence Force—all designed to attract village influentials to the development programmes of the BNP while enhancing party and administrative control and influence in the rural areas.³¹

Poor Disenchanted With Awami League Policies

The Awami League—by far the largest opposition party—is also led by middle and upper-class politicians. It still maintains considerable support among Hindus, some of whom tend to be among the poorest, but otherwise its rural support is mobilized by its own village elites, who are opposed to the BNP's rural elites on the basis of personalistic differences and group factional positions. Rounaq Jahan has pointed out that support from the

poor for the Awami League has steadily declined since the liberation war, for a variety of reasons. She explains :

The independence of Bangladesh brought with it great expectation, which later turned into great frustration. The galloping inflation of the early 1970s meant economic hardship for the poor. The high incidence of crime which followed in the aftermath of independence also meant suffering for the poor. As a result, the masses were no longer as enthusiastic about political struggle as they were before independence, when they believed that a political change would necessarily bring about the betterment of their socio-economic conditions. Ziaur Rahman's survival in power, in part, reflects this changed mood of the masses, who are now more cautious about bringing in political change.³²

Other Opposition Groups Fail to Win Over the Poor

Other opposition parties have been no more successful in organizing the poor than have the BNP and the Awami League. The Democratic League of former President Khondkar Mushtaque Ahmed is extremely critical of the Government on the corruption issue, but its own programme for rural development and food policy is essentially the same as the one now being pursued by the Government, with perhaps a slightly greater emphasis on privatization. Ironically enough, while Mushtaque Ahmed is highly critical of Zia's regime because of its corruption, Mushtaque's own party has suffered organizationally because Mushtaque himself was in prison for four years, having been convicted on charges of corruption. The other major non-communist party—the Jamaat-i-Islami—is, by the admission of its own leadership, primarily an urban party that appeals to the religiously-minded educated classes. This is so, say its leaders, because “the educated are better trained and equipped than the poor to understand Islam.”

Do the nation's political leaders perceive of hunger and malnutrition among the poorest as a critical political issue or a high priority political issue? The answer to that question is clearly no, although there is every fear that, if the middle-class or upper-class is not properly catered to, there will be unrest.³³ Some elite Bangladeshis, as well as many people in the international development agencies, have felt very intensely the normal dilemmas that stem from their enclave existence in the midst of massive hunger and poverty. There are a number of imaginative pilot projects that have attacked the poverty issue head-on in a particular village or group of villages. And yet, these projects are the exceptions, the aberrations, which do not fit with the main thrust of what the Bangladesh Government is up to nor with the priority goals of the financial Powers that back the international development establishment. As one of Zia's close associates put it, “You do hear about poverty questions from a lot of well-intentioned people in the middle ranks, but anyone involved in the power structure of Bangladesh is interested in other questions—

like how Zia will fall, whether there is disaffection in the army, who is getting promoted, who is getting contracts, and these kinds of things."

CONCLUSIONS

In Bangladesh, it is difficult to identify the poorest of the poor. Somewhere between 80 and 90 per cent of the population is poor by anyone's standards, and most people within the country tend to perceive of themselves and their own socio-economic categories as being among the most severely disadvantaged. Those with homestead plots in the rural areas tend to be better off than the completely landless, and perhaps even better off than the urban poorest, who live in more degrading physical conditions. For all of these segments of the population, however, nutritional levels have been steadily declining.

Subsidized food rations have not been intended for the poorest, except in times of acute scarcity when international relief agencies and some domestic programmes have successfully strived to prevent famine of the magnitude of 1943. Nevertheless, high population growth rates have combined with economic failure and almost constant civil strife to produce a precipitous decline in the purchasing power of the poorest. Since neither agricultural nor rural industrial growth have kept pace with the population spiral, both landlessness and unemployment have rapidly increased. Rural-urban migration has not escalated any more quickly than in other parts of South Asia, but it is growing. More important than rural-urban migration has been the constant influx of Hindus and other low status groups to India, an exodus that has been a growing irritant in Indo-Bangladesh relations.

There is a great deal of rhetoric about poverty whenever Bangladesh is discussed, and most government programmes are publicly justified by referring to their poverty-relieving potential. The major concern of government leaders, however, is clearly with political stability, which depends primarily on the support of the bureaucracy, the army, the police, and a number of key middle-class groups. The leadership of Bangladesh would like to do something about bottom-end poverty, if only because it is so degrading to the international image of the country and so demoralizing domestically. But when it comes to actual development programmes, there is usually not enough of a surplus to satisfy the pent-up demands of the upper tenth of the Bangladesh population—which is not outrageously wealthy by any outside standards—much less to tackle the food problems of the 80 or 90 per cent of the population that is under nourished or malnourished.

Agricultural production has not kept pace with population growth. Technology in the rural sector is still in the bullock and wooden plow stage, being dependent in most areas of the country on traditional seeds and other inputs. Where the new seeds and new technology have been introduced, they have unquestionably benefited the larger landowners, thereby contributing to the widening gap between rich and poor. In a country where a farmer with

unequivocal rights to 6 acres is considered well-off, the problem of equity is not one that revolves around large commercial holdings and big estates. Poverty is still associated with an agrarian structure that encourages land-holding by *maliks* who do not themselves engage in cultivation, but the poorest of the non-*maliks* and *maliks* alike are most consistently identified by their inability to master water resources.

Governments have been somewhat helpless in dealing with the pauperization of the Bangladesh countryside because they have not been able to muster enough authority to maintain the large public works—embankments, canals, roads, and so forth—essential to a productive agriculture in this largest deltaic area of the world. The present Government of Ziaur Rahman is the most effective that Bangladesh has had, but it is still struggling with longstanding food problems. Excellent weather in 1980-81 produced a bumper harvest which, when coupled with bountiful foodgrain imports, created an embarrassing surplus of food for the first time since independence. The Bangladesh Government and international donors are busily constructing new warehouses and storage areas in an attempt to build a foodgrain reserve that could be used by the Food Ministry in its future attempts to gain clout against grain hoarders and speculators. A number of schemes for exporting rice are also being considered.

The Bangladesh Government is well aware that surplus world food stocks are dwindling. A new "export and grain reserve" food strategy is a response to this phenomenon. The goals of the Government's new food policy are to increase agricultural production by maintaining high price support levels to farmers, all the while using government procurement to initiate rice exports and a grain reserve. Ziaur Rahman's declared intention is to do away with the rationing system entirely, and to double food production in five years, but even his own Food Ministry officials and party leaders remain unconvinced of these possibilities.

Movement towards an open market system and privatization of the foodgrain trade is something that governments in Bangladesh have done whenever there has been a food surplus. Governments can politically afford to go to open market systems when the price of food comes down so low that it approaches the price in ration shops. The question of whether the government is serious or not about going to an open market system while maintaining high support prices to farmers will come when foodstocks dip and the price of foodgrains rise. At that point, a dilemma has always presented itself. If the Government is unable to maintain large amounts of food in its own warehouses, or is unable to procure by maintaining high support prices, then stocks would diminish, prices rise and the government would have to go back to its old rationing system in order to satisfy urban elites, the military and the police. If, on the other hand, the Government does succeed in maintaining a surplus, keeping procurement prices high, and satisfying rural producers, the benefits of government policies go, almost exclusively, to the better-off in the countryside.


One way to escape from the above dilemma would be by revolution, which might produce collectivization or some other drastic change in the agrarian structure, but all of the available evidence indicates that the poor in the rural areas are either unwilling or unable to support revolutionary political activities. Those political party leaders who did attempt to espouse the interests of the poorest, landless sections of Bangladesh's villages in the 1960s and 1970s are now disillusioned, their parties fragmented. There are no political organizations that effectively represent the interests of the poorest segments of the population, nor is there a single significant political organization that is led by individuals who have come from the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Individual mobility, both upward and downward, has been fairly common in modern Bangladesh, but support for revolutionary activities that would overturn newly-formed elite structures has been ineffectual.

Perhaps the most difficult aspects of Bangladesh's food problems stem from the inability of national leaders to insulate the nation's economy from international forces. Bangladesh's vulnerability to Indian economic activity—including smuggling of foodgrains, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs across a sieve-like border—makes it almost impossible to control many of the key variables involved in Bangladesh's domestic food strategy of food policy. The availability and terms of international food shipments to Bangladesh are dependent primarily on political considerations within the United States and other Western nations, such as the extent of food surpluses and foreign policy orientations towards the Soviet Union, China and South Asia.

Unfortunately, the vast bulk of the poor in Bangladesh have been trapped in a terrible bind. They are themselves so powerless and unorganized that they are unable to counter the oppression of the newly-formed elites within the country. They are also unable to take advantage of whatever international moral sentiment might exist for their position because access to their problem is controlled by their own domestic elites and by an international development establishment that is not primarily concerned with the alleviation of bottom-end poverty. Under these circumstances, perhaps the most that one can hope for is the extension of some individual programmes for the poorest segments, which have either provided small avenues of mobility or have relieved the conditions of poverty in a local context. Talk of eradicating poverty in Bangladesh is the irresponsible rhetoric of millenarianism. Mankind will be lucky enough if the awful trends of the past three decades can merely be reversed in the next few years.

April, 1981.

AREAS LIABLE TO FAMINE IN BANGLADESH



Source and Explanation of Map : Bruce Currey *et al.*, *Mapping of Areas Liable to Famine in Bangladesh* (1978).

The research project which resulted in this map was carried out by a team of researchers from the John Hopkins University Center for Medical Research for the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of Bangladesh, with support from the United States Agency for International Development (AID). The map is reproduced here with the permission of Professor Currey, the principal investigator for the project, and of AID.

Professor Currey cautions users of the map that it "only shows areas with a structural proclivity to famine." It does not say, for example, that the white areas will never suffer from famine, nor does it preclude the possibility that some areas may become more famine-prone because of changes (such as population shifts or activities of war). The principal factors contributing to *structural* liability to famine in Bangladesh were defined by the John Hopkins team as follows (in order of importance) : flooding, drought, population pressure, food deficit, lack of alternative employment, low crop yields, poor land transport, river erosion, cyclone risk, and maldistribution of agricultural inputs. Taken together, the first five of these factors account for over 70 per cent of the composite index of famine liability.

NOTES

- 1 Akhter Hameed Khan, "A History of the Food Problem," Unpublished Paper presented at the 16th Conference of the Pakistan Economic Association, Islamabad University, 18-20 February 1973. All references to Dr. Khan's writings are taken from this paper.
- 2 Two excellent studies are: Donald F. McHenry and Kai Bird, "Food Bungle in Bangladesh," *Foreign Policy*, (New York), 27, Summer 1977, pp. 72-88; and F. James Levinson, "The Role of Subsidized Consumption in Reduced Population Growth: The Case of Sri Lanka, Kerala and Bangladesh," Paper presented at the Conference on Nutrition Needs, Laxenbur, Austria, May 1978.
- 3 The best recent study is W. Brian Arthur and Geoffrey McNicoll, "An Analytical Survey of Population and Development in Bangladesh," *Population and Development Review* (New York), IV:1, March 1978, pp. 23-79.
- 4 See A. Alim, *Land Reforms in Bangladesh: Social Changes, Agricultural Development and Eradication of Poverty* (Dacca, 1979).
- 5 An excellent study that brings this out is Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1975), Fourth Edition, see especially pp. 200 ff.
- 6 Jannuzi and Peach have published two volumes of findings: 1. *Report on the Hierarchy of Interests in Land in Bangladesh*, by F. Tomasson Jannuzi and James T. Peach USAID (Dacca, 1977) and 2. *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside* USAID (Dacca, 1979).
- 7 John P. Thorp, "Socio-Economic Factors and Muslim Cultural Conceptions about Land Ownership in Rural Bangladesh," Unpublished paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies meetings, March 21-23, 1980, Washington, D.C. All quotations used here and in the following paragraphs are from this paper. See also John P. Thorp, "Masters of Earth: Conceptions of 'Power' Among Muslims of Rural Bangladesh," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978.
- 8 *Bangladesh: A Profile of the Countryside*, n.6, p. 85. See also A.K. Nazmul Karim, *Changing Society in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1976), Third Edition.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- 10 Peter Bertocci, "Structural Fragmentation and Peasant Classes in Bangladesh," *Journal of Social Studies* (Dacca), V, October 1979, p. 46. All quotations from Bertocci, plus the general line of the argument, are from this article.
- 11 Abu Andullah, Mosharaf Hossain and Richard Nations, "Agrarian Structure and the IRDP—Preliminary Consideration," *Bangladesh Development Studies*, (Dacca), IC:2, 1976, p. 214, as quoted in Bertocci.
- 12 Edward Clay, "Institutional Change and Agricultural Wages in Bangladesh," *Bangladesh Development Studies*, IV:4, 1976, pp. 423-440.
- 13 These are by Ali Akhtar Khan, *Rural Credit in Gazipur Village* (Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Comila, 1964) and Kirsten Westergaard, "Mode of Production in Bangladesh," *Journal of Social Studies*, (Dacca), II, 1978, pp. 1-26.
- 14 The terms are Bertocci's, n. 10, See pp. 52 ff.
- 15 For example, see two recent village studies: 1. Anwarullah Chowdhury, *A Bangladesh Village: A Study of Social Stratification* (Dacca 1978), especially pp. 141 ff.; and 2. Jenneke Arens and Jos Van Beurden, *Jhagrapur: Poor Peasants and Women in a Village in Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1980), especially pp. 190 ff.
- 16 See *Nutrition Survey of East Pakistan, March 1962—January 1964*, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, (Washington, 1966) and *Nutrition Survey of Rural Bangladesh, 1975-76*. Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, Dacca University, (Dacca, December 1977). All figures in this section, unless otherwise noted, are from these two reports.

- 17 *Death Rate, Land and the Price of Rice, 1975-1978*, Evaluation Unit Report No. 04, Companyganj Health Project, Noakhali, by Colin W. McCord, Shafiq A. Chowdhury, Abdul Hai Khan and Ali Ashraf (Dacca, March 1980).
- 18 Bruce Currey *et. al.*, *Mapping of Areas Liable to Famine in Bangladesh* (Final Report, Preliminary Version), USAID, Washington, September, 1978.
- 19 Merlyn Vermury, *Beliefs and Practices Affecting Food Habits in Rural Bangladesh*, (New York, April 1980).
- 20 I am especially indebted to Dr. Marum, an M.D. working for CARE in Bangladesh, for information on which this nutrition section is based. Much of the material is culled from an interview with Dr. Marum in December 1980 in Dacca.
- 21 Statistics are from the Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, and from an interview with its Director, Dr. A.K.M. Ghulam Rabbani. An excellent summary description of the PFDS appears in Rehman Sobhan, "Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh," in *Bangladesh Politics*, (Ed.) Emajuddin Ahmad (Dacca, 1980), pp. 158-187.
- 22 Stated in interviews with Food Ministry officials, Dacca, December 1980. See also an unpublished paper entitled "Food Policy", Ministry of Food, 27 November, 1980.
- 23 An excellent study and bibliography of food and other rural issues is B.K. Jahangir, *Differentiation, Polarisation and Confrontation in Rural Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979).
- 24 For an expanded version of Ziaur Rahman's views of the food issue see my "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* (2-part series), forthcoming 1981. The quotations are from Part I of these reports.
- 25 An extremely well-researched book is K.M. Ashrafuz Aziz, *Kinship in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979). See also Mohammad Afsaruddin, *Rural Life in Bangladesh: A Study of Five Selected Villages* (Dacca, 1979), Second Edition. Unfortunately, neither of these books is very sensitive to political issues and processes.
- 26 This Report, *Bangladesh: Food Policy Issues*, was published for restricted distribution only in December 1979. Nevertheless, its contents have been widely reported in the Bangladesh Press and has been fairly widely circulated in Dacca.
- 27 Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, *Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development* (Boulder, Colorado, 1976), p. 53.
- 28 The reasons are explored in Mohiuddin Alamgir, *Bangladesh: A Case of Below Poverty Level Equilibrium Trap* (Dacca, 1978). See also Noazesh Ahmed, *Development Agriculture of Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1976).
- 29 Some of the background thinking to this work appears in Geoffrey D. Wood, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: Whose Framework?" *Journal of Social Studies* (Dacca), No. VIII, April 1980, pp. 1-31 and, Geoffrey D. Wood, "The Rural Poor in Bangladesh: A New Framework?" *Journal of Social Studies*, No. X, October 1980, pp. 22-46.
- 30 The social backgrounds of political party leadership in Bangladesh are traced out in several essays in Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1981). For a Marxist perspective see Badruddin Umar, *Imperialism and General Crisis of the Bourgeoisie in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979).
- 31 For an analysis of attempts at institution-building in the country-side before Ziaur Rahman, see Harry W. Blair, *The Elusiveness of Equity: Institutional Approaches to Rural Development in Bangladesh* (Ithaca, 1974). For more recent studies see Mohammad Mohiuddin Abdullah, *Rural Development in Bangladesh* (Dacca, 1979) and M. Nurul Haq, *Village Development in Bangladesh*. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, (Comilla, 1978) Ziaur Rahman's attempts at institution-building are analyzed in my 1981 *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* entitled "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," n. 24.
- 32 Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues* (Dacca, 1980), p. 217.
- 33 For a detailed analysis of Bangladesh politics see my two part 1981 *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports* entitled "Bangladeshi Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency," n. 24.

THE SEPARATIST EELAM MOVEMENT IN SRI LANKA : AN OVERVIEW

By S.V. KODIKARA*

DISSIDENT Tamil politics in Sri Lanka over the past two and a half decades has sought systematic change in the prevailing political structure as a way out of the continuing impasse in Sinhala-Tamil relations and as the only remedy against alleged ethnic discrimination by Sinhala-dominated governments against the Tamil population of Sri Lanka. The Tamil population of Sri Lanka is divisible into two categories : the Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Tamils, numbering 1,416,000 (11.1 per cent of total population) in the 1971 Census, who are indigenous, of South Indian origin and who have a long history of settlement in the island; and the more recent immigrants, the Indian Tamils, numbering, 1,195,000 (9.4 per cent of total population), who also emigrated from South India in and after the 19th century, mainly as workers in British-owned tea and rubber plantations. Areas of Sinhala settlement divide the main Sri Lanka Tamil Northern and Eastern Provinces from the Central Province, which is inhabited by Indian Tamils and Sinhalese. Since the mid-fifties, Sri Lanka Tamil leaders have sought the right to speak on behalf of all Tamil-speaking people in the island, including the Tamil-speaking Muslims, numbering about 850,000 (6.5 per cent of total population), but neither the Indian Tamils nor the Muslims have supported the demand for a separate state.¹

SEPARATIST DEMAND IN TIME FRAME : BACKGROUND TO THE MOVEMENT

The demand for a separate state for Tamils was first formally proclaimed by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in October 1976, and purported to represent the views of its constituent units : the Federal Party (the main political party of the Tamils up to that time), the Tamil Congress, the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), representing the Indian Tamils, and a small but influential group led by C. Suntheralingam, former Minister and MP, who in fact fathered the idea of a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The Indian Tamil leader, S. Thondaman's adhesion to the TULF was largely motivated by his political opposition to the then Bandaranaike Government, and not out of any convictions in regard to the separatist ideology, which in fact he promptly disclaimed. The demise of two Sri Lanka Tamil leaders of the troika presidency of the TULF left him in the invidious position of sole President of the Party for sometime, until he left to join J.R. Jayewardene's government as a Cabinet Minister after the 1977 elections.

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Federal Party Opposes Citizenship Laws, Tamil Repatriation and Sinhala Peasant Colonization

The Federal Party, founded by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1949, was originally concerned with four basic issues which were held to be vital to Tamil interests:

1. Establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic states as a federating unit or units enjoying wide autonomous and residuary powers within a federal state in Sri Lanka;
2. Restoration of the Tamil language to its "rightful place" enjoying absolute parity of status with Sinhala as an official language of Sri Lanka;
3. Conferment of full civic rights to all Tamil-speaking people (i.e., to all persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka) and
4. Cessation of colonisation of traditionally Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese people.

In point of time, it was opposition to Sri Lanka's definition of its citizenship laws in 1948-49 which brought the Federal Party into being. These laws distinguished between citizenship *by descent*, based on a two generation connection with Sri Lanka, which required no proof in respect of inhabitants considered to be indisputably indigenous (Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, Burghers), and citizenship *by registration*, based on tests of domicile, which required documentary proof of past residence and present means. The Sri Lanka Government's citizenship policy was avowedly based on the assumption that not all persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka were qualified for Sri Lanka citizenship as being permanently settled in the island, and that those not admitted to such citizenship had to be repatriated to India. On this issue, the Federal Party and the CWC were at one; indeed, the Federal Party attitude to the citizenship question was even more militant than that of the CWC, which was the accredited party representing Indian Tamil interests. For whereas the CWC later implicitly acknowledged the Sri Lanka Government's assumption and supported the Indo-Lanka Citizenship Agreement of October 1964, which provided for the repatriation of more than half a million persons of recent Indian origin to India in return for the grant of Sri Lanka citizenship to 300,000 such persons, the Federal Party consistently rejected repatriation as a solution of this question, and vehemently opposed the 1964 agreement.² For the Federal Party, the numbers game was the crux of the matter; reduction of the number of Tamil-speaking people entailed diminution of its own political position as advocate of all Tamil-speaking people in the island. The CWC itself had little interest in the Federal Party demands for linguistic parity, cessation of colonisation, or the establishment of a federal state.

The numbers game became relevant for Sinhala-Tamil relations in another context. Since the 1930s, agrarian policy in Sri Lanka had been directed towards extending irrigated areas under rice cultivation in North-Central and Eastern Provinces, and establishment of peasant colonisation schemes in these areas. These areas had been the centre of the ancient rice-growing culture, but they had been also the centre of ancient Sinhala-Tamil political rivalries, where wars between the Sinhalese and invading South Indian armies had been fought. The Federal Party position was that allocation of land in the traditional Tamil homelands (Eastern Province and parts of North-Central Province) should be reserved exclusively for Tamils, and regarded establishment of Sinhala peasant colonisation schemes such as that at Gal Oya, in Eastern Province, an attempt to challenge Tamil political predominance in their own homelands. For successive Sri Lanka governments the question at issue was essentially the question of landlessness, and landlessness was seen as being even more acute among Sinhala peasants than among the Tamil. The Sri Lanka Governments could not accept the concept of traditional Tamil homelands. Yet the border areas remain politically sensitive, and in the North-Central and Eastern Provinces, these areas witnessed some of the bitterest conflicts of the 1956 and 1958 communal riots.

Imposition of Sinhala Seen as Instrument of Ethnic Discrimination

1956, the year when Sinhala replaced English as the official language of Sri Lanka, provides another time-frame of reference in Sinhala-Tamil relations.

A highly politicised electorate returned S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike at the head of a triumphant coalition dedicated to a Sinhala-Buddhist philosophy at the 1956 elections; the Federal Party, too, came to Parliament with its representation greatly increased, in fact as the sole recognized representative of Tamil opinion in the north, and with its sense of mission as the saviour of Tamil interests greatly enhanced. Autonomous systems of communication in Sinhala and Tamil areas widened barriers caused by the Sinhala-only legislation and anti-Sinhala agitation by Tamils. From 1956 to 1965, no Tamil minister or deputy minister served in successive governments under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, W. Dahanayake, Dudley Senanayake and Mrs. Bandaranaike. Language was seen as the instrument of ethnic discrimination by the Tamils; language was seen as the instrument of class oppression by the Sinhalese.

For the Sinhalese, replacement of English by Sinhala heralded a challenge to the socio-political dominance of the English-educated elite in Sri Lanka and opened the doors of the administrative system to Sinhala-educated talents. The fact that Tamil public servants would now be required to pass a basic proficiency test in Sinhala was seen as a reasonable condition of their continuance in service. Sinhalese nationalists had often pointed to

the disproportionate number of Tamils in public service under the old dispensation, but Sinhala-only was not inspired by an anti-Tamil purpose, only by the necessity to administer the country in the language of the majority of its inhabitants.

Bandaranaike's original intention of writing into the Sinhala-only Act certain statutory safeguards pertaining to the reasonable use of Tamil was abandoned under pressure from nationalist Sinhalese interests. In 1958, however, he enacted the Act which legalized the reasonable use of Tamil for prescribed purposes. These included the right of Tamil pupils to be instructed in the Tamil language at all levels of education; the right of those educated in the Tamil language to take public service examinations in that language, provided that they had a sufficient knowledge of the official language of Sri Lanka, or that such knowledge was acquired within a specified time after admission into service; the right of any Tamil to correspond with any government official in Tamil, or of any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to do the same with any official in his official capacity and the right for Tamil to be used in these provinces for prescribed administrative purposes without prejudice to the use of the official language in respect of these prescribed purposes.

These provisions marked a significant acknowledgment of the Federal Party position short of granting Tamil absolute parity of status as an official language of Sri Lanka. However, it was necessary that Regulations were passed for the 1958 Act to become effective, but these were not gazetted until January 1966.

1966 Tamil Language Regulations Modify the Sinhala-only Principle

The Language Regulations of 1966 declared that, without prejudice to the Sinhala-only Act, the Tamil language shall also be used :

1. In the Northern and Eastern Provinces for the transaction of all government and public business and the maintenance of public records, whether such business is conducted in or by a department or institution of the government, a public corporation, or a statutory institution; and
2. For all correspondence between persons, other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of the Tamil language and any official in his official capacity, or between any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces which conducts its business in the Tamil language and any official in his official capacity.

The Regulations also provided that all ordinances and Acts, and all orders, proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law, the Government Gazette and all other official

publications, circulars and forms issued by the Government, public corporations or statutory institutions, shall be translated and published in the Tamil language also.

The 1966 Language Regulations undoubtedly entailed significant modifications of the Sinhala-only principle. It made it mandatory for a government official, who received a communication from a member of the public in Tamil in any part of the country to reply in Tamil. The 1958 Act had only stated that correspondence between persons, other than officials in their official capacity, educated through the medium of Tamil, and any official in his official capacity, may, as prescribed, be in Tamil. Similarly, any local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces could conduct its business in Tamil, and if their correspondence with government officials anywhere in the country was in Tamil, the reply also had to be in Tamil.

Here too, the change was from the "may", as prescribed in the 1958 Act, to the mandatory "shall" in the regulations. As regards the use of Tamil in all official publications, Acts, orders, circulars, etc., there was nothing new in principle; this provision merely gave legal sanction to an existing practice. But the provision which stated that Tamil shall also be used for the conduct of public business and the maintenance of public records in the Northern and Eastern Provinces involved a departure from the principle of the 1958 Act, which merely declared that in these provinces Tamil may be used for prescribed administrative purposes without prejudice to the use of the official language in respect of these purposes. Sinhala did still remain in law the only official language of Sri Lanka, in as much as correspondence between officials in their official capacity throughout the country was required to be in Sinhala, and there was nothing to prevent the use of Sinhala, in addition to Tamil, in the conduct of public business in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In practice, however, the regulations granted Tamil an equality of status as an official language in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. For these reasons, the Federal Party leader Chelvanayakam himself welcomed the regulations as an important step forward in the implementation of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. His objection to them was that "they do not confer on the Tamil-speaking people in the seven (Sinhalese) provinces their full language rights."

Decentralisation of Political Decision-Making

Decentralisation of political decision-making, short of establishment of a federal state, appeared to offer scope to both Sinhala and Tamil leaders, at least until the sixties, of a mutually acceptable basis of organizing Sinhala-Tamil relations. The idea of replacing the over-centralised *kachcheri* system of administration (based on the over-lordship of the civil servants, first on a provincial, later on a district level) with Regional Councils had been mooted by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike even before independence, when

he was Minister of Local Administration. The idea was revived after he became Prime Minister, and in 1957 Chelvanayakam and Bandaranaike entered into an agreement (the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact) pertaining to recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority in Sri Lanka as well as establishment of regional councils with wide powers delegated by Parliament and dealing with lands and land development, colonization and land alienation, education, cooperatives, health, fishing and social services, etc. Draft legislation to give effect to the Pact was prepared by the Government and was ready by April 1958. But in the communally tension-charged political atmosphere of Bandaranaike's times, implementing it proved to be impossible. Anti-Sinhala agitations organized by the Federal Party in the North had its repercussions in the South, and powers to be delegated to the proposed regional councils in respect of land settlement, in particular, were vehemently opposed by Sinhalese nationalist interests. Bandaranaike was forced to abrogate the Pact in the face of organized opposition to it from a group of Buddhist *bhikkus*. Rationalizing later, Bandaranaike took the view that resumption of anti-Sinhala agitation by the Federal Party leadership after the negotiation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was against the spirit of that agreement. "When that position arose", said Bandaranaike, "the Pact, had, in fact, been made a dead letter."⁴ Mrs. Bandaranaike's administration (1960-65) favoured District Councils rather than the provincially based Regional Councils and seriously considered draft legislation for their establishment; again, Sinhalese interest groups objected to the idea partly because their establishment prior to the solution of the citizenship status of persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka was thought to lay open the midland parts of the island, in addition to the North and East, to the domination of Tamils.⁵

The fact that neither of the main Sinhalese political parties (UNP and SLFP) commanded an absolute majority of seats in the 1965 general elections placed the Federal Party in a strategic position in Parliament, and it joined the Government of Dudley Senanayake conditionally on the basis of specific guarantees in regard to language, district councils and conditions of repatriation of persons of Indian origin. The Senanayake Government's language regulations of 1966 redeemed part of its compact with the Federal Party. Its revival of the district councils idea, however, evoked widespread opposition mainly from the Buddhist *sangha* and from local authorities in Sinhalese areas. Senanayake had been one of the strongest critics of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact on the ground that it envisaged the devolution of wide powers to Regional Councils, especially powers regarding lands and land alienation.

The District Councils now envisaged by Senanayake were to function under the central government and would have limited powers. Even so, the very idea of accepting District Councils, as it seemed under pressure from the Federal Party, was anathema to the Sinhalese. The demand for

an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, first put forward by C. Suntheralingam at about this time, only hardened Sinhalese opinion against any concessions on the district councils issue.⁶ Nor were the Tamils themselves or Tamil-speaking people united on the issue. When the idea was first mooted by Bandaranaike, the Muslim Federal Party MP for Mannar (a predominantly Muslim area) had objected to Mannar being included in the proposed Regional Council for Jaffna (which would have represented the Tamil Northern Province). The Tamil Congress leader, G.G. Ponnambalam was diametrically opposed to District Councils, stating that their establishment would be "suicidal" for the Tamils.⁷ Advocacy of District Councils during the tenure of Dudley Senanayake's Government was therefore largely confined to the Federal Party, the position of which as a government party was becoming increasingly untenable due to escalating resistance to its policies from Sinhalese interest groups and its own failure to deliver the goods to the Tamils. Withdrawal of a government White Paper on District Councils, alleged non-implementation of promises by the Prime Minister in regard to acquisition of Sinhala proficiency by Tamil public servants and differences with the Government over declaration of the area around the Hindu Koneswaran temple in Trincomalee as a sacred area, led the Federal Party Minister of Local Government to resign his portfolio in September 1968, after which the Federal Party reverted to its traditional oppositional role in Parliament and outside.

Under the next government, that of Mrs. Bandaranaike (1970-1977), introduction of a Political Authority system brought about the first real measure of administrative decentralization in Sri Lanka since independence. Political Authorities, who were Members of Parliament and generally incumbents of deputy ministerships in the government, were appointed at a district level to coordinate all matters pertaining to the district with the *Kachcheri* (head of administration (the Government Agent), and the budget was decentralized to permit special funding for district projects emanating from the Political Authority. The Government of J.R. Jayewardene (1977-) went one step further and made statutory provision for the appointment of Ministers without Cabinet rank from among MPs, who would be in charge of administrative districts. There is no statutory necessity that ministers so appointed should belong to the government party, but in the absence of co-operation from the Tamil parties, all such ministers appointed so far have belonged to the government parliamentary party, and all of them have been appointed as District Ministers in the 24 administrative districts of Sri Lanka. The Minister appointed for Jaffna District is a Sinhalese, and Muslim ministers represent districts in the Muslim populated areas of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.⁸

TULF ACCENTUATES POLITICS OF DISSENT

The change of government in Sri Lanka in May 1970 presaged also a change in the emphasis of Tamil politics from District Councils back to the language issue, with a new focus of interest in the Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka, inaugurated on 22 May, 1972. The new Constitution was devised by the House of Representatives, sitting simultaneously as a Constituent Assembly, and Tamil political parties participated in the initial stages of constitution-making. Divergences over the language provisions of the draft constitution, led to a boycott of the later Assembly proceedings by most MPs of the Tamil constituencies. However, two members of the Tamil Congress voted with the Government when the Constitution was adopted.

Tamil opinion was opposed principally to the language provisions of the new Constitution but also, to a lesser extent, to the provisions which declared that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism which was accorded the "foremost place" in the Republic of Sri Lanka "while assuring to all religions the rights granted by section 18(1)(d)," i.e., the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Though the Constitution did not define citizenship as such, Tamil opinion was opposed to the implied distinction between citizens by *descent* and citizens by *registration* as contained in the proviso to section 67, which declared that no law of the National State Assembly shall deprive a citizen by *descent* of the status of citizen of Sri Lanka.

The language provisions of the Constitution declared that the official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the Official Language Act of 1956; that the use of the Tamil language shall be in accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958; that all laws shall be enacted or made in Sinhala; that there shall be a Tamil translation of every law so enacted or made and that the language of the courts and tribunals shall be in Sinhala throughout Sri Lanka and accordingly, their records, pleadings, proceedings, judgements, orders and so on shall be in Sinhala provided that the National State Assembly does not provide otherwise under its own law in the case of institutions exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Tamil political parties objected to the provision for the use of Tamil in the courts in these two provinces being left to the discretion of the National State Assembly instead of being guaranteed under the Constitution.

In the Constituent Assembly, the Federal Party held that both Sinhala and Tamil should be the languages in which laws should be enacted, the official languages of Sri Lanka, the languages of the courts as well as the languages in which all laws should be published.⁹ When these proposals were not incorporated in the draft constitution, all the Federal Party MPs and some members of the Tamil Congress walked out of the Constituent Assembly on 14 May 1972. The Federal Party, Tamil Congress, Ceylon Workers

Congress, the Elathamilar Ottumai Munani (led by C. Suntheralingam) and the All Ceylon Tamil Conference joined together to form the Tamil United Front to protect "the freedom, dignity and rights of the Tamil people." Tamil MPs returned to the National State Assembly in June 1972, but only to accentuate their politics of dissent. Putting forward a six-point programme for the amendment of the Constitution, the Federal Party leader Chelvanayakam resigned his parliamentary seat in an effort to challenge government allegations that his party did not truly represent the aspirations of the Tamil people. His move was vindicated by an impressive victory in a long-delayed by-election. In October 1972, the Tamil United Front launched a non-violent struggle to achieve its objectives and coinciding with the first anniversary of the new constitution in May 1973 decided that the rights of the Tamils could not be regained except within the framework of a separate Tamil state. The call to *satyagraha*, first made by Chelvanayakam on a visit to Madras in late February 1972, acquired a new dimension of importance by the ostensible support accorded to it by Tamil sympathisers in Tamil Nadu and the analogy which was drawn with Bangladesh at the time.

TULF Goes Terrorist by 1975

Chelvanayakam's politics of separation was based on Gandhian principles; his demise however left the Federal Party under the control of its militants, who had no desire to co-operate or collaborate with Sinhala parties in a search for a solution to Tamil grievances short of a vow of the separatist demand. In fact, Tamil politicians who collaborated with Sinhala parties, or who did not toe the TULF line, became targets of terrorist activity organised by a militant group of Tamil youth, calling themselves the Tiger Movement. In July 1975, Alfred Duraiyappa, a former Mayor of Jaffna and member of the party in power, the SLFP, was shot dead outside a Hindu temple. In January 1978, an attempt was made on the life of M. Canagaratnam, the erstwhile TULF second MP for the constituency of Pottuvil in the Eastern Province, who had crossed the floor to join the UNP government ranks the previous December. Canagaratnam escaped with minor injuries. Apart from armed robberies including bank hold-ups, the brunt of terrorist vengeance was directed against police officers, mainly Tamil, who were involved in the investigation and detection of terrorist activities in Jaffna. Among these were Inspector Navaratnam, who was shot dead in his own residence near the Jaffna Police Station in May 1978 and Inspector Bastiampillai, the C.I.D.'s chief investigator of terrorism in the North and East who was lured by a decoy to a jungle with three of his operatives in April 1978 and brutally murdered. By July 1979, 14 police officers investigating terrorism had been murdered, and the Tiger Movement itself, in a letter to a leading Tamil daily, claimed responsibility for the Duraiyappa and Bastiampillai murders.¹⁰ All police victims were Tamils.

The TULF leadership publicly disclaimed any connection with the Tiger Movement. but neither did it act in a way that would discourage criminal activities of Jaffna youth nor dissociate itself completely from such activities. Army and Police sources have divulged that a connection did exist between the TULF and the Tiger Movement.¹¹ This is not surprising, since both organizations stood unequivocally for the same goal, namely the realization of a separate Tamil state. A conspiracy of silence has existed in Jaffna where terrorist activity has been under police investigation, and law-enforcing authorities have been hard put to obtain evidence to indict suspected terrorists. When, in June 1974, a terrorist youth, Sivakumaran, who had been arrested for bank robbery committed suicide in prison, he was accorded a public funeral in Jaffna in which prominent TULF leaders participated and a statue was later erected in his honour. The fact is that the Tiger Movement was a source of strength as well as of embarrassment to the TULF leadership. As a source of strength, it served to highlight Tamil grievances, especially those of Tamil youth whose admission to Sri Lanka Universities in the much sought after faculties of Medicine, Engineering, and Science had progressively declined after the standardisation formula for University admissions had been adopted in 1970.¹²

The Counsel appearing before the Sansoni Commission on behalf of a group calling itself the Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Organisation declared:

The majority of the people in Jaffna wanted to receive a higher education, pass examinations, and secure employment. The main industry in Jaffna is education. They have said so even in Parliament. Every parent in Jaffna wanted to give a good education to their children and send them to a higher position.¹³

This was indeed no different from the aspirations of Sinhala youth and parents in the South. Standardization was meant to correct imbalances in marking both media-wise and subject-wise, and was coupled with a scheme of area weightage intended to redress disadvantages of rural schools as opposed to urban schools, where better facilities and staff obtained. Standardisation applied to the GCE (Advanced Level) examination, which was the qualifying examination for university admissions. Tamil politicians and Tamil youth were at one in attributing the higher proportion of admissions of Tamil students to engineering and medical faculties of Sri Lanka universities to greater application and skills of Tamil students, a view seriously challenged in certain Sinhalese quarters, where it is alleged that Tamil examiners, or at least some of them, have a tendency to mark up Tamil students.¹⁴ However, that there may be a correlation between the standardisation scheme and the terrorist movement suggests itself. Both involved frustrated Tamil youth, and both were post-1971 phenomena. Tamils now have a separate University in Jaffna, but still favour admis-

sion to the established universities in Peradeniya and Colombo, especially for studies in Engineering and Medicine, which provide avenues of employment not only in Sri Lanka but, more profitably, abroad.

While subscribing to the same goal of self-determination within a separate state of Eelam, important differences of approach have divided Tamil militants from the TULF leadership. The more senior TULF leaders had been brought up under Chelvanayakam's tutelage as adherents of Gandhian principles and apostles of non-violence. TULF fought the 1977 elections seeking a mandate for Eelam, and party spokesmen have construed its performance at these elections as vindication for Eelam. As the TULF leader Amirthalingam put it:

I consider the verdict of this (1977) election as a mandate that the Eelam Tamil nation should exercise the sovereignty already vested in the Tamil people and become free.¹⁵

This claim was of dubious validity; TULF did win 17 of the 22 seats which it contested, and made a clean sweep of all seats in the Northern Province. But it was the UNP which won the majority of the seats (7 out of 12), in the Eastern Province, which TULF considered to be an integral part of Eelam. TULF obtained 69 per cent of the votes in the Northern Province but only 32.9 per cent in the Eastern Province.¹⁶ TULF ranks in the Eastern Province were further depleted by the defection to the UNP of the TULF member for Pottuvil in December 1977. In such a context, the TULF leadership was constrained to adopt a low profile on the Eelam issue and on 17 December 1977, even expressed its willingness to have a dialogue with Prime Minister J.R. Jayewardene on matters relating to language, education, economic development and decentralisation. Such an attitude was diametrically opposed to the approach of Tamil militancy. A party Youth Front resolution to appoint a national council to draft a constitution for Eelam was rejected at the TULF's second Regional Convention in July 1978, and later, in September, Tamil youths disrupted a meeting in London at which Amirthalingam himself was a speaker. In February 1979, Amirthalingam dissociated himself from a youth boycott of schools organized in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.¹⁷

Government Deals Firmly with Terrorists

The inability or failure of the TULF leadership to stem the tide of Tamil terrorism was further demonstrated when an Air Ceylon Avro passenger aircraft was blasted by a time-bomb while grounded unoccupied at Ratmalana airport near Colombo on the very day that the Second Republican Constitution was promulgated by the Jayewardene Government on 7 September 1978. When, in July 1979, Inspector Gurusamy of the Jaffna Police was murdered by terrorists, the Government decided to enforce law

and order in the North with a heavy hand. A state of emergency was declared in the Northern Province, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) law was enacted, and regulations under this law were promulgated giving the Police and armed services wide powers of arrest and search, and restricting movement of persons in this province. Attempt to overthrow the government by illegal means was made an offence punishable by death under these regulations; it also imposed censorship of publications inciting persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion. At the same time, Brigadier Tissa Weeratunga of the Sri Lanka Army was commissioned by the President, as Commander of the Security Forces in Jaffna, "to eliminate in accordance with the laws of the land the menace of terrorism in all its forms in the Island, and more specially from the Jaffna District," using "all the resources of the state" before 31 December 1979.¹⁸ These measures appeared to have taken the edge off the terrorist movement.¹⁹ In the wake of the emergency regulations, TULF leader Amirthalingam reiterated that "our doors are always open for negotiations and peaceful solution in keeping with the honour and self-respect of our people," and reaffirmed his party's commitment to the Gandhian principles followed by Chelvanayakam. But his role as party leader and his relations with the UNP Government were not without ambivalence.

Amirthalingam was leader of the Opposition as well as the leader of TULF, and he had become, in a sense, a part of the parliamentary establishment. He could not have been blind to the fact that the Jayewardene Government had attempted to ameliorate Tamil grievances short of acknowledging the principle of a separate state, and had gone further in this regard than any previous government since independence. The standardisation rule was abolished, for example, and a new formula for university admissions was instituted.²⁰

1978 REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION CONCILIATES TAMIL LEADERSHIP

The 1978 Republican Constitution declared Sinhala to be the official language of Sri Lanka, but at the same time raised Sinhala and Tamil to the status of national languages. The use of the national languages in Parliament and by local authorities and the right of a person to be educated and sit for public and competitive examinations in either of the national languages was statutorily guaranteed. The official language was declared to be the language of the courts throughout Sri Lanka, subject to the proviso that the language of the courts exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces shall also be Tamil and their records and proceedings shall be in the Tamil language. The article, according to Buddhism "the foremost place", subject to free exercise of all religions, was retained unchanged in the 1978 Constitution. But this Constitution did away with the implied distinction which existed between citizens by *descent* and citizens by *registration*, and stated that there shall be one

status of citizenship known as "the status of a citizen of Sri Lanka." Besides raising Tamil to the status of a national language, the 1978 Constitution gave statutory recognition to the use of the Tamil language *also* as a language of administration and as the language of the courts, a considerable advance on the previous constitutional position, under which the regulations framed under the 1958 Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act were regarded as subordinate legislation and could in no way be regarded as being provisions of the Constitution.

Even more significant, from the Tamil point of view, was the Government's enactment of the District Development Councils Act in August 1980, which sought to decentralize administration and effect a devolution of power on a district basis to partially elected Councils in the 24 administrative districts of Sri Lanka in a range of 15 subjects including education, health services, land use and land settlement, employment, agriculture, agrarian services, animal husbandry, food, fisheries, housing, rural development, small and medium industries, local irrigation works, co-operative development and cultural affairs. Elections for the DDCs are yet to be held; thereafter, they will consist of the Members of Parliament of the district plus the elected members who would be in a minority except in three specified districts which returned only one MP,²¹ with an elected member as Chairman of the Council and the District Minister as Chairman of its Executive Committee. In as much as the DDCs would be functioning as legislative bodies with power to pass subsidiary legislation, subject to approval of Parliament, besides performing all local government functions within the district except where municipal councils or urban councils existed,²² they strengthened, as Prime Minister Premadasa who piloted the Bill in Parliament explained, "the representative character of the democratic system by grafting on to it a scheme for self-management by the people of a district."²³ The TULF leadership welcomed the Bill, despite strong protests from its youth element, as a "general scheme of decentralisation of the administration of the country" which would enable Tamils to "work for the economic development of the Tamil-speaking districts."²⁴ At the same time, Amirthalingam emphasised that it was not meant to be a solution to the ethnic problems of Tamils or an answer to the demand for a separate state.²⁵ In an entirely different milieu in Madurai in South India, Amirthalingam reiterated TULF's commitment to the idea of a separate state for the achievement of which his party would "fight to the end" and, not unlike other dissident Sri Lankan Tamil politicians, seeking support for their cause in neighbouring Tamil Nadu, charged that Tamils in Sri Lanka were being neglected, that nothing was being done to improve their lot, and that rights offered to Tamils under the new 1978 Constitution were only on paper and intended to block their agitation.²⁶

ATTEMPTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE TAMIL PROBLEMS

These comments were made in the course of the Fifth International Tamil Research Conference convened in Madurai early in January 1981, and which was attended by TULF politicians, Tamil scholars from Sri Lanka as well as by two Tamil ministers from the Jayewardene Government (the CWC leader and Minister of Rural Industries, S. Thondaman, and Minister of Regional Development, S. Rajadurai), besides the Muslim Speaker of Sri Lanka's Parliament, Bakeer Markar. Specific grievances adduced by Amirthalingam included allegations that Tamils were being "humiliated" by the Government for using their language, that some Sri Lankan universities had closed down their Tamil medium sections, that Tamils were being discriminated in public sector employment, and that President Jayewardene had failed to summon a promised all-party conference to find a suitable solution to the Tamil problem.

Attempts to internationalize the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka have become a familiar tactic of the TULF leadership, and Amirthalingam's Madurai speech must be construed as made specially for the enlistment of sympathy and support from the Tamil Nadu public and Tamil Nadu political parties. Commenting editorially, *The Hindu* contrasted the attitude of Amirthalingam and his TULF supporters with that of a few months earlier, when they appeared to be convinced about the efforts of President Jayewardene to solve the problems of the Tamils in a "fair and just" manner. They had then declared that it was meaningless to adopt a hostile attitude towards the government and even extended their support to the District Development Councils. But *The Hindu* also concluded that "there could be no more propitious time than now" for President Jayewardene to hold the All-Parties Conference he had promised, "to thrash out the problems of Tamils" and to scrutinise to what extent the concessions granted to Tamils in the spheres of language, public employment and admission to higher institutions of learning were in fact being adhered to in spirit.²⁷

The difficulties of having an All-Parties Conference in Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue could not have been unknown to Amirthalingam. Quite apart from the exigencies of domestic party politics, which has always in the past precluded a bipartisan approach to Sinhala-Tamil relations, no Sri Lankan Government in power could negotiate with the TULF so long as the latter remained committed to the goal of a separate state. For both sides, Eelam is not negotiable; but while language and other concessions granted to Tamils by the government are genuinely meant to bring Tamils into the mainstream of public life in Sri Lanka, for the Tamil leadership these are merely steps towards the realization of the separate state. Hence deadlock was perhaps unavoidable, as also the desire of the TULF leadership to overstate their case and exaggerate alleged acts of discrimination, when the blame lay largely with this leadership for their lack of willingness to accept successive Sri

Lankan Constitutions for what they were worth, and to co-operate with successive governments to improve the lot of the Tamil people.

CONCLUSION : TAMIL NOW ENJOYS NATIONAL STATUS

Indeed, far from Tamils being humiliated for the use of their language, Tamil now enjoys a status in Sri Lanka which is unparalleled in other parts of the Tamil-speaking world. Tamil, a regional language in India, is a national language in Sri Lanka, and its free use in the Sri Lankan National Parliament, in the Northern and Eastern provinces, in all public records, on radio and television, on postage stamps, currency notes, in public correspondence initiated by Tamils in the Tamil language, and as a medium of instruction at all levels of education, is an established fact. Early in December 1980, more than a month before the Madurai Conference, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Public Administration had liberalised procedures for gaining proficiency in Sinhala by Tamil public officers, giving new-entrant officers six months leave with full pay to acquire such proficiency, exempting minor employees from the requirement of acquiring such proficiency and granting old-entrant officers who had lost the benefit of salary increase by virtue of the operation of the second language requirement, the facility of confirmation in their posts and restoration of increments before retirement for the purpose of eligibility for pensions and gratuities.²⁸ During the Budget discussions in Parliament, TULF spokesmen conceded that the Ministry circular on language was "far-reaching", and a source of relief to Tamil public servants.²⁹

As regards the closure of Tamil streams of instruction in universities to which reference was made at Madurai, the University Grants Commission did terminate Tamil medium streams in all faculties in Colombo University and the Tamil Language Department in Kelaniya University, but this decision was taken concurrently with the requirement that instruction in the Tamil medium be given in all faculties in the prestigious Peradeniya University in Sri Lanka. The Sinhala section of Jaffna University had permanently closed down after the August 1977 riots, and Jaffna University now functions as a full-fledged Tamil university with faculties in Arts, Science and Medicine. A university campus in Batticaloa (Eastern Province), affiliated to Peradeniya University, with faculties in Science and Agriculture, teaching in Tamil is scheduled to open in October 1981. There is no evidence to indicate that these changes have been made other than for reasons connected with staffing exigencies and numbers of Tamil medium students registered for courses in Colombo University and in the Tamil Language Department in Kelaniya University. Nor can it be held that they are inconsistent with section 21(2) of the Constitution of 1978, which lays down that where one national language is a medium of instruction in any course, faculty or department of a State-financed university, the other national language shall also be made a medium of instruction in such course, department or faculty

for students who had previously been educated in the Tamil medium, *except* in instances where like courses, departments or faculties existed in any other campus or branch of the same university or of any other university for the alternative national language.

The gravamen of the TULF however, was that the government had failed to provide the personnel for the implementation of the constitutional provisions which recognised Tamil as a national language and as a language of administration in the North and East; that is, that adequate numbers of Tamil-speaking people were not being recruited to certain categories of public service employment and that recruitment to the armed services and police force was highly discriminatory to the Tamils. The charge made by Amirthalingam that not more than 5 per cent of new recruits in the Police Force, and 2 per cent of new recruits in the Armed Services, were Tamils since 1977, was not denied during the Budget Debate. It might however be contended that the Sri Lanka Army, recruited and trained as it is mainly for counter-insurgency activities in the island, might find itself equally disadvantaged fighting counter-insurgency both in the North and South with Tamil cadres in its fighting arm, while the low Tamil recruitment to the Police Force and the alleged inadequacy of Tamils serving in police stations in the North could hardly be without relevance to the spate of killings of Tamil police officers and the consequent reluctance of Tamil policemen to serve in this area.³⁰ A more legitimate Tamil grievance pertained to recruitment to other categories of the public service, where it was shown that out of 4289 persons appointed to certain categories of the service between February 1977 and the end of 1980, only 5.73 per cent were Tamils and 1.9 per cent Muslims; the lowest incidence of Tamil recruitment during this period being in the Government Clerical Service and the Sri Lanka Administrative Service.³¹ Arguably in these services, too, recruitment policy could hardly have been uninfluenced by considerations of the usefulness of Tamil public officers in a transferable service who might have an inadequate knowledge of the official language, or who might, with or without political instigation, display an unwillingness to acquire the required proficiency in such language. Again, the question may be simply asked: Is the Tamil political leadership to blame for the plight of Tamil public servants today?

The Madurai Conference was in the nature of a setback to the TULF's continuing efforts to internationalize support for their separatist cause. The DMK under Karunanidhi, an erstwhile supporter of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause, dissociated itself completely from the Conference, while the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, in the course of his own conference speech administered a rebuff to the TULF, objecting to references to the so-called Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, and declared that the Conference would not allow itself to be used as a platform for anyone to propagate any political ideology, nor did Tamil Nadu want to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. Ramachandran emphasized that the government and people of Tamil Nadu always wanted to maintain the best of relations with the govern-

ments and peoples of other countries, particularly with those of their neighbours.³²

World Tamil conferences have customarily tended to aggravate Sinhala-Tamil tensions and differences by injecting political overtones to discussions which are intended to be basically academic. Amirthalingam's changing attitude at Madurai may perhaps be understood in this context, but leaving aside the rhetoric of his argument a hardening of the TULF's relations with the Government can be discerned, which Prime Minister Premadasa's February visit and tour of Jaffna, in connection with the inauguration of a model village in Udupiddy as part of his Village Re-awakening Programme, might have done something to mollify but which, in the long run, bodes ill for the future of Sinhala-Tamil relations.

In August 1977, post-election mob violence (now becoming endemic after general elections in Sri Lanka) took a communal turn when latent anti-Tamil hostility was vented against the community accompanied by looting and arson of Tamil shops, with the inevitable repercussions in the North. The riots, the worst since 1958, actually started with a clash between the police and a Tamil crowd at a school carnival in Jaffna, leaving four Tamils shot dead and one policeman wounded. From here they rapidly spread southward in the wake of rumours, mostly false, that Buddhist temples had been burned and Sinhalese people murdered in the North. The Government was constrained to clamp down a prolonged curfew starting on 18 August, accommodate nearly 40,000 Tamil refugees in camps in Colombo and Kandy and airlift Tamils from the affected areas in the South to Jaffna because transit by rail and road had become hazardous. By 22 August, when the curfew was lifted, 125 persons—97 Tamils, 24 Sinhalese, 1 Muslim, and 3 unidentified—were officially listed as killed in the riots. A government communique of 29 August accused the SLFP by implication of responsibility for these events. "Though these criminal acts appeared on the surface to be a communal conflict," it said, "it is believed that there was a political conspiracy behind it." But the SLFP leader, Mrs Bandaranaike herself accused the government of failing to maintain order and said the riots were a logical outcome of the post-election riots, in which hundreds of her supporters had lost their property and at least 30 had been killed. For the TULF leader, Amirthalingam, however, the violence "vindicated to the hilt" the demand for a separate state: "If we do not have some place of safety, we shall have to live eternally in refugee camps."³³

The August riots of 1977 demonstrated, again, the combustible nature of the present Sinhala-Tamil relationship. To have hoped that this would diminish with the dawn of a separate state was only wishful thinking for it may be surmised that the issue of the separate state itself had now become a discrete factor bearing upon the tensions in this relationship.

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NOTES

- 1 The Sinhalese, concentrated in the Western, Southern, North-Central, Central, North-Western, Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces numbered 9, 147,000 (71.9 per cent of total population) in 1971, and are themselves of ancient Indian origin.
- 2 See the author's *Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence* (Colombo, 1965).
- 3 *House of Representatives Debates* (1966), Vol. 64, col. 128.
- 4 *House of Representatives Debates* (1958), Vol. 31, col 932.
- 5 See *Times of Ceylon*, 17 June 1964.
- 6 See S. Suntheralingam, *Ceylon: The Beginnings of Freedom Struggle* (Columbo, 1967).
- 7 *The Sun* (Colombo), 4 May, 1967. Even the depressed castes in the North expressed themselves to be opposed to the idea of District Councils. *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 November 1967.
- 8 Under the same provision, the President appointed Ministers without cabinet rank for specific subjects which might be delegated by any Cabinet Minister. Such subjects so far include the Colombo Group of Hospitals, Coconut Industries and Regional Development, the last being assigned to a Tamil Minister.
- 9 *Constituent Assembly Debates* (1972) Vol. 1(2), col. 2084.
- 10 See W.I. Siriweera, "Recent Developments in Sinhala-Tamil Relations," *Asian Survey*, (Berkeley, CA), September 1980; also leading article in *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 July 1979.
- 11 See the evidence of Brigadier S.C. Ranatunga and Police Superintendent, J.D.M. Ariyasinghe, before the Sansoni Commission, as reported in *Ceylon Daily News*, 3 July and 12 July, 1979.
- 12 Tamil students, who had accounted for 40.7, 40.8 and 31.1 per cent of total admissions to the faculties of Engineering, Medicine and Science, respectively, in Sri Lanka for the year 1970-71, numbered 14.1, 17.4 and 21 per cent, respectively, for these same faculties in 1975. The corresponding figures for Sinhalese admissions were 55.9, 53.7 and 65.3 per cent in 1970-71 for Engineering, Medicine and Science, and 83.4, 78.9 and 76 per cent, respectively for the same faculties in 1975. The increasing percentage of Sinhalese students gaining admission to these faculties is explained by the availability of better educational facilities for Sinhalese students in hitherto less-developed areas of the country as well as by the operation of standardisation. The drop in Tamil admissions to the prestigious faculties in Sri Lanka universities is significant, but percentage-wise it still compares favourably with the percentage of Sri Lanka Tamils in the total population which was 1 per cent in 1971.
- 13 Reported in *Ceylon Daily News*, 7 July 1979.
- 14 A parliamentary furore was caused when Industries Minister, Cyril Mathew alleged that Tamil examiners in a science subject in the GCE (Advanced Level) April 1977 examination had overmarked certain answer-scripts of Tamil medium students in a particular question. When Tamil parliamentarians charged that Minister Mathew was indulging in "baseless allegations," he reiterated in a letter of appeal addressed to the President, that university admissions should be based on a racial quota in conformity with population proportions as "the only fair, just and equitable way in which the problem of university admissions could be solved...." Text of letter in *Ceylon Daily News*, 19 July 1979.
- 15 *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 October 1977.
- 16 In the Puttalam constituency in the north-west too, the winning candidate was UNP, and the TULF candidate trailed a poor third.
- 17 Siriweera, n.10, p. 906.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 911.
- 19 According to the Inspector-General of Police, there were no bank hold-ups and no killings by hand-bombs in 1980. Political and communal violence in the year was also virtually non-existent. *Ceylon Daily News*. 1 January 1981.

- 20 The GCE (Advanced Level) examinations still remained the qualifying examination for entrance to the University, but admissions were now based on a quota of 30 per cent for merit, 55 per cent allocated on a district-wide basis, and 15 per cent reserved for backward areas.
- 21 Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya.
- 22 Town Councils and the ancient institution of Village Committees will disappear with the implementation of DDCs.
- 23 *Parliamentary Debates*, 8 August 1980 Vol. 11, col. 408-09.
- 24 *Ceylon Daily News*, 18 August 1980.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 *The Hindu* (Madras), 9 January 1981.
- 27 Ibid., 10 January, 1981.
- 28 *Ceylon Daily News*, 5 December 1980
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid., 28 November 1980 and 5 December 1980.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 *The Hindu*, 9 January 1981.
- 33 See *Keesings Archives*, 7 October 1977, p.28-590. The Report of the Sansoni Commission which investigated these events is still awaited.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY : UNITY AND SOLIDARITY A DISTANT DREAM

By B. VIVEKANANDAN*

IN the aftermath of the Second World War, the founding fathers of the European union movement, like Jean Monnet, envisaged that a new united Europe should be built up around a community concept. The functional approach which was adopted in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, and subsequently in the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) too, aimed at the promotion of a new outlook of mutuality and trust, transcending the traditional barriers of nation states, in Europe. The founding fathers hoped that by unifying Europe through consent internecine quarrels among European nations could be brought to an end and the continent insulated from becoming a theatre of another world war. In a way, the bringing together of France and Germany, under a broad common economic framework like the EEC, has certainly minimized this fear. Therefore, one has to concede the fact that the community concept of the EEC has contributed significantly to the promotion of reconciliation between these two traditional rivals of Europe. Similarly, the European Economic Community, with its twin basic features of a free trade area and a customs union, has enabled the convergence of the economic activities of nine countries of Western Europe.

CONFLICT OF NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY CONCEPTS

Nevertheless, these limited achievements during the post-war period should not obscure the challenges the European Community faces today. Although originally the Treaty of Rome envisaged a steady advancement towards European integration, the progress made in this direction so far seems to be an optical illusion. Behind the apparent unity, the Community is virtually torn between conflicting desires of various member countries. In fact, most of them remain almost totally self interested, even going to the extent of breaking the Community laws when they find obstacles to the promotion of their self interests. Therefore, behind the facade of unity, fierce and incessant economic battles are being fought among the European Economic Community member countries to promote their own narrow national interests.

Common Agricultural Policy Results in Disunity

On various vital issues, the members of the European Community give

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the impression that they are on a war of attrition raising serious doubts over the enduring character of the Community. One such issue which has an explosive potential is the working of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It may be pointed out that the Common Agricultural Policy is the major course of action which the European Economic Community has adopted so far to promote economic integration among the member countries. But it appears that instead of promoting integration it has the potential to promote disintegration among the members of the Community. Indeed, in recent years, it has operated in a manner which resulted in a serious drain of the resources of certain member countries to the net benefit of others who have a larger farming sector. Indeed, by its very nature the CAP is bound to promote imbalances between the member countries' budget contributions and the reciprocal advantages they derive from it. This is partly because of the varying sizes of the farm sectors of member countries and partly because about 65 per cent of the Community budget is earmarked to support EEC's 8 million farmers.¹ Moreover, the CAP incurs a lot of wasteful expenditure since the agricultural subsidy under its auspices has been utilized to produce a lot of surpluses; the butter mountain sold abroad at prices far below the cost, is an example.² Moreover, the policy props up market prices at artificially high levels.

The latent troubles for the EEC over the question of budget contributions can be seen from how the British contribution to the Community budget grew heavier as years passed. The contribution Britain has had to make to the European Economic Community budget, until the recent agreement, has certainly been disproportionate to the benefit it could expect in return. Against the French contribution of 702 million Francs, the British contribution in 1980 was to the tune of 9,000 million Francs.³

It is quite obvious that the imbalance in Britain's net contribution to the Community budget is partly due to the farm levies of the EEC (Britain still imports a large quantity of cheap food from outside the EEC) and partly because of the Common Agricultural Policy. Indeed, a country like Britain which has only a small farming sector (2.5 per cent of the labour force), unlike France and West Germany, could hardly think of any benefit from the Common Agricultural Policy, especially when the major share of the EEC budget goes to agriculture. In 1979, for example, in a budget of about £9,000 million, the share of agriculture was about £6,800 millions. Naturally, therefore, members with large agricultural sectors would be the beneficiaries. If, then, the CAP remains unaltered it would inevitably continue to suck up the resources of members with small farm sectors to the benefit of countries with larger farming sectors. Britain was peeved over this prospect and the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, complained in November 1978 that the British contribution to the EEC budget was "clearly out of balance" and that if the budgetary imbalances "were to remain uncorrected it would do long-term damage to the Community as a whole as well as Britain."⁴ His successor, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, also said in October

1979, that Britain "simply cannot go on being Europe's biggest benefactor" and expressed her determination to secure a cut in Britain's contribution to the Community budget.⁵

The budget issue has seriously harmed the Community concept. At the Dublin Summit of the EEC Heads of Government in November 1979, Mrs. Thatcher demanded a cut of £1,000 million in Britain's net budget contribution for 1980.⁶ When others rejected this demand, she warned that her country would not hesitate to "precipitate a crisis" if it did not receive satisfaction.⁷ Following this, demands were made in Britain for studying the option of its withdrawal from the European Economic Community. The National Executive of the Labour Party passed a resolution stating:

In view of the lack of progress to meet Britain's demand at the Dublin Summit, Britain should immediately cease paying all EEC taxes, stop Ministers attending EEC meetings, and decide to undertake a study of options open to us, including amending section 2 of the European Communities Act and withdrawal from the EEC—and to prepare alternatives for Britain.⁸

Besides, a strong impression was given that the British Government was engaged in the preparation of contingency plans to leave the EEC and that senior civil servants were studying the possible effects of a British withdrawal from the Community.⁹ Subsequently, on 18 March 1980, Mrs. Thatcher said that Britain would have to consider withholding its Value Added Tax (VAT) contributions, about £800 million, to the EEC budget if there was no equitable solution of the problem of Britain's contribution.¹⁰ If this had been implemented it would have been in violation of the Community law. Two days later, on 20 March 1980, on the question of CAP, farm prices, etc., the House of Commons witnessed an acrimonious expression of deep disenchantment in Britain towards the EEC.¹¹ Although subsequently a temporary solution to the problem was found by deciding to refund to Britain about £1,577 million in 1980 and 1981 in return for an agreement for a 5 per cent increase in the EEC farm price, the problem cannot be treated as solved.¹² The solution has only temporarily shifted the major burden from Britain to West Germany which is expected to make a net payment of £1,050 million to the European Economic Community budget in 1980.¹³

What is significant is that the budget settlement has done nothing to correct the basic imbalance in the Community spending—the major share, i.e. 64.5 per cent, is still for the Common Agricultural Policy. On the other hand, what the budget settlement has done is to impose a further strain on the Community's budgetary system. The cost of refunds to Britain during the next two years and the increases in agricultural expenditure will almost exhaust the Community's existing resources by the end of 1981. This would inevitably lead the EEC to a financial crisis,

which could be overcome either by substantial modification of the CAP or by increasing the VAT above 1 per cent.¹⁴ Since France, as a big food exporter, makes its main gain from CAP it has little interest in any thorough reform of the system. Although there is talk of "structural changes" of the budget to prevent "the recurrence of unacceptable situations," one cannot be sure of its nature. However, under the new arrangement, by which Britain would be insulated from the budget problem in the next two or three years, Germany would bear the main cost of any increase in the agricultural spending.¹⁵ EEC's expansion with Spain and Portugal will make further calls on its own loaded financial system, mainly in the agricultural sector. Whether the CAP will survive further expansion of the European Community is a big question.

French Ban on Lamb Imports Violates EEC Rules

There is a marked tendency among the members of the European Community to violate its regulations and pursue a defiant path even if it slightly infringes a member's narrow national interest. This is especially notable in the manner in which France had imposed an illegal ban on the import of British lamb meat disregarding the Treaty of Rome and the findings of the European Court. Indeed, this has also done great damage to the Community concept. Fortunately, all other EEC members had opposed the French action. In June 1980, France announced that in addition to the total ban on lamb imports from Britain, they were also cutting back lamb imports from Belgium, Holland, West Germany and Ireland to 70 per cent of the tonnage imported in May 1980. At a meeting of the EEC Agriculture Ministers on 17 June 1980, protests were made by the Germans and the Dutch, who characterised the French move as a violation of the Community's free trade rules. Finn Olav Gundelach, EEC Commissioner for Agriculture, said that he was "very disappointed" by the French attitude.¹⁶ The Anglo-French "lamb war" ended in October 1980, following the introduction of a new lamb and mutton policy which opened the French market to Britain's sheep farmers.¹⁷ Similar was the recent refusal of three member states—Belgium, France, and West Germany—to make their contributions to financing the 1980 EEC Supplementary Budget. As a result, Gaston Thorn, President of the European Commission, had to take the harsh step of threatening the defaulters with legal action.¹⁸ What these developments indicate is that if countries resort to unilateral national remedial measures, the Community would remain no more than a common trading system.

Evolution of Common Fisheries Policy Unsuccessful

The failure of the Community to evolve a new agreed common fisheries policy also shows how difficult it is for EEC members to pull on together. The

fisheries policy adopted by the Community in 1970 was based on the principle that the Community's fishing grounds should be equally accessible to the trawler fleets of all member states. No revision to this free-for-all policy took place after the enlargement of the European Economic Community in 1973. For the last five years this problem remains unresolved. Britain and Ireland have viewed this indifference of the Community as an attempt to impose upon the new members an obligation to give other member countries the right to unlimited access to the fish stocks of Ireland and Britain. Although some minor modifications were made in the earlier policy which introduced limited national fishing zones from 3 to 12 miles off coast lines of member states, they were not intended to be a permanent settlement as this policy was also intended to be phased out by 1982. Britain has argued that as 60 per cent of all fish caught within 200 miles of the coast of EEC member countries are from British waters, any common fisheries policy should give weight to this fact. Britain wants that a 12 mile coastal belt should be kept for its own exclusive fishing and from 12 to 50 miles for a "dominant preference" for British fishermen. Although in early 1980, the nine Community members made certain moves in the direction of formulating a common fisheries policy by agreeing to total allowable catches for waters within 200 nautical miles of Community coasts, the sensitive question of quotas of fish catches for each state has not yet been decided.¹⁹ The EEC Commission had earlier proposed that Britain should get only 31 per cent of the total fish catch of the Community as against the British claim for 45 per cent.²⁰ Many in Britain felt that the Commission's proposal was unfair to Britain.²¹ In December 1980, a settlement of this problem appeared to be in sight, but the negotiations broke down as France instructed its delegation not to yield on the issue of "access"—i.e. the right of coastal states to reserve some waters wholly or partially for their own fishermen. The French delegate insisted that the existing limits on fishing by other member-states within 12 miles off the British shore must give way after the end of 1982 to "free access" upto the beaches. Britain, on the other hand, insisted that waters within a 12-mile belt off Britain must be permanently reserved for its own fisherman. On the question of the share of fish catch, Britain was offered over 36 per cent of the main species which would have been acceptable for Britain as part of a package settlement.²²

Little Progress Towards A Monetary Union

The European Community has also made little progress towards the currency union although several European leaders have often called for a single European currency and a centralized monetary policy. It is important to note that controls over the exchange rate and the money supply are among the most important functions of modern governments and the national governments are extremely reluctant to surrender their individual

control over these policies to any supra-national authority. This would mean loss of national control over certain vital aspects of macro-economic policy. In view of this fear, the prospects of a monetary union seems to be very slim. Added to this, the line of thinking in certain countries like Britain is how to restore to the National Government the powers which it has lost to the Community. Peter Shore, Britain's shadow Foreign Secretary, for example, said in the House of Commons on 24 March 1980 that a Labour Government would want to redress "the loss of rights by this House to the EEC."²³ Obviously such restoration would entail a number of changes, including amendment of the European Communities Act of 1972 and an agreement that the judgements of the European Court would deem to be only advisory. These are important matters with a lot of potential posing question marks to the endurance of the European Community. However, it is extremely unlikely that Britain would join the European monetary system in the foreseeable future. The Foreign Office in Britain is totally opposed to the idea. Further, with the expansion of the EEC as a result of the entry of Spain and Portugal, the chances of a monetary union are likely to recede further.²⁴

PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENCE ON THIRD WORLD

Vulnerability of Community Members due to Dependence on Oil

The other set of EEC problems are centered round the potential threats to its essential supplies like oil and raw materials and to markets. It is a well known fact that in general, the industrial complexes of European Economic Community countries are designed to operate with cheap oil as the energy source. Therefore, it is not easy for them instantly to switch over to a new energy base, whether solar, nuclear, wind or tidal wave. In the situation, the oilimporting countries of the European Economic Community are in a weak position and may go to any extent, not necessarily collectively, to keep up the flow of oil to their individual countries. Indeed, the overwhelming dependence of the EEC on imported oil at once reveals its inherent weakness because these countries could easily be pressurized if the oil-producing countries make oil increasingly costly or if they are denied access to oil sources. Assuming that these countries might make efforts to reduce their dependence on oil by increased utilization of coal and nuclear energy, it is estimated that by 1990, given average economic growth, EEC's energy requirement could be 50 per cent more than what it is today. Even if alternative sources of energy play a larger role, the EEC would still be dependent on imports for half of its requirement, which according to one estimate, would be between 470 and 570 million tonnes of crude oil.²⁵ Therefore, it is obvious that the 1980s is going to be a crucial decade for all industrialized countries of the European Economic Community since no alternative to oil could be meaningfully used in the current decade.

They would be most vulnerable to any disruption of oil supplies. Perhaps, Britain may be an exception. Indeed, a scramble for the little oil available can heighten tensions, with serious implications for the Community.

Dependence on Raw Materials

Similar is the extent of dependence of the European Community countries on the import of raw materials and minerals. It may be noted that throughout the fifties and the sixties the interdependence between the developed and the developing countries was not obvious to the latter. The focus was more on the dependence aspects of the developing countries on Western loans, investments, aid and markets. The underdeveloped countries could hardly envisage a situation in which they could exert countervailing pressures on the developed nations. But the early seventies demonstrated the vulnerability of the developed nations to the pressures of the developing countries; the successful moves of the OPEC since 1973 to raise oil prices have really scared the developed nations of the west. It provided confidence to other third world countries which possessed raw materials that they too had the potential to apply pressures on the West if need arose.

Countries of the European Community depend heavily on the underdeveloped countries for their vital commodity imports; about 55 per cent of their raw material are imported from the underdeveloped countries. In the case of important products like minerals, this dependence is likely to increase in future. However, the uninterrupted supply of raw materials is quite vital for the health of the economies of the European Economic Community countries. In fact, none of the developed countries could fill the gap if these supplies were to be cut off. Therefore, if the prices of these commodities were to be pushed up or if supplies were disrupted, it would have a crippling effect on the EEC countries which depend upon them.

Trade Patterns not Directed to Development of Third World

Although the formation of the European Economic Community helped the member countries to increase the size of their domestic market for the 250 million people outside the Community, especially in the underdeveloped countries, the markets have not widened in any appreciable manner partly due to the absence of improvement in the purchasing power of these countries and partly due to the capacity of some of these countries to produce certain high quality consumer items. The continuing poverty in the underdeveloped countries, with about 60 per cent of population lacking effective demand and purchasing power, keeps world trade 60 per cent less than it otherwise would have been. Unless the purchasing power of this vast section of the world population in the underdeveloped countries is increased, and thus stimulate demand, it would reduce the scope to

have a larger market for EEC countries in the third world. But this process cannot be harnessed in any meaningful way if the developed EEC countries concentrate more and more on arms trade with the third world, bereft of any real transfer of resources, in exchange for the purchases they make from the latter countries. It is true that in recent years the wealth of the European Economic Community countries has been drained substantially towards the oil rich countries of the Middle East and the Gulf. To recycle this wealth back to the EEC, some of them have resorted to greater arms trade. Of course, all the major countries are engaged in arms trade; the United States and the Soviet Union, as per the figures available for 1978, lead the rest with arms exports worth \$5,800 million and \$4,000 million respectively. In the Community, France leads with \$2,000 million worth arms exports, followed by Britain with \$660 million and Italy with \$620 million.²⁶ Indeed, this pattern of trade relationship cannot promote the development of the developing countries since a substantial portion of their resources keep getting squandered on armaments alone. Along with aid, trade should also be directed towards the development of the third world.

Protectionist Measures not Conducive to Healthy Relationship

The European Economic Community's protectionist measures, imposing tighter controls on imports from the most competitive developing countries, are also not conducive to the promotion of the development of the third world in any meaningful manner. Pertinently, the Community's present Generalised System of Preferences ended in 1980, and the new system, which has a provision for review every five years, is expected to run for another 20 years. Under the GSP, the European Economic Community allows developing countries duty free entry for their industrial exports, within specified limits, and partial exemption from duties for their agricultural exports. Under the EEC Commission's new proposed rules the very competitive countries would be subjected to new rules limiting their export to the EEC of sensitive goods which are likely to undermine the livelihood of the latter's own producers. However, whatever the reasons put forth to justify protectionism, the protectionist measures of the Community have not helped to develop a healthy relationship between it and the developing countries.²⁷ Since the third world has essential resources which the EEC countries need, they can also unite and bargain effectively as the OPEC has done in recent years. In this connection, it is interesting to note that when the Community asked Australia in 1980 to reduce its import of sheep meat to 8,000 tonnes against 25,000 tonnes last year, Australia had threatened the EEC with a trade ban, which would have meant a loss of exports worth about £500 million a year.²⁸ A similar step by the third world countries of Africa and Asia would be disastrous for the Community.

While the EEC has resorted to protectionism against imports from the developing countries, its own domestic market has been threatened by the industrial and technological advancement of the United States and Japan. The automobile industry, for example, is seriously threatened by Japanese imports; Japanese cars have become highly competitive in the EEC open car market partly because they are cheap, reliable and popular and also partly because in the context of the oil price hike Japanese small cars are in greater demand than the big indigenous cars produced by the Community countries. In 1979, Japan exported 2,13,000 cars to Britain and 1,84,000 cars to West Germany. Italy has restricted the Japanese car imports to 2,300 a year. In 1980, efforts were made to introduce a voluntary curb by Japan in its car exports to the European Economic Community, especially Britain. Although demands have been made to impose import controls against the Japanese, the EEC Commission had refused to act in this regard.

APPRAISAL : EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WEARS THIN

All these factors clearly indicate that the European Community's problems are many and serious. Beyond the statutory union of domestic markets under the Treaty of Rome, the people of the nine constituents are yet to develop a sense of belonging and purpose that would bind them together. Torn between conflicting desires of member countries the EEC seems to have no direction. In fact, the member countries seem to have their own independent ideas about their final destination. Of course countries with a proud heritage and different perceptions are brought together to give an impression of European solidarity. But they are there for different reasons; the Benelux countries, for whom the EEC is the available avenue to maximise their political influence and economic prosperity; France, because it promotes the interest of French farmers and condemns it when the Community obligation threatens the French sheep farmers or requires France to compromise its political sovereignty. On closer scrutiny, then, Community solidarity wears very thin.

The creation of an Economic Community of Nine has not succeeded in the effective handling of the problems of the member countries. The high hopes with which certain countries joined the Community remain shattered. Britain, for example, which joined with the hope of finding a solution to various economic problems, is simmering with surging discontent. Opinion polls conducted by Market Opinion and Research International (MORI) reveal that there is a progressive decline in public support for British membership since the 1975 Referendum in which the British electorate had voted by two thirds (67 per cent) in favour of Britain's continued membership in the EEC.²⁹ In October 1977 this majority had come down to 53 per cent; in May 1978, it had further come down to a minority 47 per cent while 53 per cent registered their opposition to Britain's continued

membership. In July 1980, the size of opposition to Britain's membership had grown to 70 per cent with only 30 per cent supporting it.³⁰ The visionaries who hoped for a powerful revival of British industry also remain disappointed. In fact, many in Britain believe that British membership in the European Community was a disaster. It is true that for Britain membership has resulted mainly in the escalation of food prices, loss of jobs, crippling effects on the balance of payments and a ruining effect on its economy. In 1979-80, Britain was faced with a trade deficit of £2,500 million with the EEC of which £750 million was accounted for by textiles alone.³¹ Britain's trade deficit in manufactured goods with the Community was to the tune of £4,000 million per annum causing a rise in unemployment.³² Moreover, within the EEC the British share of exports has fallen from 13.7 per cent in 1963 to 8.6 per cent in 1977.³³ Although the European Community could not be blamed for all of Britain's ills, it certainly has made things worse for Britain. The Community's Common Agricultural Policy contributed considerably to Britain's budget deficit and inflation through increased food prices. British industries under Britain's EEC membership, have been reduced in their ability to stop import penetration. The Labour Party has openly come out with the proposal for Britain's withdrawal; the Party's annual conference, held in October 1980 in Blackpool, passed a motion by a two-thirds majority, urging it to make Britain's withdrawal from the Community a priority in the next elections. The motion urged the Party to disengage Britain from the Community institutions and to work for peaceful and equitable relations between Britain and all the countries of Europe and the rest of the world.³⁴ In the circumstances, even a section of the Conservative Party has come to a similar conclusion that Britain should withdraw from the EEC as soon as possible, since the whole exercise of its membership was a disaster.³⁵ A document from the Conservative Political Centre noted a general feeling of growing disenchantment among the British "with the whole concept of Europe."³⁶ The fact that only 32 per cent of the British electorate had turned out to vote in the elections for the European Parliament is indicative of this disenchantment.

One major cause of disenchantment in certain EEC capitals is the uneven manner in which the CAP has operated till now. In the absence of simultaneous development of the regional and industrial policies of the EEC, which could extend benefits to more industrialised countries of the EEC also, the CAP cannot remain as it stands today without destabilising the Community itself. At the same time there is little prospect of a revision of the CAP since France, which is currently the biggest beneficiary, has declared that it would oppose any attempt to water down the policy. The French Cabinet has taken the stand that under the Treaty of Rome only the EEC Council of Ministers, acting unanimously in response to proposals from the European Commission, could take such a decision.³⁷ It appears that France would firmly oppose a revision of the CAP and also a further expansion of the EEC with countries like Spain and Portugal, apprehending

that their entry might result in its collapse. The former French President, Giscard d'Estaing, had already indicated that there should be a pause before the Community was enlarged, to include Spain and Portugal, because some new members were still not fully integrated.³⁸ However, if by force of circumstances the CAP were to be abandoned, and each member asked to manage its own farming sector and food requirements, the European Economic Community would instantly be reduced to more or less a predominantly industrial free trade area. There is a distinct possibility of such a development in future. It is doubtful whether a system which compels countries with small farming populations to support the farmers of other countries with large farming sectors to produce enormous surpluses, and keep the food prices artificially high, can sustain itself for long.

It appears that after toying with the idea of a community concept for some time, nation states in the European Community have started asserting themselves and pulling apart before they were to be further enmeshed into a process from which they would be unable to pull out easily after some time. However, it is obvious that during the 24-year life of the Community even the economic union of the member countries has not progressed much.

The European Community's further expansion on 1 January 1981, with Greece as its tenth member has not minimized its problems. Even though the country's government led by George Ellis took Greece into the Community with the hope that it would bring economic advantages,³⁹ the fact that all major opposition parties in Greece had boycotted the celebrations organized by the Government in connection with its entry showed that the nation was deeply divided.⁴⁰

In a broader perspective, these developments indicate that the vision of a united Europe, nurtured by the founding fathers of the movement, has considerably faded. For those who viewed the establishment of a Common Market as the first step towards the unification of Europe, modelled on the United States of America, the goal seems to be still a distant dream. The national governments in the EEC countries have shown extreme reluctance to transfer any more of their power to the supra-national European institutions; they zealously guard their position as the fount of authority and the ultimate repository of sovereignty. Certainly, this trend is not in tune with the cause of European unification. Fundamentally the spirit of oneness is conspicuous by its absence.

One external factor which needs special mention in this context is the potential threat to the European Economic Community emanating from the recent Soviet moves in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. It appears that one of the major objectives of these moves is to gain control over supplies like oil, raw materials and minerals vital to the developed countries of Western Europe. Through a series of politico-economic and military moves the Soviet Union seems to be trying to suck into its orbit as many countries of Asia and Africa as possible. Since 1971 it concluded friendship

treaties with a number of strategically important countries of Asia and Africa; in the Middle East alone it has concluded such treaties with five countries although some of these did not produce the desired results for the Soviet Union. The underpinnings of economic collaboration in all these friendship treaties are of considerable significance in this context. The Soviet aim in these moves seems to be to choke oil supplies from the Gulf and also the vital supplies of raw material and minerals from Africa and thus ruin the industrial complexes of the EEC nations which depend heavily upon these supplies. Certainly, under the present conditions of over-whelming dependence on oil and raw materials, developments in Africa and Middle East can affect the European Community as closely as developments at home. However, if the Soviet moves succeed, without resorting to a war of weapons and waging just an economic war, the Soviet Union can impose its dominance on West European countries and reduce them to thralldom. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the deployment of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean have placed the USSR in a stronger position to dominate Iran and the Gulf and thereby to threaten the vital flow of Middle East oil to Western Europe.

The cracks in the original scheme of the European Economic Community and the multiple challenges from outside create doubts over its enduring nature. The issues thrown up around the budget controversy have raised doubts in the minds of certain EEC countries that rush for integration would not result in the enduring cohesiveness of the Community and might prove a costly mistake. Moreover, it is obvious that despite the formation of the European Community, the fusion of the destinies of the Nine is still not in sight. Their efforts to keep up appearances of unity can hardly conceal the fact that the Community concept has not acquired much depth among the member countries. Indeed, the Community remains a house deeply divided, and, at times, gives the impression that individual country's move in different directions, each one suspicious of the other, while pretending on the surface some desire for a unified approach. Early in 1980 an important French leader, Jacques Chirac, had gone to the extent of openly saying that it was time for Britain to be told to leave the European Community.⁴¹ In this context, one may agree with a ponderous observation James Callaghan, British Prime Minister, made on the Community three years ago. He said: "With hindsight, we can see that perhaps the founding fathers were paying too much attention to the finished spire of the cathedral and too little to the foundations."⁴²

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NOTES

- 1 *The Times* (London), 11 July 1980.
- 2 In April 1980, EEC decided to sell 20,900 tonnes of butter to the Soviet Union at a price of £670 per tonne which cost the EEC £1,738 per tonne. *The Times*, 2 May 1980.
- 3 Ibid., 11 March 1980.
- 4 Ibid., 14 November 1978.
- 5 Ibid., 6 October 1979.
- 6 Ibid., 30 November 1979.
- 7 Ibid., 1 December 1979.
- 8 Ibid., 20 December 1979.
- 9 Ibid., 8 December 1979.
- 10 Ibid., 19 and 21 March 1980. Britain's estimated gross contribution to the EEC budget for 1980 was £2,000 million.
- 11 United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Session 1979-80, Vol. 981, cols. 652-80.
- 12 According to one estimate, 5 per cent increase in farm prices would cost the British housewives an extra £200 million a year. *The Times*, 2 October 1980.
- 13 Ibid., 16 June 1980.
- 14 According to Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, in a properly balanced Community, the budget should be "at least of the order of 2 to 2.5 per cent of the Community's GNP", (compared with 0.8 per cent now). He suggested that the ceiling of the Value Added Tax (VAT) should be raised from the present 1 per cent and new revenue sources such as levy on imported oil coupled with a tax on oil production should be created. *The Times*, 21 November 1980.
- 15 Ibid., 3 June 1980.
- 16 Ibid., 18 June 1980.
- 17 Ibid., 1 October 1980.
- 18 Ibid., 13 January 1981. The Supplementary Budget contained provisions for extending aid to the Italian earthquake victims and for an increase in spending in the regional and social spheres, beyond what had been approved by the EEC Council of Ministers.
- 19 Ibid., 16 June 1980.
- 20 Ibid., 11 September 1980.
- 21 The House of Lord's Select Committee for the European Community's affairs said that the proposal was unfair to Britain.
- 22 *The Times*, 18 December 1980.
- 23 Ibid., 6 June 1980.
- 24 Since 1978, the European Monetary System (EMS) is in operation. In the present form it is only an arrangement designed to limit currency fluctuations among the eight full members of the EMS. Britain is not a member of the EMS, nor is likely to be one in the near future. Ibid., 14 November 1980.
- 25 Ibid., 3 June 1980.
- 26 Ibid., 19 February 1980.
- 27 Ibid., 8 March 1980.
- 28 Ibid., 17 July and 16 September 1980.
- 29 According to Enoch Powell, the decision to join EEC was an observation. *The Times*, 1 October 1980.
- 30 Ibid., 21 November 1980.
- 31 Ibid., 17 April 1980.
- 32 Ibid., 6 June 1980.
- 33 *Financial Times* (London), 26 March 1980.
- 34 *The Times*, 2 October 1980. According to Enoch Powell, outside the EEC Britain could be stronger, more prosperous, more confident and could have better relations with its continental neighbours.

- 35 Ibid., 30 August 1980.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 *Financial Times*, 10 November 1979.
- 38 *The Times*, 6 June 1980.
- 39 Ibid., 30 December 1980.
- 40 Ibid., 6 January 1981.
- 41 Ibid., 14 March 1980.
- 42 Ibid., 15 November 1977.

DRAGON KINGDOM'S URGE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE

By MANORAMA KOHLI*

DURING the year 1979, on a couple of occasions in a few statements of the Bhutan ruler and its National Assembly, one could sense that landlocked and sheltered Bhutan was in for a major change in its role as a sovereign and independent state. Many in India were ready to assume that to meet the growing aspirations of Bhutan for an "international role" the Treaty of 1949 may have to be revised. Article 2 of the Treaty in particular, under which Bhutan is to be guided and advised by the Government of India in the conduct of its foreign relations, it was felt, may have to be abandoned altogether.¹ The Druk Gyalpo (ruler), Jigme Singye Wangchuk in a Press conference in Bombay in September 1979, stated that the Treaty of 1949 needed to be "updated."² To many it sounded that Bhutan was not fully satisfied with the existing pattern of its relationship with its southern neighbour.³

Only a month earlier, some members of the National Assembly of Bhutan had held that Article 2 of the Treaty did not bind Bhutan to accept all advice rendered by India; it only obliged it to seek the latter's advice and guidance.⁴ A somewhat similar interpretation had been made a couple of times earlier also,⁵ but read along with a "candid" demand of the Druk Gyalpo for "updating" the Treaty of 1949 it sounded a little different.

Even more disturbing from the Indian point of view was the impression that Bhutan was seeking to have direct talks with Beijing on the question of boundary delineation between the two countries.⁶ The Druk Gyalpo's statement, "to leave the border undemarcated would be to the disadvantage of Bhutan in the long run," was inferred as an attempt to initiate some diplomatic moves to have talks with China for the settlement of the boundary dispute which had been hanging fire ever since the days of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Though the Druk Gyalpo denied having any intention of establishing diplomatic contacts with China since he called it "utter nonsense,"⁷ the opening of some limited communication with China could not altogether be ruled out.

At the Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in August 1979 at Havana, Bhutan took a stand on the issue of the admission of Kampuchea which was found to be not only different from that of India but which fell in line with that of China. While India favoured leaving the seat vacant, China supported the claims of the ousted Pol Pot regime of Kampuchea.⁸ Bhutan, earlier in the United Nations and in the non-aligned conferences had voted differently from that of India, as for example, on the issue of the rights of the land-locked countries, but the Kampuchean issue was too serious a

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subject, of immediate concern to India and its position in Asia. Therefore the fact that Bhutan should become a supporter of Chinese strategy in the whole of Southeast Asia was viewed very seriously by the then occupants of South Block, causing quite a "flutter in the dove-cots."

In any case, the specific issue of the revision of the Treaty of 1949 was closed when in November 1979 the Druk Gyalpo said that he did not see any need for the revision of the Treaty.⁹ Nevertheless, the larger issue remains very much alive and therefore needs proper examination. If the Dragon Kingdom wants to play a larger role in the wider issues of regional and international importance, the question would be asked as to what extent this role is consistent with the existing status and power position of Bhutan? The answer to this question will have to be formulated in the context of the perception of the Bhutanese leadership, of their "national interest," and of the altered status of the kingdom as a member of the international community. From the decision of Bhutan at Havana and the statements of the Druk Gyalpo and National Assembly members it seems that there is an urge for an "international role" on the part of Bhutan.

At times one tends to think that these expressions are merely of a demonstrative character. These are impulsive reactions, one may argue, of a people who lived in a state of isolation for centuries together, and now that the barriers were broken there was an outburst of new hopes and aspirations. Therefore what was very important for Bhutan was that its recently acquired sovereign status should be made known to as many countries and peoples as possible and what it was unable to have for hundreds of years it should now have in a few decades. Such a demonstrative urge sometimes makes the people overlook the physical limitations of their kingdom.

But notwithstanding the demonstrative aspect, few will be able to hold that Bhutan's political and legal status as a polity has not witnessed a tremendous change since the Treaty was signed in 1949. What therefore the National Assembly or the ruler is asking for is the consequence of that change. Even the exhibitive urge is a reflection of the growing awareness of the people that as a community they must be evaluated in the context of this change, indeed as a "sovereign and equal" member of the family of nations which Bhutan claims to be. It is therefore imperative that such a status must be conferred upon it both in formalistic diplomatic terms as well as in the structure and process of decision-making in the international bodies. The Kampuchean issue at Havana or the voting pattern of Bhutan in the United Nations forums are individual examples of that quest of Bhutan as a "state".

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN BHUTAN

It is well known that even after the formal recognition of Bhutan and Nepal as independent states, the British did not allow or encourage them

to participate in matters even of direct mutual interest to them. To keep them isolated from the outside world, as well as apart from each other, was indeed the principal objective of Britain's imperial policy as followed by it in the entire Himalayan region. India, on the other hand, after independence rejected such an approach as Nehru and the Congress Party were determined to abandon the entire imperialistic model of Britain in the Himalayan neighbourhood, as elsewhere.¹⁰ An indication of such an approach was given when in 1947 at the Asian Relations Conference both Nepal and Bhutan along with Tibet were invited.¹¹

Treaty of 1949 Ushers in a New Era in Bilateral Relations

Consistent with India's anti-imperialist attitude therefore, while concluding the Treaty of 1949 with Bhutan replacing the earlier agreement of 1910, some changes of a subtle nature were made. The Treaty substituted the word "Maharaja" as used in 1910 by "Druk Gyalpo" for the ruler of Bhutan. This was done to hold the Bhutanese Head of State distinct from the rulers of princely states in India who were normally designated as "Maharajas".¹² Difference could also be discerned in the relevant provisions of the Treaty of 1949 defining the procedure and machinery for the settlement of disputes between India and Bhutan arising out of the application and interpretation of the Treaty.¹³ The surrender of an area of about 32 square miles in the Dewangiri region to Bhutan was also motivated by India's desire to "set right the inequality of the British rule left as a legacy to the Government of India."¹⁴ To quote Dr. Nagendra Singh, the signing of the treaty "ushered in a new era in the legal status of Bhutan leading ultimately to the emergence of Bhutan as a modern state fully equipped to become a member of the United Nations."¹⁵

Events in the Himalayas Precipitate Opening of Bhutan

Yet it is not only in purely legalistic terms that India showed a positive response to the emergence of Bhutan as a sovereign state. India also played an active role in the birth of modern Bhutan in the wider political sense. Indeed, India was as much responsible as the then Maharaja of Bhutan in deciding to end the closed status of Bhutan which was partly a self-imposed condition. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the opening of Bhutan was precipitated by the events in the Himalayas, which were so close to the borders both of India and Bhutan, during the decade of the 1950s. The occupation of Tibet by China during 1949-51 and the subsequent Tibet Revolt in 1959 convinced both India and Bhutan that a closed Bhutan was only an invitation to subversion from China and a gap in the defences of India in the eastern sector.¹⁶ Therefore, following the historic visit of Pandit Nehru to Bhutan in 1958, the forbidden Buddhist Kingdom in the Himalayas

decided to open its doors to the outside world under the imaginative and farsighted leadership of Jigme Dorji Wangchuk.¹⁷

BHUTAN ENTERS COMITY OF NATIONS

With the ending of isolation therefore, it was inevitable that Bhutan should awaken to a new outlook and to a new experience.¹⁸ The process of internationalization of Bhutan as a sovereign and independent country started unfolding itself slowly and gradually but in decisive terms. It began with the admission of Bhutan to the Colombo Plan in the early 1960s when as its member it became eligible to receive necessary aid and assistance.¹⁹ Seven years later, in 1969, Bhutan became a member of the International Postal Union. This was Bhutan's first admission to a regular international organization of a world-wide character.²⁰ But the decisive breakthrough for Bhutan came in 1971 when India sponsored its admission to the United Nations.²¹ Bhutan got a seat in the prestigious third world body, the non-aligned movement, in 1973 at the Algiers Conference. As a consequence Bhutan's dependence on India, which at one time was almost its exclusive diplomatic channel, was substantially reduced.²² It would therefore be highly unrealistic to believe that the change was without any impact on the perception of the rulers in Bhutan and their diplomatic interests; they now were more enthusiastic on further enlargement of their foreign contacts. As an Indian diplomat with wide experience in Bhutan and Sikkim, wrote in 1969 :

Once Bhutan has abandoned her isolation and established contact with the rest of the world, she will inevitably be drawn into the mainstream of world events and before long she will claim her place in the community of nations.²³

Changes in the international status of Bhutan necessitated some adjustments in the pattern of Indo-Bhutanese bilateral relationship also. On the surface they might appear to be merely symbolic, but when examined in depth they speak of the new consciousness of Bhutan, of its altered position. It will therefore be too simplistic to take these adjustments as only of a superficial nature.

Diversification of Bhutan-India Relations in the Seventies

In 1963, the Bhutan ruler got his title changed from "His Highness" to "His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo." The change certainly indicated a new emphasis on a distinct identity of his "Bhutanese designation."²⁴ In 1968 the "Residency," the office through which India's dealings with Bhutan and Sikkim were conducted, was re-designated as "India House". The name Residency, it was argued, smacked of British colonialism since for all political

purposes the British Viceroys in India did not consider Bhutan more than a "dependency."²⁵ The same year, Bhutan agreed to have a special officer from India "to coordinate, expedite and facilitate the implementation of various Indian-aided projects in Bhutan as well as a Liason Officer of the Government of India with the Government of Bhutan for all other matters of mutual interest." For the first time "Bhutan permitted a Resident Representative of another country on their soil."²⁶ These seemingly minor changes in Indo-Bhutanese relations however marked the beginnings of diversification of Bhutan's bilateral relations more or less on formal lines. The next change which took place in 1971 was consistent with Bhutan joining the United Nations; Bhutan's representation in India and vice versa was raised to the ambassadorial level.²⁷ A full-fledged External Affairs Ministry was created in Bhutan in June 1972.²⁸ Thus by the mid-1970s, as a member of the Colombo Plan, International Postal Union, United Nations and subsequently of the non-aligned movement and with fullfledged diplomatic contacts with India and partial contacts with the other countries through international organizations, Bhutan was on the threshold of breaking new ground in terms of its role as a "nation state."

In the year 1978, presumably at the request of the Bhutan Government, the Bhutan Mission in New Delhi, as it was known till then, was renamed as the Royal Bhutan Embassy. Commenting on the change in the nomenclature of the Bhutan Mission, a leading Indian daily wrote: "the revised nomenclature is not without significance, especially since it should logically lead to a qualitative change in the Indo-Bhutanese connexion."²⁹ The change at any rate, underlined the "manifestations of the land-locked mountain kingdom striving to acquire a more distinct personality in the comity of nations."³⁰

EXPANSION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

This quest of Bhutan became manifest in further expansion of its diplomatic relations in the economic field outside the Colombo Plan and the United Nations, independent of and beyond India. By virtue of an agreement signed between India and Bhutan in 1978, the latter was permitted to sell its exportable surpluses to third countries provided India was not in a position to buy them.³¹ Till then Bhutan's trade contacts were exclusively with India except those under the aegis of the Colombo Plan which permitted only limited contacts with countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan etc.

Bhutan opened diplomatic relations with Dacca in Bangladesh in 1979. This is the first country after India with which Bhutan now has full-fledged ambassadorial relations.³² That further diversification is on the cards may not altogether be ignored. The keenness with which the Druk Gyalpo has been pursuing the case for the establishment of an air base in Bhutan ever since 1978 is an index of the desire for diversification and opening up the

country. Air links are vital for the people of a land-locked country in which the development of a circulatory system both in internal and external fields is handicapped by its geographical features. In 1980 New Delhi accepted this demand of Bhutan.³³

WIDENING HORIZONS OF A NEWLY EMERGENT STATE

Bhutan's rising urge to play an independent role in foreign matters must also be attributed partly to the internal developments in Bhutan and the growing sense of nationalism among its people. The number of people who are now more conscious of a "state idea" is larger today than twenty years earlier although the state's socio-economic structure continues to be predominantly feudalistic. The geophysical characteristics of Bhutan with high, impassable mountain peaks and torrential water streams dividing the country into a number of valleys has helped in cultivating a sense of self-sufficiency and distinctness among the inhabitants. The absence of transportation and communication lines contributed to exclusiveness among different tribal communities who chose to live in different valleys, each developing its own distinct language, customs and way of life. A sense of security which some of the loftiest Himalayan peaks in the region engendered among the people as a whole did not let them feel the relevance of a strong national government.³⁴ In sum, Bhutan till very recently was without strong national sentiments overriding their local and tribal loyalties. Except for the theocratic institution of monarchy there were hardly any functionaries or institutions with nation-wide activities and jurisdiction.

Communication Network Breaks Down Social and Cultural Barriers

With the decision to end the secluded status of Bhutan, a process of internal development and modernization of the so-called state machinery had also to be launched. Following Nehru's visit to Bhutan in 1958 and talks with the then Druk Gyalpo, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, the first Five Year Plan for Bhutan was formulated. Financed entirely by India, to the tune of rupees seventeen crores, the main emphasis was on road building projects in Bhutan of which there were hardly any till then. But today there are four main highways already completed as a consequence of which the major towns in Bhutan like Thimpu, Paro, Tongsa and Tashidzong have been connected with the plains region in West Bengal and Assam in India. Besides, they also help interlink different valleys in the country. As a matter of fact many of these roads have quite a good amount of traffic, both of goods and passengers, being carried through the state-controlled transport system. Needless to say that these roads have played a major role in destroying barriers among the people which existed at one time almost in absolute terms. With more intercommunication a sense of common nationhood, a necessary ingredient of a "modern state system," is likely to grow further.

While on the one hand these communications facilitate people from remote corners to reach areas of economic and industrial activities, they also break down and erode cultural and linguistic barriers. The development of educational programmes are also likely to usher in similar results.³⁵

Economic Progress Generates Parallel Political Changes

Above all, Bhutan's political system has also witnessed quite a few changes and innovations. Although it is said that the first Maharaja of Bhutan, Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, had drawn a blue print of road building activities and other reforms for Bhutan,³⁶ it is Jigme Dorji Wangchuk who is regarded as the "Father of modern Bhutan". It was he who conceived the entire idea of the socio-economic development of Bhutan and decided to end the policy of isolation, also it was during his reign³⁷ that the political system was given a "new look". The country's governmental system was democratized; in 1965 he established an Advisory Council to advise him in all matters of national importance. A Council of Ministers to help the King discharge state administrative and executive functions was established three years later.³⁷ The Council can be compared to a body of ministers with each member incharge of a major department of the Government. In 1969 the Tsongdu,³⁸ the National Assembly of Bhutan which had been in existence for almost half a century, was given more powers than it enjoyed hitherto. On a proposal initiated by the Maharaja it was converted into a "sovereign" body since its decisions did not require approval of the Druk Gyalpo in order to be effective.³⁹ In 1968 the first ever banking institution was introduced in Bhutan.⁴⁰ The following year, the High Court of Bhutan came into existence marking a great step forward towards the separation of the Executive from the Judiciary. Indeed, Thimpu which is the seat of all these institutions with a secretariat building and buildings of the UN Aid and Indian Embassy, plus a three star hotel run by the Government, a fairly modern shopping complex and quite a few towering public buildings, has become the symbol of the change in this traditional, medieval Buddhist Kingdom, and all this within a short span of about two decades. A national museum which has more recently been set up at Paro, is yet another illustration of the nation-state idea which helps a people seek an identity of their own in the outer world. While it is true that the idea has not yet taken root in the hearts and minds of average Bhutanese who still cling to the traditional way of life, one cannot at the same time deny the fact that the ruling elite, the royalty and the princely class and quite a few well educated and Western oriented families have been sufficiently exposed to these ideas and also articulate them in terms of policy decisions and state behaviour. What is therefore called a quest for an international role is nothing except a parallel movement in politics which emerges out of economic progress and emancipation and manifests itself in the assertion of national character and widening horizons of a newly

emergent nation.⁴¹ As the compulsions for economic modernism increase a horizontal expansion in Bhutan's external contacts is understandable.

Tibetan Developments

One of the determinants of the external behaviour of any state is the impact of its immediate environment and its perception by the leadership. Bhutan's environment, needless to say, is the South-Asian sub-continent and within this it is the Himalayan sub-region which affects it most intimately and in a variety of ways. An event therefore leading to a major shift in the geo-political and strategic conditions in the Himalayas must have a direct and enduring influence on Bhutan. As such the role which it will play in the changed environment should directly be related to the perception that the ruling groups formulate of the situation. That it was the developments⁴² in Tibet, first during 1949-51 and in the following ten years or so, were the most decisive factor in making Bhutan give up its policy of isolation must again be cited as a case even at the cost of sounding repetitive. Perhaps after the Younghusband Expedition in Tibet in 1903-04⁴³ this was the most important event in the history of the Himalayan region during the present century. It affected the power configuration not only in the region but as the subsequent Sino-Indian clash came to prove, in the entire Asian continent as well. Ever since the "loss" of autonomous status of Tibet, the Himalayan heartland, the Kingdoms and territories of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were exposed to a challenge, the size and magnitude of which had not been witnessed earlier in the entire historical memories of the people of the area. The sealing of the borders between Bhutan and Tibet was one consequence which flowed directly from this event.⁴³ A new window which would enable Bhutan to get out of this sealed status was necessary. If therefore a single factor explanation has to be offered justifying the end of the closed door policy of Bhutan, then it must be found in this event of the 1950's.

REGIONAL FACTORS FACILITATING EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Nepal's New Role Worthy of Emulation

Ever since the loss of Tibet, other changes, though not of an equal dimension, from the point of view of the changing role of Bhutan in foreign matters, have taken place. First, the emergence of Nepal from a position of "special relationship" with India to that of "equidistance" between India and China and later, as a "balancer" between two giant neighbours might have left a pattern which the ruling elite in Bhutan found relevant for imitation. That Nepal's role in the Himalayan region may be described as that of "pace-setter" in this respect, need not altogether be lost sight of even though Bhutan has not the same potentialities in terms of size,

location and development, etc.⁴⁴ Therefore the policy of diversification which Kathmandu adopted in the earlier phase might indeed be a model for Bhutan also in the years to come. Besides, since the two kingdoms share a common geographical environment they are likely to formulate an identical strategy as far as the protection and promotion of their interests are concerned. This has already been witnessed in regard to the question of the rights of the land-locked countries.⁴⁵ Also being more experienced in terms of its diplomatic relationships Nepal can see the advantage of bringing Bhutan to its side and presenting a joint strategy for the sake of securing some concessions from India, both economic and political.⁴⁶

Sikkim's Merger with India Heightens Insecurity

The second factor of intra-Himalayan significance was the joining of Sikkim as a state in the Indian Union. There was a pronounced unfavourable reaction in Bhutan and Nepal; both of them behaved in an assertive manner in their external relations. The event was viewed by them as a loss of "cultural identity" of a neighbouring Himalayan kingdom. A reaction defined purely in instinctive terms was that of the protection of the traditional identity of Bhutan as well as Nepal. The urge to widen Bhutan's contacts with the countries in Asia and even outside can therefore be ascribed to a sense also of insecurity which got heightened after the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union. The occasion of the coronation of Jigma Singye Wangchuk was in fact utilized for consecrating the sovereign status of Bhutan through "recognition" by the Great Powers. The festivities on the occasion and the list of the invitees, including the Super Powers, was "an attempt by Bhutan to assert itself as a sovereign nation."⁴⁷ In particular Bhutan utilized this opportunity to invite China. It was after a gap of almost sixty-five years that an official delegation from China visited Bhutan.⁴⁸ Although the Druk Gyalpo negated all apprehensions of Bhutan seeking to establish regular official links with China,⁴⁹ this could certainly be interpreted as a beginning in the "normalization" of Sino-Bhutanese relations.

China's New Diplomatic Role

No discussion on Bhutan's changing role as a nation state is complete without reference to China. Chinese policies and strategies adopted in the context of the Himalayan region and with the neighbouring states will always be watched very closely by Bhutan. Therefore any actual or perceived change in China's behaviour will also lead to some adjustments and alterations in Bhutan's policy approaches and strategies. Ever since the occupation of Tibet, China's consistent objective has been to wean the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim away from India. Till mid-1960s China tried to achieve this through "aggressive diplomacy." But after it failed

it has adopted the "diplomacy of sweet neighbourliness and equal friendship." To this end, the Chinese leaders found it pertinent to play upon the independent sentiments of the ruling elites in these states. This was an added thrust of Chinese diplomacy with which it also approached Bhutan. Thus while visiting Bhutan in 1974, the leader of the Chinese delegation, Ma Mu-Ming took special note of the desires of the Bhutan Government to rely on their own efforts in developing their economy and safeguarding their sovereignty and economic self-reliance.⁵⁰

Bhutanese Elite Takes Advantage of Political Changes in India

Last, but perhaps the most important regional factor in Bhutan's external role is India and its position and status in the sub-continent. Being a small state and handicapped by its land-locked position, Bhutan must look towards India for the widening of its contacts with the third countries. The Dragon Kingdom's capability in international matters therefore will depend upon the concessions and advantages it is able to extract from India.

During the Janata rule, Indian leadership pursuing the policy of what is called "beneficial bilateralism" chose to maintain a "low diplomatic profile" towards all the neighbouring countries.⁵¹ Taking this as a favourable factor the Bhutanese sought to have as many concessions as possible from the new Government.⁵² Thus it was during Janata rule that Bhutan was allowed to diversify its economic and political contacts. The echoes for the revision of the treaty also became louder during Janata rule.

But when no less a person than Druk Gyalpo himself voiced concern for "updating" the treaty New Delhi was going through a period of extreme political uncertainty. A lame duck government such as which obtained in New Delhi during the second half of 1979, could have been looked upon as a "weak India" by Bhutan; indeed the Bhutanese ruling elite seem to have made a concerted effort to further Bhutan's position of vantage. From a comment which the Druk Gyalpo made about India's role in the Havana Conference such an impression appears obvious. Speaking of Bhutan's stand on the Kampuchean issue at the Havana meet, he said :

India took no position at all. Can you blame us if we took one and can our stand be described as being in opposition to India ?⁵³

A Chandigarh daily reacted to this :

Perhaps it was the vacuum in power in Delhi that led the Royal Government to seek changes which would have increased its scope for establishing independent contacts with foreign powers.⁵⁴

Yet another factor which cannot be ignored is the policy of normalization of India's bilateral relations with China which was a part and parcel of

India's policy of "beneficial bilateralism." An apprehension that a condition of growing detente between the two big neighbours of Bhutan might erode India's interest and its involvement in the economic development of Bhutan, could also have accentuated the assertive and independent tone of Bhutan vis-a-vis India. This is how the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering, summed up the deliberations of the National Assembly in which some members spoke of the need to establish direct communication with China. He said :

Some National Assembly members felt that if China and India became friends Bhutan would lose all importance to Peking and New Delhi. They thought we should make our own efforts to develop ties with China or be left out in the cold.⁵⁵

CONCLUDING REMARKS

One may conclude this analysis by saying that Bhutan has undoubtedly come a long way ever since the signing of the Treaty of 1949. Both internally and externally it has acquired many traits of a modern nation state. What is, therefore called its quest for an international role is but an articulation of that "state idea." A document which was signed in 1949 sounds outdated in the context of the altered environment of Bhutan. As a matter of fact it has already been re-interpreted. In the 1960's it appeared to Bhutan that it was "not hundred per cent independent." But the position that is now taken is that the advice which the Government of India gives to Bhutan "is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not."⁵⁶ Bhutan's current behaviour is obviously in conformity with this interpretation of the Treaty. India has evidently accepted this interpretation as there is no contradictory official statement nor has it placed any impediments in the externalization of Bhutan as a sovereign and independent state.

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NOTES

- 1 For the text of the Treaty see *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1949-1959*. Lok Sabha Secretariat (New Delhi, 1959) 2nd. edition, pp. 17-19.
- 2 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September 1979.
- 3 See the Editorial, *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 27 November, 1979.
- 4 *Sunday Standard* (Chandigarh), 27 August, 1979.
- 5 Talking to Indian newsmen in June 1960, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, the then Bhutan ruler had stated, "We don't consider ourselves to be the protectorate of India. We consider ourselves independent. But we are not hundred per cent independent because of the 1949 Treaty." *The Hindu* (Madras), 3 June, 1960. In 1964, the acting Prime Minister of Bhutan, Lhendup Dorji told a Press Conference, "there is no bar to Bhutan's participation in independent foreign relations." *The Hindu*, 10 August, 1964. In 1974, Jigme Singye Wangchuk said that Art. 2 of the Treaty "did not impinge upon Bhutan's right to

- conduct its relations with foreign countries." *Hindustan Times*, 7 June, 1974. The Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tsering, in a news conference at Thimpu in June 1974 said that the "advice given to Bhutan by India in foreign policy matters is entirely optional and it is upto Bhutan to follow it or not." *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 7 June, 1974.
- 6 Bhutan has almost a four hundred km long common boundary with Tibet. Due to vague delineation the boundary is disputed in places. Ever since the emergence of the Sino-Indian border dispute the Indian approach has been to include the Tibeto-Bhutan sector also in its border talks with China.
- 7 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September, 1979.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 5 September, 1979.
- 9 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 9 November, 1979.
- 10 Partly due to the bilateral approach which India followed and partly in the absence of a clear policy statement by India a confusion persists even today on account of which it is often contended that India after independence also has sought to preserve the old "colonial rights" in these States. For details of this view see Srikant Dutt, "India and the Himalayan States," *Asian Affairs* (London), Vol. XI, Part I, February 1980, pp. 72-78.
- 11 The Conference was not officially convened by the Government of India but since the Government rendered every possible assistance in the holding of the Conference and the aims and objectives of the Conference were in conformity with the views of Jawaharlal Nehru, it can be cited as a case of India's official point of view. For details see A. Appadorai, "The Asian Relations Conference in Perspective," *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1979, pp. 275-285.
- 12 Nagendra Singh, *Bhutan: A Kingdom in the Himalayas*. (New Delhi, 1972), p. 137.
- 13 See Article 9 of the Treaty of 1949.
- 14 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 135.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Pradyuman P. Karan and William M. Jenkins, *The Himalayan Kingdoms : Bhutan Sikkim and Nepal* (Princeton, 1963), p. 49. It is believed by some writers that Bhutan's immediate response to Nehru's proposal to modify its isolationist policy was non-committal as the then Maharaja feared that this would involve the Himalayan Kingdom in big-power confrontation. Nevertheless, the circumstances of 1959-60 were such that Bhutan was left with no choice and decided for closer relationship with India. See Leo E. Rose, "Bhutan's External Relations," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 47, No 2 Summer 1974, p. 195.
- 17 At least one Indian author, Nari Rustomji, who served as Adviser to the Government of Bhutan at one time gives credit for ending the policy of isolationism to the then Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji. For details see his *Bhutan : The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (Delhi, 1978), pp. 10-12.
- 18 V.H. Coelho, *Sikkim and Bhutan* (New Delhi, 1970), p. 98.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 20 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 148.
- 21 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 24 December, 1971.
- 22 Leo E. Rose, n. 16, p. 202.
- 23 Coelho, n. 18, p. 74.
- 24 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 137.
- 25 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 10 May, 1968.
- 26 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, pp. 139-140.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 28 *Statesman*, 19 June, 1972.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 *Indian Express*, (Chandigarh), 16 August, 1978.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 30 March, 1978.
- 32 *Statesman*, 30 December, 1979.
- 33 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 26 February, 1980.

- 34 Bhutan experienced for a very long time civil war conditions on account of different warring factions led by provincial leaders of Bhutan. In 1885 when the then Tongsa Penlop Ugyen Wangchuk emerged as the strong man the civil war came to an end. In 1907 Ugyen Wangchuk was installed as the Maharaja of Bhutan with the help of the British Indian Government. This was the beginning of the dynastic rule in Bhutan; the present Druk Gyalpo is fourth in the line of succession.
- 35 According to official reports, till the close of the year 1977-78, Bhutan had one hundred and twenty two educational institutions of which one was a "junior college," two teachers' training institutions and two technical training establishments. As many as one hundred and thirty three students had gone to India and abroad to receive higher education. For details of the statistics in developmental activities of Bhutan see *Statistics At a Glance, 1977*, Planning Commission, Bhutan, Central Statistical Organisation (Thimpu, 1978).
- 36 Archival records indicate that J.C. White, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Bhutan in 1906, suggested to the then Government of India to undertake the road building projects in Bhutan. (*Foreign Deptt. Secret E. Consultations*, June 1907, No. 637). Sir Ugyen Wangchuk not only evinced interest in the proposal but also expressed keenness to develop the resources of his country (*Enclosure, Foreign Deptt. External. A Consultations*, December 1908, No. 41).
- 37 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 139.
- 38 The Tsongdu is an old Bhutanese institution but in its present form and character it was revived by Jigme Dorji Wangchuk in 1953.
- 39 Ram Rahul, *The Himalayan Borderland* (Delhi, 1969), p. 112.
- 40 Nagendra Singh, n. 12, p. 145.
- 41 Sunanda K. Datta Ray, "The Awakening of the Dragon," *Statesman* (New Delhi), 4 April, 1978.
- 42 Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, during his term of office, initiated a Himalayan policy which is often described as the "forward policy." Within the framework of this policy he wanted the British Government to extend their sphere of influence right upto the borders of the Himalayas so as to prevent any other foreign power asserting its supremacy in the region. Since he perceived that Russia was on its onward march towards Tibet, after prolonged and persistent appeals to Whitehall he was finally able to procure consent to send a mission to Lhasa the objective of which, as put on records, was to have some trade concessions from Lhasa. But as his private correspondence reveals, the real motive was political. At the end of the expedition a convention called the Tibet Convention was concluded in 1905. This is how the well-known British policy of conferring buffer status on Tibet and the bordering states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim reached its apex. For a detailed account of the expedition see Parshotam Mehra, *The Younghusband Expedition : An Interpretation* (Bombay, 1968); Alastair Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia : Road to Lhasa* (London, 1960), pp. 275-317.
- 43 Bhutan's trade links with Tibet were as frequent and old as those with India. To Tibet, the main supply from Bhutan was that of rice. When the Bhutan-Tibet border was sealed and all trade contacts between the two came to a stop it caused a serious economic strain on the Bhutanese polity. It was partly to meet this strain that Bhutan had to launch its developmental activities in 1961. For details see Rahul, n. 39, pp. 123-127.
- 44 Nepal's experience of having been able to have "a more positive international image abroad" has also brought in focus some constraints of such a policy model. For the argument see Rose, n. 16, pp. 198-199.
- 45 Dutt, n. 10, p. 76.
- 46 In August 1980, Nepal's National Assembly urged upon the Government to pursue vigorously their policy of developing close ties with all the South Asian neighbours including Bhutan with which the need to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations was also expressed. *Times of India* (New Delhi. 14 August 1980).
- 47 *The Times* (London), 30 May, 1974; Dutt, n. 10, p. 76.

- 48 The last time when an official Chinese delegation had visited Bhutan was in 1908.
- 49 *The Hindu* (Madras), 7 June, 1974.
- 50 *Indian Express* (New Delhi) 18 June, 1974.
- 51 For an interpretation of Janata's style of non-alignment see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Towards Good Neighbourliness," *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4, July-December, 1978, pp. 463-474.
- 52 It is however said that a "low profile" image which the Janata Government chose to follow towards the neighbouring countries of India was a failure in the ultimate analysis. For this view see S. D. Muni, "India's Beneficial Bilateralism in South Asia," *India Quarterly*, (New Delhi) Vol. XXXV, no. 4, October-December, 1979, pp. 417-433.
- 53 *Indian Express* (Chandigarh), 11 September, 1979.
- 54 See the Editorial, "Relations with Bhutan," *The Tribune*, (Chandigarh), 27 November, 1979.
- 55 *The Tribune*, 5 November, 1979.
- 56 See n. 5 above.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

DYNAMICS OF CONFRONTATION: TARAPUR AND INDO-US RELATIONS

THE hard reality of today's nuclear world is based on the Super Power fallacy that there can only be two options on the nuclear issue—that a country can either be a nuclear-weapons state (NWS) or a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). In view of the decline in other sources of energy, however, the importance of a third option—the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—has increased considerably over the last few decades. Since the line between the technological research required for the peaceful exploitation of the atom and weapons technology is very fine, the Super Powers, particularly the United States, are suspicious of any country which has advanced independently in the field of nuclear research. And this suspicion is especially directed at non-aligned nations, which may develop into independent nuclear power centres or may upset the precarious balance of terror which has been achieved through the “mutual deterrence” tactics of the two major power blocs. The Super Powers, however, have not been able to stop the emergence of a number of medium Powers, who have demonstrated or undemonstrated nuclear capabilities. Although they have not opted for nuclear weapons, they are not likely to surrender their independence on the question of decision-making on nuclear issues. The growing shortage of traditional sources of energy, the kaleidoscopic changes in international affairs, especially in South-West Asia, and the intransigent attitude of the Super Powers, therefore, point to the fact that nuclear issues affecting international and bilateral economic and security relations among technologically advanced and technologically advancing countries are likely to become increasingly significant in their foreign policy calculation in the decade of the eighties. A recent example of an extreme case of action taken on the basis of a country's threat perception is the pre-emptive strike by Israeli planes on an Iraqi nuclear plant. The case of Tarapur, though less dramatic, is equally important as a study of the dynamics of confrontation of the nuclear policies of a major nuclear weapons state and a developing nation which despite its capability, has rejected the nuclear weapons option without surrendering its independence on nuclear decision-making.

The Tarapur Atomic Power Station symbolizes India's advancement in the field of nuclear technology. However, it also symbolizes the effects of dependence on another country for its basic requirements. As a necessary price to be paid for the rapid development of nuclear technology, India bound itself by an agreement, signed in 1963, to operate the Tarapur station only on special nuclear fuel (U-235) supplied by the United States. In exchange for American technological assistance and the supply of enriched uranium, India also submitted the Tarapur plant to inspections and pledged to account for all fissile material. In January 1971, it was placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards through a trilateral agreement. There was no hitch in Indo-US co-operation on the Tarapur

plant till 1974, although the Indian position on international controls over nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power had diverged widely from that of the United States from the very beginning. Then, on 18 May 1974, India detonated a peaceful nuclear device at Pokhran and shocked the "nuclear club" into a new perception of threshold countries. The United States increased its commitments to the IAEA to enable it to have more control over the diversion of nuclear supplies for "non-peaceful" purposes. In addition, a meeting of 15 major nuclear suppliers was held at London to work out, among other things, stricter guidelines for the control of the end-uses of exported nuclear materials and technologies and the application of IAEA safeguards in places where they were not already in operation. And India, the "offender", came in for special arm-twisting by the United States because not only had India demonstrated its independence in nuclear decision-making and had acquired considerable technological know-how through foreign assistance and indigenous experimentation, it had also consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would have opened all its plants and research work to international inspection and therefore, interference. According to the American viewpoint, the technology required for a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was the same as that for a "non-peaceful" one, and therefore, India was subverting the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by insisting on the right of NNWS to experiment with PNEs. The fact that this argument was blatantly discriminatory, since the Super Powers continued to perfect their weapons technology, was glossed over. India's weak point, at this juncture, was its dependence on America for its supply of nuclear fuel for Tarapur, and powerful interest groups within the United States did not hesitate to use the fuel as a hostage in an attempt to pressurize India into toeing the American line on its nuclear policy. The intensity of American intransigence has not been merited as India has not broken any of its contractual obligations with the United States. But it appears now that because of the American attitude, both countries, are moving towards an "amicable" termination of the Tarapur Agreement which was to be in force till 1993.

AMERICAN NUCLEAR CONSIDERATIONS

The fact is that the 1974 explosion suddenly brought a highly contentious issue to the foreground. India and the United States had always looked at the nuclear question from completely different angles. Although both countries opposed proliferation, the United States promoted horizontal non-proliferation alone, while continuing to increase its own stocks of nuclear weapons. India, however, believed in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and opposed both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. It also believed that it should not be a party to any international agreement which was discriminatory and pursued the goal of curbing proliferation only at a horizontal level.

The twin considerations of America's nuclear policy have been nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation. In the context of the bi-polar world which it has helped to create, its primary focus has been on nuclear deterrence, which entails the massive stockpiling of nuclear arms. By implication, therefore, it is restricted from promoting vertical non-proliferation, as this would cut into the very foundations of its security perceptions. Non-proliferation, it must be pointed out, was a later consideration. In the beginning most nations had neither the resources nor the technological know-how to go in for nuclear armaments. It was only after the French voiced their intention to acquire nuclear weapons with or without American assistance in the late fifties, that the grave possibilities of the proliferation of nuclear weapons acquired significance for the United States. Non-proliferation became an obsessional issue with the American Government in the 1960s. In his Inaugural Address, John F. Kennedy stated that both the United States and the Soviet Union were "rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom."¹ Later, in his State of the Union Message, he reiterated that "we must prevent . . . [the] arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear Powers . . ."² The primary concern of the United States was that weapons proliferation would complicate its nuclear policy, which was essentially suited to a bi-polar world. The creation of new nuclear nations would upset existing alignments and increase the danger of a nuclear war through an erosion of predictability which was one of the basic facts of mutual deterrence. The United States also feared that if even a single additional country joined the so-called "nuclear club", other threshold Powers would be tempted to choose the nuclear option, if not for anything else, for security purposes alone. This was actually an extension of the theory of communism to nuclear issues. One additional factor may have been the economic monopoly that the United States and other members of the nuclear oligopoly held over the non-nuclear weapons states, and would continue to hold if these states were permanently kept in their stranglehold through discriminatory treaties. The United States was ready to share its "atoms for peace" but only on its own terms.

SUPER POWERS AND NPT

It is interesting to note that the United States and the Soviet Union began to co-operate seriously on the issue of non-proliferation only after a third uncertain element—China—broke into the bi-polar system in 1964. It is also significant that the NPT which emerged as a result of prolonged Super Power negotiations mainly guarded the vital interests of the Super Powers: it neither forbade the proliferation of weapons or exchange of technological know-how among nuclear weapon-states nor did it subject these states to international controls. What it actually did was to try to limit nuclear weapons technology to only these states, while banning non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons, or "other nuclear explosive

devices." It further obliged NNWS signatories to accept IAEA "safeguards" so that these states would not be able to divert "nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."³ It was essentially aimed at curbing horizontal proliferation, while by-passing vertical proliferation altogether. Its discriminatory nature was aimed not only at limiting weapons technology to those who already possessed it, but also at banning NNWSs from experimenting with peaceful explosive devices. This would, by inference, relegate signatory NNWSs to a position of permanent technological inferiority.

INDIA'S VIEWPOINT

The Indian position on nuclear issues has been quite different. India's primary concern has been to use nuclear energy to help it overcome its economic problems and disadvantages. The Indian Government has consistently stressed that India is interested only in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to Nehru, "The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India, that is to say, in a country whose power resources are limited, than for . . . an industrially advanced country . . ."⁴ As a follow up, India is also opposed to the idea of using nuclear technology for weapons purposes. The American view of nuclear deterrence is against the Indian concept of disarmament. Thirdly, India has also always maintained its right of independence in decision-making on nuclear issues. As early as 1948, the Indian representative to the United Nations General Assembly, Mrs. Vijaylakshmi Pandit, told the Assembly that while India was willing to give the International Atomic Development Authority all power necessary to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it firmly opposed the idea of giving it any authority that might restrict its national sovereignty over the peaceful utilization of atomic energy resources.⁵ Finally, although India has always opposed nuclear proliferation, it has constantly attacked the discrimination inherent in non-proliferation treaties promoted by the Super Powers. India's position is that horizontal non-proliferation can be justified only if it is accompanied by vertical non-proliferation. Otherwise what might occur is "atomic colonialism" by nuclear "haves" over nuclear "have-nots". Thus, despite its highly principled posture on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, India has consistently refused to sign the discriminatory NPT.

POST-POKHRAN DEVELOPMENTS

Till 1974, however, the United States concentrated on Super Power nuclear diplomacy and paid scant attention to the Indian stand on nuclear issues probably because it did not really expect India to explode its peaceful device. India had however, given fair warning of its nuclear capability. The United States did not draw any line of distinction between a peaceful

explosion and nuclear-weapons testing. Powerful interest-groups immediately jumped to the conclusion that if the NPT was not vigorously enforced, the American conjectures regarding nuclear weapons proliferation may actually become *fait accompli* in the near future. The fact that there has been a significant increase in the number of states which have a near-weapons capability in recent times, served to increase its apprehension. Further, India too added to its special fears by entering into bilateral agreements with a number of non-nuclear weapons states for the promotion and exchange of nuclear technology. Although there is no actual evidence to prove this point, this factor has probably weighed high in its economic and security threat perceptions. Its subsequent actions show that the United States may allow proliferation but again only on its own terms. Its less than adequate response to Israel's surgical strike on Iraq's nuclear plant, its continued nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel despite their known nuclear weapons capabilities, and more significantly the bid to bend the Symington Amendment so as to give massive doses of military aid to Pakistan, which is not a signatory of the NPT, all show that the United States is discriminatory even in its attitude towards horizontal non-proliferation.

However, with regard to India, the American attitude has been very uncompromising. It has indulged in a display of power in which the discontinuation of further supplies of enriched uranium to Tarapur has been held as a "big stick" over India. The period 1974 to 1981 can be analytically divided into four stages, the first leading to the change in government in India in 1977, the second covering the tenure of the Janata party and ending with the Afghanistan crisis in 1979-80, the third comprising President Carter's last year in office, and the fourth beginning with Ronald Reagan's election. Although there has been a definite continuity in the policies of both countries, certain attitudinal differences can be marked in each of the stages. These have been shaped by domestic factors and unexpected regional changes. In the first three stages, the Administration supported the cause of continued supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur, although it stepped up its pressure on India to accept the NPT. Various lobbies and pressure groups in Congress and elsewhere, however, opposed it. In the final stage, there was a shift in the attitude of the Administration as well.

First Phase

Shortly after the Pokhran experiment in 1974, doubts were voiced in both Houses of Congress about India's professions of peaceableness and its assertion that no material supplies by the United States had gone into the PNE. Demands were made for a complete review of the nuclear assistance arrangements between the two countries. The focus was on Tarapur in particular, but the aim was to curb India's sovereignty in nuclear decision-making. The basic question was, as Representative Stanford Parris

put it, "If the nuclear development programme is peaceful . . . why does [India] refuse to sign the NPT?"⁶ The Administration, however, accepted India's assertions and maintained that India had not violated any of its contractual obligations to the United States as set out in the Tarapur Agreement.

The first real challenge came in March 1976. The Center for Law and Social Policy, a private organization, initiated a petition for a right to intervene in the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proceedings on Tarapur. It was acting on behalf of three scientific and environmentalist groups, the Sierra Leone Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources Defence Council, which demanded that the United States should withhold further supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and the possible diversion of the end products of U-235 for the production of weapons. The environmentalists also voiced their concern over the disastrous ecological effects of nuclear installations, but this was merely a hypocritical cover-up of the real intentions. The main objection to the supply of enriched uranium was that India had neither signed the NPT nor renounced its right to experiment with peaceful devices. It was pointed out that if America continued to supply enriched uranium to India, it would lose its leverage with other nuclear-exporting nations like France and Germany in asking them to withhold nuclear technology from NNWS's like Brazil and Iran. If India were to sign the NPT, however, these objections would turn out to be invalid.

At this stage, the State Department, the Justice Department and the NRC's own professional staff recommendations opposed the demands of these groups because of the contractual obligations of the United States. It was against American interests to actually terminate the Agreement at this point because not only would it lose its leverage with India, but such an act would jeopardize America's credibility as a nuclear exporter. During the NRC hearings, the State Department explained that "... our supply performance... will... strongly influence our reputation with other nations [who] would unquestionably view with great seriousness any interruption of the fuel supply ... to a nation which has violated no undertaking to the United States The predictable and inevitable consequence of any such US action will be to assure and accelerate further the development of sources of supply of enriched uranium and nuclear equipment independent of the United States...."⁷ The NRC was finally persuaded to clear one shipment of enriched uranium for Tarapur but deferred its decision on further shipments.

Morarji Desai : A Deviation in Policy?

The second stage in this power game began with the Janata victory in India in March 1977. The new Prime Minister declared that no explosion was required for experimentation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

He further stated that if such experimentation proved to be absolutely necessary, "we can always do it in consultation with other people,"⁸ without naming who these other people were. This made the task of the Carter Administration much simpler, for here was an Indian Administration which was more or less forswearing further nuclear testing. The State Department could push its case for continuing fuel supply to Tarapur, although it warned that another nuclear explosion, peaceful or otherwise would automatically result in the suspension of all American supplies. It is significant that along with his aforementioned policy statement, Morarji Desai also announced that a license for 12 tons of enriched uranium had been cleared for Tarapur, shortly before, on 29 June 1977. Although he assured that his policy change was not a pre-condition for the supply of fuel for Tarapur, he added a suggestive note when he clarified that "there is an understanding that discussions would be held between US and India on the large question of nuclear proliferation."⁹ Whether the Prime Minister was bending India's nuclear policy as a result of American pressure, is not known. It must be pointed out in all fairness, however, that the Desai Government remained firm on the question of not signing the NPT and thus not accepting international safeguards for its other nuclear plants which it had developed without foreign assistance.

This, however, had been the American aim from the beginning. Since the Desai Government had bent one of the basic foundations of India's nuclear policy, the United States increased its pressure to make India accept international control over all its nuclear facilities. President Carter tried to persuade the Janata Government to accept full-scope safeguards during his visit to India in January 1978. Later in 1978, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was passed by both Houses of Congress in the United States. This was an example of "full-scope" pressure tactics. It required that in order to qualify for the export of nuclear materials, a country must agree to full-scope safeguards on its entire nuclear establishment within 13 months of the bill becoming law. By implication it meant that India, if it wished to remain a recipient of nuclear fuel from the United States, would have to accept full-scope safeguards by March 1980. The Act is another instance of Super Power bullying, because in international relations the domestic laws of one country should not affect the contractual obligations of bilateral agreements signed prior to the passage of the domestic law, without the consent of both countries. The Indian Government has, therefore, correctly maintained that India cannot be bound by the restrictions implicit in the 1978 Act and that the Tarapur Agreement cannot be subjected to conditions extraneous to that Agreement.

State Department Versus Congress

The third stage marked a certain urgency on the part of the Carter Administration to improve relations with India. As a result, fuel supply to

Tarapur became a priority issue in Indo-US relations, more so, because the 18 month grace period ended in March 1980 and with it pressure mounted in both Houses of Congress for the immediate suspension of further supplies. The main consideration in the Carter Administration's attitude in this period was the precipitation of the Afghan crisis in December 1979. The importance of India and Pakistan as necessary factors in the American foreign policy calculations, increased with the expansion of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Although it was felt that India had pro-Soviet sympathies, the Carter Administration wished to promote better relations with both India and Pakistan in order to counter the perceived Soviet threat in the region. The new government of Mrs. Gandhi helped matters by condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and expressing hopes of improvement of bilateral relations with Pakistan. Thus, despite the fact that she resorted to the old line on nuclear policy and expressly declined to rule out the possibility of "peaceful nuclear experiments" by India, the Carter Administration thought it expedient to overlook the statement and consolidate relations with India by pushing for the release of licenses ensuring continued supply of enriched uranium to Tarapur. Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, explained to the Foreign Relations Committee that "a refusal at this time to fulfil our obligations under the supply agreements would cast a long shadow on overall relationship with India... [whereas a] positive decision on Tarapur will encourage India in the long term to act in ways consistent with our interests, as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the prospect of a prolonged Soviet presence in Afghanistan."¹⁰ He added that the Soviet Union was sure to exploit the situation if the United States were to refuse further supplies, to the extent that it "...[may well] supplant us as the source of Tarapur fuel." The fact that Pakistan rejected an American aid offer of \$400 million on 5 March 1980 as "peanuts" may also have enhanced India's importance in the strategic perceptions of the United States.

Thus, President Carter issued an Executive Order on 19 June 1980, authorizing the export of 40 tonnes of nuclear fuel, despite an unanimous recommendation by the NRC on 16 May, that export licences should not be granted to India as it had not accepted full-scope safeguards by March 1980, and was not likely to do so. The Administration's argument was that India had applied for the stated 40 tonnes well before the expiry of the grace period and the NRC had adopted a very restrictive interpretation of the 1978 Act with regard to India. The State Department, however, faced considerable opposition in Congress when the Executive Order came up for debate in September. It is significant that the Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses as well as the main body of the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in favour of the stoppage of supplies. It was only through a very narrow margin in the Senate (48 to 46) that one consignment of 19.8 tonnes could be cleared. This, too, came after massive persuasive efforts by the State Department which pointed out among other things, that a termination

of the Agreement would also release India from its obligations. The Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie stated at a Press Conference that India would be well within its rights to claim that if the United States breached the Tarapur Agreement, it would not be bound by the Agreement in regard to the accumulated plutonium wastes at Tarapur. He added that plutonium was used for constructing weapons, "and if the Tarapur fuel is removed from international safeguards, a precedent would be set that strikes at the heart of our nuclear non-proliferation policy."¹¹

Reagan and His Hardline

Ronald Reagan's electoral victory signalled the end of the third stage. His perception of American strategic interests in South and South-West Asia relegate India to a place of lesser importance than had been accorded it by the Carter Administration in the preceding year. In its annual military posture statement for 1981, the Reagan Administration clearly stated that it intended to improve its military balance in "South-West Asia", a relatively new geopolitical construction of which Pakistan is a part. This involved "support for friendly regional governments against politically and potentially hostile states and groups; limitation of Soviet power and influence throughout the region and deterrence of direct Soviet military intervention."¹² The United States required "in any event access to local and *en route* facilities... to ensure force sustainability."¹³ In the context of the developments in South-West Asia, and Reagan's evaluations, Pakistan is the ideal geo-strategic partner in the region. The United States requires a friendly state which might sign formal agreements allowing it to set up its own military bases in pursuance of its policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Pakistan, on its side, needs a strong ally against the perceived threat from its Northern borders. India, meanwhile, purchased military equipment from the Soviet Union, at what American sourcees, called "sweetheart rates" in 1980. This in American estimation, presumably placed India further inside the Soviet camp. Thus, to promote its own interests, the United States has stepped up its arms aid to Pakistan on the one hand, and de-accelerated its pressure on the Congress to continue the suply of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur plant. In April 1981, high level talks were held between H.N. Sethna, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Eric Gonsalves, the External Affairs Secretary and Alexander Haig, the United States Secretary of State. The sharpest disagreements were on the question of fuel supply to Tarapur. The United States more or less notified India of its decision to terminate the Tarapur Agreement because it had not agreed to full-scope safeguards, but it insisted on maintaining safeguards over the end products of the nuclear fuel supplied to Tarapur. It also wanted a say in India's reprocessing of the spent fuel because of the clause of "joint determination" in the Tarapur Agreement. Sethna rejected the very idea of maintaining safeguards or any other obligation after the termination of the Agreement. An official delegation is

expected shortly in Delhi, presumably to negotiate the major steps in the termination process. The Indian Government, however, still keeps its options open. As an authoritative source sees it, the United States is applying the ultimate kind of pressure to make India bend, but it would surely not like to cut its final lines of communication with India on the question of India's nuclear policy by stopping all supplies to Tarapur.¹⁴

Whatever the future may hold, it is important to note the lesson Tarapur has taught us. The moral of the story is that any country, developing or otherwise, which is dependent on another nation especially a Super Power, for the supply of its basic needs in nuclear technology, is vulnerable to pressurization. The one saving grace in the Tarapur affair was that India was not totally dependent on the United States for all its supplies. From the beginning it cultivated diverse ties for nuclear co-operation with Canada, France, the United Kingdom and more recently, with the Soviet Union. It must be pointed out, however, that on the question of nuclear issues, the other Super Power is equally severe. India's treaty with USSR specifies that any disagreement regarding safeguards or any other treaty obligation between New Delhi, Moscow and the IAEA would be referred to the International Court of Justice or its appointed nominees and their decision would be final and binding on all parties. Under the circumstances, it is in our interests to strive for complete autonomy. We have been pursuing the goal of self-sufficiency, specially since Canada terminated its Agreement with India and the first delays in nuclear fuel supply from the United States began to occur in 1976. India has large deposits of uranium and thorium and an alternative fuel technology using mixed oxide fuel is being perfected. This can be used even at Tarapur, when the stock of fresh fuel finishes in two or three years. As long as the Super Powers keep to their limited discriminatory attitude on nuclear issues, it is India's duty to break out of their stranglehold. In a free world, we can not do otherwise.

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NOTES

- 1 John F. Kennedy, *The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1961* (Washington D.C., 1962), p. 2.
- 2 Ibid., p. 26.
- 3 For the text of the NPT, see J.P. Jain, *Nuclear India* (New Delhi, 1974), Vol. 2, pp. 204-10.
- 4 See *Lok Sabha Debates* (Government of India), Vol. 5, part-2, 10 May 1954, col. 7036.
- 5 See Jain, n. 3, Vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
- 6 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 19 October 1979.
- 7 *Statesman* (New Delhi), 26 March 1976.
- 8 *Hindustan Times*, 14 July 1977.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 29 July-4 August, 1980, pp. 15572.
- 11 *National Herald* (New Delhi), 17 September 1980.
- 12 Excerpts from the *Annual US Military Posture Statement, Middle East/South Asia*, 7 February 1981, (USICA, New Delhi, 1981).
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Interview with undisclosed source, 10 June 1981.

NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENVIRONMENT MOVEMENT

THE object of this study is to briefly analyze the contribution of Jawaharlal Nehru to the global environment movement and world order based on global harmony of mankind. Currently progressing the world over, the ostensible purpose of this movement is to ensure the continued progress of our civilization based on the establishment of harmony of man with man and with nature. The degradation of global environments is the result of policies pursued by states in disregard of the ecological requirements of man and global society. In this respect, our analysis here is directed to the contribution Nehru made to the scientific temper of our age, to promoting policies for the design of world harmony, and to evolving an equilibrium in the international system based on the synthesis of ideas of the East and West. In this process, he produced a synthesis of knowledge which indeed is the object of science. Einstein pursued a synthesis of the laws of nature. Abdus Salam, another Nobel laureate, is continuing this synthesis. Nehru attempted to create harmony between the social and natural environments and suggested removal of social tensions through the planning process. Nehru's scientific mind reveals a pre-established harmony with the global environment with which he seemed to have applied his mind to the solution of some general problems of international society. Indeed, Einstein himself applied his mind to the general problems of science with a pre-established harmony. As he said in honour of Max Planck in his famed address in 1918:

The longing to behold that pre-established harmony is the source of the inexhaustible perseverance and patience with which Planck (and we may add here, as throughout Einstein), has given himself out to the most general problems of our science, not letting himself be diverted to more profitable and more easily attained ends.¹

Nehru had indeed made the world his field of thought and action. His pragmatism goes with Einstein's relativism. His emphasis on life's values of faith, creativity, love, non-alignment, attitude to nature, reflect his quest for world harmony. He in fact, attempted to impart a unified view of global life which he thought was needed for this civilization to function. Indeed his views need our attention and analysis in the context of problems of global environment and the emerging world order of the 21st century. He had the experience of practical life as well as the genius to reflect upon his experiences. As Arnold Toynbee says: "...history cannot be written effectively unless the writer has acquired an outlook that can be given only by actual experience of practical life."² Nehru's views therefore on human affairs in general, and on science, creativity, nature, spiritualism, progress, global culture, history and synthesis reveal a continuous beam of harmony which is undoubtedly of great essence when we examine the global environment movement of our times.

ATTITUDE TO NATURE, ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE

Nehru had the grasp of nature's unity in diversity; his love of nature and the world at large stemmed from this basic philosophy of nature. This was also the basis of his approach to the philosophy or the temper of science. He noted the harmony of nature and its processes. Like Tagore, he believed in growing with and into the environment; this indeed was his religion and faith. "In the final analysis, one has to rely on some kind of a basic faith in the future of man," he stated to a Shantiniketan audience in 1957.³ This basic faith originated from his harmony with nature. He also had a beautiful view of the world which he expressed in his letter to children. "I would love to talk to you about this beautiful world of ours, about flowers and trees and birds and animals and stars and mountains and glaciers and all the other wonderful things that surround us in this world," he wrote.⁴ With this inward joy and beauty he went about in life with an open mind. In his address to the University of California on 31 October 1949, on "The Age of Crisis", Nehru reflected on the problems facing mankind. He said: "I am no prophet nor have I any magical remedy to suggest. I have tried to grope my way, to think straight and to coordinate, as far as possible, action to thought... I am convinced that any policy, any ideology, which ignores truth and character in human beings and which preaches hatred and violence, can only lead to evil results."⁵

ON SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Nehru laid the foundations of a modern scientific structure for India. He created the temper of science for India and its people. On a recent visit to India, Nobel laureate, Abdus Salam, stated: "He [Nehru] was ahead of his time."⁶ It needs to be adequately emphasized that Nehru himself was deeply rooted in the philosophy of science; his background and thinking reflected a scientific mind. This can be noted in his understanding of international and national affairs. Indeed, in his approach to the study of human affairs his scientific thinking, unique in a way, is apparent in his blending of science with other disciplines like history, planning, international relations, economics, etc. Almost all the doctrines that he propounded, even non-alignment, had a deep-rooted scientific philosophy behind it; his approach and background was completely objective and analytical. This is indeed his greatest contribution to twentieth century thought and world order. This entitles him to be called the leader of renaissance India. Nehru was also an internationalist who imparted scientific values of truth, cooperation, freedom, and progress to international relations. His intellectual and moral sweep was profound as it helped transform the whole colonial system to a free enterprise between nations based on scientific equality and dignity.

Nehru's philosophy of science is based on the creativity of human mind.

While speaking on "The Spirit of Science", he said: "Science...does not merely repeat the old in better ways or add to the old but creates something that is new to the world and to the human consciousness."⁷ Further asking the question—What is the spirit of science? he said:

It means many things. It means not only accepting the fresh truth that science may bring, not only improving the old but being prepared to upset the old if it goes against that spirit. It also means not being tied down to something that is old because it is old, because we have carried on with it but being able to accept its disintegration; it means not being tied down to a social fabric or an industrial fabric or an economic fabric if it goes against the new discovery.⁸

Nehru therefore believed that "a nation cannot progress if it merely imitates its ancestors; what builds a nation is creative, inventive and vital activity. I seek the creative mind."⁹

Nehru was in favour of maintaining values which had timelessness. He keenly followed the progress of science and technology in the world and kept his mind open in regard to its application in the global and Indian spheres. Indeed, he expressed his caution on the unrestrained use of science and technology in his address to the University of Delhi on 6 December 1958. He said :

While discarding the old mysteries, we live at the edge of a new kind of mystery. The reaction of people to this varies. A few are driven to deeper thought and enquiry and a search for ultimate values, but most others, finding it too difficult to make any sense out of this confusion, relapse into cynicism and negative attitudes, rejecting the old patterns and standards and evolving no new one.¹⁰

Nehru in fact, was keen to balance the culture of technology with a wider vision. He posed the problem and sought its solution as follows:

It has become inevitable for us to fit in with the modern world of science and technology and it will be dangerous for us to imagine that we can live apart from it. It will be equally dangerous for us to think that we should accept technology without those basic values which are of the essence of civilised man.¹¹

Nehru's vision of science and technology was thus for the creative understanding and development of our society. He did not want to subordinate human values to technology. This is of vital interest in the planning of environment, and, in the overall pursuit of the scientific temper. In environmental planning, such a composite view of science and technology is important for maintaining wholesome human environments and harmony with nature. As Tagore said that the highest purpose of this world is not

merely living in it, but comprehending and uniting with it.¹² So did Nehru believe in developing human mind and personality along with scientific, creativity and comprehension in a scientific world.

IN SEARCH OF PROGRESS

Nehru's creative mind was always in search of progress which he tried to define in many ways. In the global environment movement we have at the moment a kind of dialogue between leading thinkers and scientists on this subject. How should progress be defined? Should there be limits to scientific research on subjects like DNA, and the like? Should science and technology seek harmony with nature? Is progress related to the progress of spirit of man? Indeed we find an undercurrent of opinion in scientific thought that whereas we may not put limits to basic scientific creativity, man should however, maintain harmony with nature.¹³ Einstein also appeared to imply that his motivation for scientific research was for improvement of knowledge about the universe, and therefore of man.¹⁴

Nehru believed that progress was of human spirit, the international universal spirit of man, to which Tagore also had drawn attention.¹⁵ Scientific research could help the growth of this universal spirit of man. Toynbee points out the dichotomy of man's progress in intellect and not of spirit which is of greater well-being.¹⁶

The approach to progress, according to Nehru, was therefore based on consent, cooperation and love; it was an evolutionary process. Evolution, as Rene Dubos, a contemporary biologist of repute, says, is a creative process.¹⁷ Indeed, Huxley defines reality as one gigantic process of evolution.¹⁸ So Nehru's endeavours for progress are to be seen in this perspective of evolution; it was based on consent, it was pragmatic, and flexible depending on time and context. One cannot therefore see any determinist approach to progress.

Recalling Gandhiji, Nehru indicated that he gave directions and left decisions to be taken by one's own motivation and consent. He had a quality of sensing change and through love and consensus he changed the minds and hearts of people. With great feeling, Nehru assessed Gandhi as "essentially a man of God (who) walked on the soil of India and sanctified it by his penance. He sanctified not only the soil of India but changed the minds and hearts of our people."¹⁹ Man had been accepting changes and developing in history. Nehru thought "The whole course of history has fascinated me. . . . On the whole what has fascinated me really is the story of man developing himself wherever he might be."²⁰ Co-operation was a necessary requisite for the progress of man. It was more important than competition. As he said in his Azad Memorial lecture on "India Today and Tomorrow" on 23 February 1959: "We have to evolve a high order more in keeping with modern trends and conditions and involving not so much competition but much greater co-operation."²¹ Competition, to him, was not a kind of struggle for

existence, but a co-operative enterprise for progress. Indeed Darwin's theory on the struggle for existence is now reformed by leading biologists of our time, such as Rene Dubos and Julian Huxley. According to them, evolution is no more genetic but is psychological involving a co-operative sense among men. Darwin also suggested that man was a higher being in the natural order, possessed with moral and reflective powers needed to promote common happiness.²²

Nehru has drawn our attention in the international system to the spirit of international co-operation of man and his moral and reflective powers for evolving a progressive global society. He felt that law and legal principles should also embody moral and ethical values.²³ Such values, Nehru believed, were important for historical progress. Addressing Columbia University on this theme on 17 October 1949, he said that a statesman had to act in reality, but truth should always be kept in view. India, he said, was trying to combine idealism with its national interests.²⁴ How was progress to be judged? Nehru was looking for a standard of value to judge progress. There could be a humanist or a scientific approach to judge progress, but not a dogmatic approach. He was in favour of a scientific approach but, he said, he did not want to limit progress to science and technology. Rather, he was in favour of an integrated view of life as propounded by the Buddha or Plato,²⁵ but not an acquisitive society for mankind.²⁶ The ecological problems of world society are now being appreciated as arising out of man's great ambition for material progress. Nehru seems to have foreseen this as he said: "I begin seeking for something deeper than merely the physical aspect of civilization. I find that my mind is more interested in what Plato or the Buddha said, which has a timelessness about it."²⁷

ON PLANNING AND FUTUROLOGY

In the global environment movement planning and reflections on futurology are important considerations for the welfare of mankind. In history, it is the first time that man is living in a single global community because of integration through science and technology. Also it is the first time that science and technology is having an impact of global dimensions on the environment. The UN Declaration at Stockholm in 1972 recalled this aspect:

A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly environment on which our life and well-being depend. Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can achieve for ourselves, and posterity a better life in an environment more in keeping with human needs and hopes.²⁸

With this perspective on planning and futurology, Nehru applied his genius

to planning in India. Addressing an important session in Parliament on 14 March 1961, on the subject of the importance of tomorrow, he said:

There is another thing I should like the House to think about. Shall we not also think of our tomorrows sometimes? Or, must we invariably lose ourselves in our todays! I cannot ignore today, obviously. But so far as I am concerned, I must confess to you that the morrow is slightly more important to me than today. If we are thinking in terms of progress, we have to build for a tomorrow that will make progress possible.²⁹

In planning also, Nehru looked obviously to progress. He was a thinker who, like Einstein, thought of the eternal tomorrow. Planning provided to him a whole scenario for the nation and the need to chalk out frontiers of progress. As Arthur Koestler says: "The principal mark of genius is not perfection, but originality, the opening of new frontiers. . . ."³⁰ Nehru's creative genius lay in opening new frontiers of scientific and social progress in the country. He tried to maintain harmony between the goals of progress and the quest for their realisation. Writing about harmony in the pursuit of creativity, Tagore said: "We realize that creation is the perpetual harmony between the infinite ideal of perfection and the eternal continuity of its realisation; that so long as there is no absolute separation between the positive ideal and the material obstacle to its attainment, we need not be afraid of suffering. . . ."³¹ Therefore Nehru was keen to follow the ideals of progress in a planned way. He believed that the Planning Commission was necessary where people could think freely and in an integrated way.

Prediction in human affairs is not easily possible, says Toynbee, but reflections on the future are.³² With the available knowledge of the past and the present, one can think of tomorrow and plan for it to some extent. Addressing Columbia University on 17 October 1949, Nehru said:

In this world of incessant and feverish activity, men have little time to think, much less to consider ideals and objectives. Yet, how are we to act, even in the present unless we can know which way we are going and what our objectives are? It is only in the peaceful atmosphere of a university that these basic problems can be adequately considered.³³

Planning enabled the capacity to think aside, free from the tensions of the present and to prepare for a better tomorrow. So said Einstein about his motivation for research, which can be compared with the longing of "a town-dweller, in his cramped quarters which pulls him towards the silent, high mountains, where the eye ranges freely through the still, pure air and traces the calm contours that seem to be made for eternity." With this inward urge, Einstein believed, goes the positive commitment of the scientist, the speculative philosopher, the painter and the poet, each trying in his own way to overcome the world of experience by striving to replace it by a lucid

and a simpler image of the world which knowledge would bring.³⁴ It is again a question of that pre-established harmony of mind with which Einstein and Nehru saw the processes of planning or scientific research. Planning meant to Nehru a positive commitment for a better tomorrow. In the age of crisis, future planning provided a hope, a positive hope for mankind. This he said while addressing the University of California: "The past crowds in upon me and standing at this razor's edge of the present, I try to peep into the future."³⁵ Nehru, therefore, had great faith in the younger generation because in them he found a glimpse of the future. He inspired the younger generation with his genius and intelligence. Inspiration, as J. Krishnamurti says, is contained in intelligence, and intuition is the highest point of intelligence.³⁶ Indeed even science is an imaginative process which connects phenomenon in a rational sense. The scientific imagination dreams of explanation and laws.³⁷ To Einstein, "Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience correspond to a logical system of thought."³⁸ Planning and futurology for Nehru were therefore a combined exercise in scientific and rational planning for progress.

EVOLVING A GLOBAL CULTURE

Culture is a part of the global environment. Environment affects culture and the latter in turn affects environment. A technological culture has indeed produced an adverse impact on environment particularly in view of armaments. Culture is therefore a way of life which has evolved over time. Nehru's view of culture was all that was best for man to possess in the world. It involved a refinement of the mind, morals, tastes and enlightenment of civilization. He said, "no one section of the community in India can lay claim to the sole possession of the mind and thought of India;"³⁹ culture must have depth and dynamism.⁴⁰ To be dynamic and creative, he added one needed a higher view of culture. According to poet Iqbal, man is not a closed mind and is capable of absorbing external forces. He is assimilative in nature. A good life, according to the poet, must be creative and original leading to beauty and order.⁴¹ A higher view of culture is therefore of tolerance and synthesis of values and traditions. This holds true in the traditions of India, To this Nehru makes reference with great feeling. He says: "I lay stress on the unity of India, not merely the political unity which we have achieved, but something far deeper, the emotional unity, the integration of our minds and hearts, the suppression of feelings of separatism."⁴² This spirit of unity and toleration by Indians is of great essence to the development of a harmonious world culture. Arnold Toynbee, in the Azad Memorial lecture on "One world And India", said: "I am speaking, as you will realize, of the movement, now astir in all mankind, to live together, for the first time in human history, as a single family." Again, referring to India's traditions of tolerance and synthesis, he stated: "India's special contribution, as I see it, will have been her large heartedness and broadmindedness. This will have been a gift of

priceless value to mankind in the new age into which mankind has now been launched by the West's special contribution to the unification of the world."⁴³

A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY

Nehru had a new vision about the role of history. He was a pioneer in promoting international co-operation and harmony in international relations. He wanted to see that history should balance global forces for creating world harmony. Conflicts of the past were to be forgotten for a better world of today and tomorrow. He in fact, had a faith in the future of man. He saw man evolving and developing inspite of obstacles and problems. Why did he like history? In his address to the Asian History Congress, he said:

I never studied history in the formal way but informally. I have been greatly interested in history chiefly because of my seeking to understand the past rather in terms of the present and even of the future to come. I have approached it as a developing drama, leading up to the present and making me wonder where it will lead to in the future.⁴⁴

Further, he added: "The whole course of history has fascinated me... on the whole what has fascinated me really is the story of man developing himself wherever he might be."⁴⁵ "I try to think of history as a process that leads man to higher and better stages of progress."⁴⁶ He liked H.G. Wells' approach of a social man in history. Stating that historians could put things in perspective, he wondered whether they could pierce the veil of the future unless they became great seers.

Nehru's historic vision for world harmony and peace was obvious in the movement of non-alignment and Panch Sheel. The present global environment movement is in line with Nehru's ideals of global harmony of man and man and with nature. In contemporary history, international co-operation was needed to move towards progress and development of man and global society. Scientific creativity can be harnessed further for realizing new goals and frontiers of knowledge about the universe. Towards this aspect of scientific understanding of international life, Nehru laid great stress. His approach to history was therefore, like Toynbee's; that of a student of human affairs. He participated in it and balanced it himself and helped in shaping it for future generations.

TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER EQUILIBRIUM

Nehru provided synthesis to the ideas of the East and the West. He interpreted the East to the West and vice-versa. He advocated unity in diversity which has been the basis of India's philosophy through ages. Speaking about Nehru, Kabir said: "It is the combination of contrariness that gives richness

and complexity to genius."⁴⁷ Nehru's genius lay in grasping the manifold traditions of India and the West. He believed in an open-minded approach. Speaking of non-alignment, he said, it was a positive and a vital policy which flowed through India's struggle for freedom and out of Gandhi. In an age when power blocs and alignment between states was the order of the day, it was hard and difficult to explain non-alignment which was a part of his spiritual and ethical philosophy for presenting Gandhiji's message of non-violence in the world. The futility of the armaments race has only proved him right. The contemporary global urge among nations to re-awaken the spirit of non-alignment as a moral force for world harmony vindicates Nehru's vision for a peaceful and creative world order. Panch Sheel was another message of Nehru for unity in diversity of global life. It meant non-interference among countries which may have different systems of progress, but a common aim of promoting good life. Indeed he imparted to the international system a moral and spiritual touch which was in keeping with the line of great *rishis* and seers of India. Nehru was a modern *rishi* who interpreted the melody and the philosophy of India to the world to evolve a stable global equilibrium. Indian life was of contemplation, he said in an important address in Washington on 18 December 1956.⁴⁸ (III, p. 48.) Toynbee makes a reference with much concern while advocating this contemplative habit of India. He says:

This is, I believe, the greatest lesson that India has to teach the present day world. Western Christendom did recognise and practice the virtue of contemplation to some extent in the Western Middle Ages. Since then we have almost entirely lost this spiritual art, and our loss is serious, because the act of contemplation is normally another name for the art of living. So now we turn to India. This spiritual gift, that makes a man human, is still alive in the Indian soul. Go on giving the world Indian examples of it.⁴⁹

Much of the global tension is related by biologists and psychologists to the lack of a contemplative habit. It was this trans-rational faculty of man which Toynbee referred to as of great importance for stability and harmony of the world order. It relates to the inner equilibrium of man and is an aid to reality. Mrs Indira Gandhi has described the synthesis of science and spiritualism in the Indian tradition:

Whereas the West believes in rational thought as either the only or one of the main tools in its search for the ultimate reality, for us the tool has been the whole of consciousness, comprising the rational mind, reflective intellect, intuition, perception and emotion. It is extensive and comprehensive, including rationale thought as one of its components.⁵⁰

Einstein, among modern scientists, advocated the trans-rational and the

intuitive approach to the understanding of truth and reality. For this reason modern scientific philosophers are able to find common spirituality of mankind emerging out of common beliefs and values to which Nehru and Gandhi, for example, among others, gave an impetus for evolution. Julian Huxley, for example, said at an international UNESCO conference that there is need for synthesis of ideas and beliefs of social and personal values for a common psychosocial system struggling to be born.⁵¹ Again, at a recent international conference in New Delhi, the speakers emphasized the need for evolving universal principles of jurisprudence and not segregating it into narrow Hindu, Muslim or Roman compartments.⁵²

Thus, Nehru's non-alignment, Panch Sheel and decolonization were eminent concepts to impart a dynamic and creative image to international society to attain the universal brotherhood of man, and to free global environment for the development of man as a creative being in modern history.⁵³ This is his great contribution to the contemporary global environment movement struggling to see the armaments race curtailed and eager to promote conservation of resources and harmony with the natural environment in a unified technological world order.

CONCLUSIONS

We have analyzed Nehru's mind and his manifold contributions for the promotion of harmony of global environment. Nehru created an international movement and consciousness for a common brotherhood of man within and across national frontiers. Non-alignment is one such movement. Global harmony is another. Synthesis of science and spiritualism is yet another great contribution for the unification of mankind. All these ideals put together promote conservation of man and environment. In this whole process, Nehru's genius lay in combining different patterns of thought, and in providing a synthesis for the global order. The planning process was a part of his dream of looking to a better world of tomorrow. His vision of futurology was implicit in all the plans he made for the establishment of a scientific temper in India to which Nobel laureate Abdus Salam paid warm tributes recently. Nehru's great vision is seen in his discourses on planning, futurology, science, philosophy, history and international relations. He once again produced an image of the philosophy and culture of India and the world. This synthesis in modern times has been his greatest contribution to the harmony of global society. The consciousness that he and Gandhiji have produced towards the spirit of common brotherhood and spirituality of mankind augurs well for the success of the global environment movement whose major purpose is to promote harmony of man with man and with nature.

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NOTES

- 1 See G. Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler To Einstein* (Massachusetts, 1973), p. 377. This is from a summary of the distinguished lecture by Einstein in honour of Max Planck in 1918 in which Einstein gives his motivation for scientific research.
- 2 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1948) Vol. 10, p. 106.
- 3 See *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*. Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1958, Vol. III, p. 436 Hereafter referred by Volume and page number. There are four such volumes covering Nehru's speeches from 1946 to 1963.
- 4 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, pp. 435-36.
- 5 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 419
- 6 Abdus Salam in conversation with B.M. Udgaonkar of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, See Sunday Review of *Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 January 1981, p. 1.
- 7 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, p. 364
- 8 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 364.
- 9 "Dynamic Life", Address to the University of Saugar, 30 October, 1952. *Speeches*. Vol. II p. 431.
- 10 "Towards a New Equilibrium," Address to the University of Delhi in *Speeches*. Vol. IV, p. 168.
- 11 *Speeches*. Vol IV, p. 170.
- 12 Rabindra Nath Tagore, *Creative Unity* (Calcutta, 1971), p. 49.
- 13 This is the impression one gathers from discussions held by some leading scientists. See "Limits of Scientific Enquiry" (*Daedalus*, 1978). See also B.D. Nag Chaudhuri and S. Bhatt, "Man Out of Harmony With Nature : Some Reflections from India on The Global Environment Movement," *Eastern Journal of International Law* (Madras), Vol. 10, 1979, pp. 297-303.
- 14 Einstein in *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein*. n. 1.
- 15 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol III, p. 437.
- 16 Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization On Trial* (New York, 1948), p. 262.
- 17 Rene Dubos, "Man And His Environment," *Britannica Perspectives* (Chicago, 1980). Vol. 4, p. 235.
- 18 T.H. Huxley. Cited in *Ibid.*
- 19 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol IV, p. 433
- 20 *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 177 in his address to the Asian History Congress, New Delhi on 9 December 1961.
- 21 *Speeches*. Vol. IV, p. 5.
- 22 Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (London, 1952). p. 592.
- 23 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol IV, p. 425
- 24 *Ibid.*, Vol II, p. 393
- 25 "Basic Wisdom," Address to the University of Ceylon, 12 February 1950. *Speeches*, Vol. II, pp. 423-24.
- 26 *Speeches*. Vol III p. 54.
- 27 n. 20, p. 179.
- 28 See United Nations Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, 3 July 1972, Annex II, pp. 2-6.
- 29 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol II, p. 557.
- 30 Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (London, 1964), p. 402.
- 31 Rabindra Nath Tagore, n. 12, pp. 15-16.
- 32 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History: Reconsiderations*. Vol. 12 (London, 1964), p. 4.
- 33 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. II, p. 391.
- 34 Einstein, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought*, n. 1.
- 35 n. 33, p. 420.
- 36 See *The Mind of J. Krishnamurti* by L.S.R. Vas (Ed.), (Bombay, 1971), pp. 81-82.
- 37 C.S. Pierce, *Essays In The Philosophy of Science* (New Delhi, 1975), p. 197.

- 38 A. Einstein, *Out of My Later Years* (Connecticut, 1975), p. 98.
- 39 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 418.
- 40 *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 357.
- 41 K.G. Saiyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy* (Lahore, 1954), Introduction and p. 124.
- 42 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 37.
- 43 Arnold Toynbee, see publication *One World and India* by Indian Council of Cultural Relations (New Delhi, 1962), p. 50.
- 44 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. IV, p. 177.
- 45 *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 177.
- 46 *Ibid*., Vol. IV, p. 179.
- 47 Toynbee, n. 43, p. vi.
- 48 *Speeches*. n. 3, Vol. III, p. 48.
- 49 Toynbee, "One World And India," n. 43, p. 113.
- 50 Indira Gandhi, "*Times of India*", (New Delhi), 3 February 1981. The Prime Minister was speaking on the synthesis of science and spiritualism in the context of the tradition of Indian philosophy.
- 51 Julian Huxley in *Science and Synthesis*, A UNESCO Symposium on 10th Death Anniversary of A. Einstein and Tielhard de Chardin (New York, 1971), p. 29.
- 52 Speakers were participating in an international seminar on "Islam's Contribution to the Culture and Civilizations of the World with Special Reference to India. See *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 31 January 1981.
- 53 Indeed Tagore and Einstein, while discussing the nature of reality, agreed that the ideal for man would be to realise, in one's individual being, the universal human spirit. See "The Nature of Reality", a dialogue between A. Einstein and Rabindra Nath Tagore, in *A Tagore Reader* (Ed), by Amiya Chakravarty, (New York, 1961), p. 113.

BOOK REVIEWS

INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965

A Review Article

TWO years ago, Air Marshal (Retd) M. Asghar Khan, former Commander in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force and now head of the Tehriq-i-Istiqal party, set down his impressions of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. He had retired from service shortly before that conflict but nevertheless, played a part in it as a self-appointed co-ordinator of military supplies. His book first published in Britain in 1979 is now in an Indian edition.*

I doubt if it was a coincidence that the book appeared shortly before the General Elections that were to have been held in Pakistan last year. Whatever the motive, it provides a first-hand account of how that country was run at a critical period in its history.

At the outset, the airman-turned-politician, whose original home was in Kashmir, refers to the 1965 war as one that "appears now to have been fought for no purpose." His regret is not that the war was fought but that it did not succeed. Otherwise, he fully supported the plan, code-named *Operation Gibraltar*, to foment armed uprisings in order to oust India from Kashmir. He commends as "bold and imaginative" the Army General who thought up the scheme and records that it was acclaimed by President Ayub Khan and his top civilian and military advisers, of whom presumably he was one. A further cause for disappointment was his own inability to play a direct part in the conduct of the war.

Asghar Khan has plenty to say about the operation, and the manner in which it was launched. It was, to begin with, strictly a Foreign Office-Army affair. The Navy and Air Force were left out of it. This might have made sense if the Army's actions were to be limited to training guerillas and infiltrating them into Indian territory, but when regular troops and armour were to be used, as they were in the Chamb sector, then it is strange indeed that the possibility of a general conflict was not foreseen. Yet that was the case. Judging India's likely response from its lacklustre performance in a territorial dispute in the Rann of Kutch earlier in the year, Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister, is said to have persuaded Ayub Khan to accept the notion that India would not go to war to defend Kashmir. *Operation Gibraltar* was mounted on this ingenuous, and as it proved, false premise.

For those who maintain that a Supreme Commander is essential to the efficient conduct of war the example of Field Marshal Ayub Khan should provide a corrective. He combined in himself the roles of President, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence. In Asghar Khan's evaluation of him, the Supreme Commander's thoughts and actions ran mainly along Army lines, with little understanding of the capabilities of the

* M. Asghar Khan: *The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965* (Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Sahibabad, 1979), xx, 146 p., Rs. 35.

Navy and the Air Force. From what I can make out, the Supreme Commander did not have the benefit of advice from a responsible inter-Services body, such as a Chiefs of Staff Committee. Frequent and regular meetings of the Chiefs would have been difficult to arrange in any case, for the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs were based at Rawalpindi, Karachi and Peshawar respectively. When the war began there was no clear idea of where the Supreme Command should be located, or for that matter, how the diverse activities of the three services should be controlled. Asghar Khan dismisses General Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as a nonentity and says that the war on the ground was run by a couple of Brigadiers and a Lieutenant Colonel, while he became unofficial adviser to the Supreme Commander on air warfare and co-ordinator of war supplies.

At this point it is worth recalling that the Indian Army tried to contain the troubles in Kashmir on its own, and continued to do so even when the Pakistan Army crossed the border at Chamb. It was only when Pak armour broke out from Chamb towards Jaurian and the Jammu-Srinagar highway on 1 September, that the Indian Air Force was asked for air support. From then on events moved rapidly. The Government of India approved a general offensive against West Pakistan; the Army and Air Force mobilized their forces and the first Indian troops crossed the international border on 6 September with the Indian Air Force attacking deep inside Pakistan. East Pakistan was specifically excluded from these operations in the hope that matters could be settled in the west.

Both sides went to war without any long-term plans and clear-cut military objectives, with forces assembled in haste against ill-defined targets and with insufficient information. The two pounded away at each other until Pakistan, with fewer resources to back up its effort, was forced to call a halt. A cease-fire was proclaimed on 23 September ending a war in which neither side won a decisive victory, though India could at least claim that it had foiled Pakistan's attempt to annex Kashmir by force.

Operation Gibraltar foundered on the rocks of conceit and military incompetence. Underlying these Asghar Khan also espies a conspiracy. The ground for this is laid by Altaf Gauhar, who was at the time of the War Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. In his Foreword he avers that the Foreign Office and General Headquarters of the Army deliberately embarked on the enterprise after Asghar Khan had retired from service, for had he remained in command of the Pakistan Air Force "he would (have given) the *Operation* a positive and decisive complexion, because of his devotion to the cause of Kashmir and his whole attitude toward war with India." Asghar Khan is more outspoken in his assertion of a conspiracy. He accuses Bhutto of misguiding Ayub Khan in the expectation of Pakistan suffering a military defeat. "This", he writes, "would result in Ayub Khan being ousted and in the confusion that would follow he, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would be the obvious person to negotiate a settlement with India and then take over as Pakistan's President." Such a

statement from anyone other than a member of the erstwhile Pakistan establishment would have carried no weight, but in the present context it deserves attention if for no other reason than that it gives some idea of the tortuous politics of that country.

The popular belief in India has always been that Pakistan is forever ready to go to war with it. Certainly in 1965, when Pakistan was receiving military aid from both the United States and China, and supplementing it with its own purchases, it was thought to be a power to reckon with. It is a revelation, therefore, to learn that its armed forces were short of supplies when *Operation Gibraltar* escalated into a full-scale war. Having spent two days advising the Supreme Commander and the Pakistan Air Force Chief on how to wage the air war, Asghar Khan set off on visits to China, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran in search of "urgently required equipment and stores." This was done largely on his own decision, says Gauhar, though I cannot help thinking that he may have been encouraged to do so by those whom he sought to advise. The meetings with Chou En Lai, President Soekarno, President Gursel and the Shah produced mostly sympathy. Indonesia alone promised to help with hardware, some of which arrived after the fighting had stopped. It is worth noting that in spite of the United States being an ally, no American equipment was made available to Pakistan once the war began, either directly or via Turkey or Iran. Tracing the history of Pakistan's relations with the United States from the early '50s to 1965, Asghar Khan sees the bright prospects of US military aid being used against India gradually grow dim. He is critical of the aid given to India after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, following which there was growing mistrust of American intentions. Asghar Khan goes so far as to say that the Americans most probably knew of India's plan to attack West Pakistan, and even hoped that the fall of Lahore "would have a favourable effect on (Pakistan's) conduct of international affairs...." The 1965 war was obviously a turning point in US-Pakistan relations; they have been going different ways since.

President Ayub Khan realized soon enough that *Operation Gibraltar* had miscarried. His armed forces were in no position to wage a protracted war. He therefore favoured a British proposal for a cease-fire. Asghar Khan was against it. He maintains that though the Pakistan Army had done poorly the Pakistan Air Force had more than held its own. The Indian advance had been stayed and with the supplies expected from abroad he thought the tide could be turned. He was for continuing the war because "the Indians were in an even more unsatisfactory situation than we were, and a prolongation of the struggle might have serious consequences for their over-stretched resources in logistics and communications ... and their morale was not as good as ours."

The Indian situation was in fact not bad. Except for a Pakistani incursion into the Rajasthan desert, Indian forces were well inside Pakistan, advancing on Sialkot and Lahore. Pakistani counter-attacks had been repulsed, notably so at Khem Karan where a sizeable armoured force was wiped out.

As we now learn, this caused Ayub Khan much distress and made him amenable to a ceasefire. The Indian Air Force was attacking targets as far as Rawalpindi and Peshawar, compelling the Pakistan Air Force to restrict its activities mainly to the defence of airfields and other strategic points. Military supplies were plentiful and their transport to the fighting front by road and rail, and where necessary by air, was no problem. And the higher command organisation was just about getting into its stride when the ceasefire was declared. Morale was high throughout the 17-day war, for there was never any doubt about its outcome.

Every fighting service needs its heroes and tales of derring-do. The war provided the setting for both. The former Air Chief records several stirring events. But his account is modest compared to that of a British journalist who was commissioned to write a history of the air war. John Fricker likens it to the Battle of Britain in World War II, when so much was owed by so many to so few. As described by him, India would have over-run Pakistan but for the Pakistani Air Force. This is not the place to examine such a claim. It has been done elsewhere; those interested should see *New Delhi* magazine, dated 24 December 1979.

This slim, well-produced volume should more appropriately have been called "The Second Round", for the first, as I recall, was fought in 1947-48. Another inexplicable feature is that a couple of photographs of Indian fighter planes appear where, from the text, one would expect to see a map of Pakistan. For good measure, the book contains the author's views on a variety of subjects, ranging from the selection of military commanders to international relations. It also includes two appendices: one is the text of a lecture on the defence problems of Pakistan, and the other purports to be an historical analysis of the 1965 war. The latter, translated from the Urdu original, begins with the arrival of Islam on the Indian sub-continent some 1,200 years ago and in six short pages leads up to the military successes of 1965. It ends with a glowing reference to the unity of East and West Pakistan; this in 1979!

Despite such oddities, meant perhaps for the voter, Air Marshal Asghar Khan has rendered a service to students of Pakistan affairs by revealing the manner in which the abortive war of 1965 was fought. He indicts Bhutto, who cannot answer the charge, for conspiring to bring about Pakistan's defeat. A contributory factor, if not the principal one, was the absence of a sensible system of higher command under a Supreme Commander who had absolute authority but limited ability. Another was the shortage of military supplies which became the author's close concern. Nothing came of his visits to friendly states to obtain supplies. It is significant that no appeal was made to the United States, Pakistan's ally and principal source of military hardware; by 1965, their relations had soured with the bitter realization that the United States did not favour independent action by Pakistan, and no support could be expected from it against India.

Throughout this brief testament runs a deep distrust of India. The possi-

bility of an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute has no place in such thinking. If those who govern Pakistan are of like mind then, regrettably, another round may have to be fought one day!

March 1980

P.C. LAL*

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REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

A Review Article

ONE of the most conspicuous developments in the field of international organization since World War II has been the proliferation of regional organizations. In some respects, the post-war regional system could be regarded as an extended version of the concept of military alliance which is virtually as old as the institution of war between political communities; yet it is significantly different. The regional organizations not only cover security agreements but also deal with a broad range of economic, social and political problems. An additional difference is that the regional organizations are not only multilateral but also highly institutionalized in terms of regular meetings of the state-parties, operating budgets and a permanent secretariat staff. These regional groupings bear long and often awkward names including such traditional labels as "league", "organization" and "association" but they are increasingly getting supplemented by such designations as "community" and "union". Although sometimes more accurately reflecting aspirations than reality, the new nomenclature suggests the revolutionary impact of science and technology which has tied together all the peoples of the earth in an unprecedented intimacy of contact, interdependence of welfare and mutuality of vulnerability.

The proliferation of regional organizations indicate that although "one world" has not yet been achieved, there is no denying the existing reality of global interdependence. Indeed, the issue is : Are regional organizations preferable to the global ones for promoting international peace and security, economic and social well-being, human rights and other important goals sought by the international community? Are the activities of universal and regional organizations complementary or conflicting when they pursue their respective objectives in areas where their functions overlap?

A study, or rather a collection of studies, undertaken by the United Nations Institute of Training And Research (UNITAR), *Regionalism and the United Nations*,* provides enough material for scholars to find an answer to the question. This study, as is characteristic of all UNITAR publications, attempts no definite conclusions of its own. But an overall impression which one gets is that the two—global and regional organizations—are really complementary to each other. This is true to an extent, but the issues involved are too complex and related developments too tortuous to yield a simple answer.

Let us have a look at the United Nations Charter provisions and related developments during the last more than thirty years. To go into historical details would be too involved; nevertheless, the general aspects must be noted.

*Berhanykun Andemicael, (Ed.): *Regionalism and the United Nations*, (Oceana Publications, New York, 1979), xx, 603p.

REGIONAL GROUPINGS AND "DEFENCE" ARRANGEMENTS INITIATED

During the Second World War, while planning a framework for postwar organization, both the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the three chief architects of the United Nations had, at the initial stage, shown preference for regional security arrangements.¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt was of the view that big Powers should play the policeman's role, collectively or singly "policing" different regions. Winston Churchill fully shared Roosevelt's views and urged the creation of regional security arrangements through which the Great Powers might exercise their policing. He envisaged three regional councils for Europe, Asia and the Western Hemisphere respectively.

What eventually turned the scales in favour of global organization was perhaps the realization by US policy planners that after the war, the United States was going to be the most powerful nation and the only one for some time to come capable of playing a global role. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull feared that the "isolationist" groups in the United States might seize the idea of autonomous regional agencies to advocate American participation in a Western Hemisphere Council on condition that the United States remain outside the other Council. Thus, the Roosevelt Administration eventually came round to the global concept and supported it all through the various stages of the formation of the United Nations. The State Department memorandum of 11 August, 1943 attempted to bury all doubts in this regard and categorically stated the United States official views as follows: (i) that the basis of postwar international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; that there are grave dangers involved in having the world-wide organization rest upon the foundations of previously created, full fledged organizations; and (ii) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.²

At the Dumbarton Oak's Conference, on British insistence, regional security arrangements were extended recognition as auxiliary but subordinate to the general security system.

In San Francisco, there was much pressure from the Latin Americans, the Arab League members, the British Commonwealth, as well as from France for greater recognition of regional arrangements in matters dealing with peace and security.

What finally emerged was that while the general principle of subordination of regional arrangements to the principles of the Charter was retained in the final text of the Charter, the position of regional arrangements and agencies was also strengthened. Pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements was to be encouraged and in case of acts of aggression, "the inherent right of individual or collective self defence ... until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures ...," was also recognized.

Welcoming the Charter provisions, the United States representative, Senator Arthur Vandenburg noted: "We have found a sound and practical formula for putting regional organization into effective gear with global institutions. We do not thus substract from global unity of the world's peace and security; on the contrary, we weld these regional king-links into a global chain."³ However, "Article 51 foreshadowed the possibility of the regional tails wagging the global dog, rather than acknowledging the directing superiority of the universal organ."⁴

In presenting its report to the President of the United States, the country's delegation made a pertinent point. It argued that "concessions to regional pressures should not establish a precedent which might engender rivalry between regional groups at the expense of world security."⁵

The ink had hardly dried on this report, when the United States took definite initiatives leading to those very kind of regional groupings and rival interactions. The Brussels Pact followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in turn led to the establishment of Warsaw Pact Organization, marked just the beginning. Scores of such "defence" arrangements followed. Again, the second time, the chief architect of the global organization was letting down its own creation.

CONTRADICTIONS IN THE OPERATION OF SUBORDINATE REGIONALISM

The first serious conflict situation which pitted the global concept against the regional one was the Guatemala Question in June 1954. The United States was determined to see that the Government of Guatemala (a democratically installed one), which had turned "hostile" to US economic interests, should be toppled. To achieve its objective, the United States engineered what it referred to as a civil war; insisted that any questions involving peace and security could only be considered by the Organization of American States (OAS). In a situation where Guatemala's capital was under heavy air-attack, and its government was seeking protection from the United Nations Security Council, its representative was not even granted a hearing—thanks to the manipulation, arm twisting and threats of the American representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, who also happened to be the then President of the Security Council.⁶ Indeed, developments relating to Guatemala, Hungary, the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia are some of the glaring instances which indicate how the two Super Powers have successfully carried out their acts of "criminality" in the name of regionalism. Theoretical justification advanced by the two Super Powers in the respective situations were interestingly identical and amounted to an open defiance of the basic premise of universalism of the United Nations—that threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression in any part of the world is a concern of the international community as a whole. The United States, for instance, had contended, in justification of its action in the Dominican Republic, that the despatch of US troops to any country in the Western Hemisphere

was justifiable if that country seemed to be slipping out of the fold of the non-Communist Inter-American Community and that the United States forces could be used whether such intervention was requested by the Government concerned or not. Further, the United States maintained that what was happening in the Dominican Republic was a matter for hemispheric action alone. On this occasion, the Soviet Union, of course, stood for globalism, the universal concept of collective security, the letter and spirit of the Charter, principles of non-interference etc. and condemned the United States action in the Dominican Republic in the strongest terms, as it did earlier in Guatemala. But three years later, the Soviet Union, in justifying the five-Warsaw-Power invasion of Czechoslovakia, echoed the very same argument. It claimed the right to use force to protect its ideological community against an encroachment by an alien ideology or sphere of influence not congenial to it and insisted that events in Czechoslovakia were a matter of concern to the States of the Socialist Community alone and outside the purview of the United Nations.

It was Guatemala and Hungary over again, but repercussions were likely to be more serious since a repetition amounted to buttressing a concept which was the very negation of the global concept of collective security.

This, in a way, is a sordid tale of so-called co-operation and compatibility between regionalism and United Nations globalism.

The book under review, however, has conveniently ignored these developments. There is, of course, passing reference to Guatemala and the Dominican Republic in the context of OAS relations with the United Nations (pp. 147-224). They are, however, mentioned only in the context of the position taken by different governments on these conflict situations and the conclusions (leading to action or inaction) reached by the Security Council. Hungary and Czechoslovakia do not figure in the entire set of studies on regionalism contained in this book. The editor has explained that collective security arrangements, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even though they have a regional core, have not been included for various reasons. And the reasons given (p. 4) are so unconvincing as to raise the question of academic integrity.⁷ But one should not carry this line of criticism too far. UNITAR and its research fellows have their own limitations; of course, some advantages too. As regards the later aspect, one may quote the foreword by the Executive Director of UNITAR. It says:

In preparing these articles, the authors have drawn upon archives and documents which are not easily accessible to outside scholars and some have obtained additional data from interviews with national delegates and officials of the organization concerned. (p. xvi)

Hardly any scholar working outside the closed circles of the United Nations could have the benefit of consultation and comments of delegates as well as officials. On the other hand UNITAR's research fellows suffer from a

serious constraint. They are obliged not to write anything which would reflect value judgement on the actions and policies of any of the member governments.

It is true that an author of a study sponsored by UNITAR is said to express his views "independently" and as such his views do not reflect those of the staff and the trustees of UNITAR, but the fact remains that the research fellow/author is funded by the Institute and the Institute in turn is dependent on voluntary contributions from member states and other sources and that its activities (including publications, of course), are subject to review by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. As such, controversial issues have to be handled gingerly—names not mentioned and specific instances not cited when a critical reference is made. It is not surprising therefore that some of the analyses and arguments in UNITAR studies are left hanging in the air and the treatment at places is drab.

In an attempt to avoid UNITAR getting into troubled waters, great care is taken, so it seems, in selecting research fellows to author its studies. Academic/research experience, and over-all competence are, of course, given due weight, but sometimes "nationality" and "official status" are also taken into account. For instance in this collection of studies under review, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the United Nations" is authored by L.I. Lukin who has "impeccable credentials" for writing on this theme. A citizen of USSR, a graduate in Economics from the Moscow Economic and Statistical Institute (where he was also a lecturer), he has served as an expert in the Soviet Planning Commission, etc., etc. Presently he is a counsellor in the Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Who else could have a better insight into the functioning of the CMEA to tell us how its activities contribute to the "achievements of the goals established in the United Nations Charter." [?] (p. 449) It is a fairly comprehensive study on the structure of the CMEA and the evolution of its relations with the United Nations and gives us all the relevant facts within in a small compass, but only that much which the author would like a reader/ student to know. We are told that the CMEA is one international organization which does not recognize "juridical division of states into greater and lesser Powers" and that it "*strictly* observes the principles of equality among member states." (p. 450) That is to say Albania, for instance, was considered fully equal to the giant USSR during Albania's membership which lasted from 1949 until October 1961, when it ceased to be its member. One should not be surprised to note that the author finds CMEA an ideal organization. There is not a word of criticism in some forty pages of the study.

Let us examine another valuable study entitled "The League of Arab States and the United Nations." Who else could do a better job than Hussein A. Hassouna. He is "a legal adviser to the Foreign Minister of Egypt and was previously a member of the Egyptian Permanent Mission to the United Nations." (p. viii) It is pertinent to note here that until the developments

that flowed from the Camp David Agreement (1979), Cairo was the headquarters of the Arab League and an Egyptian used to be its Secretary General. It should also be noted that this article is based on extracts from the author's study published by UNITAR in 1975.⁸ Interestingly the author's conclusions are that the Arab League is an ideal regional organization "which has always cooperated with the United Nations and that an increased reliance of the United Nations in the peace and security field, a development that is actually taking place," (p. 328) calls for an elaborate and effective League mechanism and to that extent makes some pertinent suggestions to improve the functioning of the League. However, in the entire presentation the author skillfully avoids criticism of the League or its member-states. There is hardly any discussion, for instance, of Yemen where two members of the Arab League—Saudi Arabia and Egypt—fought a "proxy war" in the mid-1960s, or of inter-member territorial disputes (e.g. Gulf States) or of the Morocco-Algeria conflict regarding erstwhile Spanish Sahara.

Yet another important study on the question of regionalism and the United Nations in the peace and security field is in regard to the role of the Organization of American States (OAS). Its author is Aida Luisa Levin, an American who earned her doctorate from Columbia University, New York, specializing in Latin American Studies. Her piece (pp 147-224), is exceedingly rich in material but lacks incisive critical analysis. It presents a factual survey of conflict situations—including that of Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic—and records the views expressed by various member governments on the issues involved and also consequential action/inaction of the United Nations on each occasion in the context of larger issues involving regionalism versus globalism. However, in doing so she presents a narrow one-sided picture, skilfully steering clear of those aspects which would present a critical view of the United States position. It is an open secret that the United States had, time and again, used the OAS to camouflage its unilateral action by providing it a regional garb and sometimes in clear defiance of Article 53 of the Charter.

Indeed, on certain points, this study conveys half truths which naturally lead to a distorted version. For instance, the author notes that the Government of Cuba had recognized in 1960 the competence of the OAS to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic, but then in January 1962, what the author calls "an about-face" position, Cuba strongly protested when the OAS imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. (p. 167) The author fails to tell the reader that when OAS action against the Dominican Republic was taken in August 1960, Cuba had abstained. Further, she also fails to tell us how the situation in Cuba differed from that of the Dominican Republic and that the limited action taken against the latter was withdrawn within a "couple of months." She makes no mention of a chain of Cuban complaints, beginning July 1960s, both to the General Assembly and the Security Council of acts of hostility by the United States, nor of the character of the new Cuban governments that had

come to power in 1959. In fact, the name Fidel Castro, does not figure anywhere in this study.

What is, perhaps, more disturbing is that the author not only fails to discuss the United States hegemony over OAS and consequential dangers inherent in the regional system but also finds justification for the special status the Organization enjoys on the ground that it

...includes several medium-size states as well as a *Super-Power* and therefore *does not seem to require material assistance from the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security* as some other regional organizations (e.g., the OAU) do. (p. 193) (Emphasis added).

EVALUATION

Notwithstanding the criticism noted above, this collection of essays provides—in terms of factual information—a fairly exhaustive study and through case analysis, a basis for full-scale appraisals of the relationship that has evolved during the past three decades between the United Nations and some of the regional organizations. The main focus is, to quote the editor, “on the roles played by the United Nations and the regional bodies in helping to solve problems of peace and security, to promote economic and social development, and to foster intra-regional and inter-regional economic co-operation in regions divided by political and ideological differences.” (p. 3)

The volume is divided into four parts. The first containing two contributions, one by Sir Peter Smithers and the other by Davidson Nicol provides an introductory analysis of different forms of regionalism existing today and the problem of institutional proliferation within and outside the United Nations. While Sir Peter concentrates on providing a theoretical framework on the nature of inter-governmental organizations and of the United Nations itself, Davidson Nicol examines the role of the Commonwealth as an illustration of inter-regional coordination within the United Nations.

Part two contains three contributions analyzing the roles of comprehensive regional organizations as they relate to the role of the United Nations in the peace and security field. On this aspect, besides the two papers, one on OAS and the other on the Arab League referred to above, there is a study on the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the editor himself. It presents a summarized and updated version of his book published in 1976.⁹ Here again, there is all praise for the OAU which in terms of its principles and purposes, the author believes, qualifies the African Organization as a regional agency under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. (pp. 226-232) The author raises pertinent questions, provides the factual information on such critical issues as that of Western (Spanish) Sahara and Djibouti but skilfully skips from indulging in any criticism of the OAU or casting value judgement on the role of African states involved in the conflict situation.

Parts III and IV are devoted to studies on economic regionalism. It is interesting to note that while part III consisting of two articles—one by Parley W. Newman and the other by Michael Haas—is devoted to economic organizations in the developing areas, Part IV is concerned with economic organizations in Europe.

Newman brings to focus the role of the United Nations Economic Regional Commissions in the three continents—Africa (ECA), Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), West Asia (ECWA), and Latin America (ECLA). The other contribution by Haas takes up an analysis of Asian “Non-UN Intergovernmental Organizations” and examines their relationship with the United Nations. He examines only three such “organizations”—Colombo Plan, Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)—out of some two dozen in existence. (p. 398) That Haas is arbitrary in his “selection” is very obvious. The rationale and explanation provided (pp. 398-402), is not at all academically convincing. Why select APO and not the oldest sub-regional organization, i.e. South Pacific Commission (SPC)? Perhaps, an analytical study of SPC would bring out the reality, more than any other institutional arrangement, that almost all regional/sub-regional organizations in Asia have been imposed by the former colonial Powers. Likewise, the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) is not taken into account because the author might get himself into troubled waters since RCD is a product of the Cold War era—an off-shoot of the Baghdad Pact/CENTO.

Part IV dealing with economic regionalism in Europe contains, besides a piece on CMEA (by Lukin) referred to above, a study of Council of Europe by A.H. Robertson and one on EEC by John de Gara. Both these themes are competently handled by their respective authors and are in line with UNITAR's traditional approach. Mention in particular should be made of John de Gara's study of EEC and its relations with the United Nations. Its analysis of policy co-ordination of the nine EEC members and their voting pattern in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly (p. 571), for instance, speaks about the amount of research work that has gone into it. Indeed, all these essays contain a mine of information which would prove extremely useful to students and scholars concerned.

It is intriguing to note that while the developing world of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the context of economic regionalism is grouped into one section, the European world is treated in a separate section. Such a framework extends recognition, and rightly so, to the great divide of our time between the rich and the poor, the newly emerging nations representing 72 per cent of the earth's surface and 69 per cent of its populations and the old colonial Powers constituting the European world. The former constituting the periphery and the latter the centre of power in the existing international economic order.¹⁰ Thus, while tacitly accepting the great divide between the north and the south, this collection of studies, running to more than six hundred printed pages adroitly avoids mentioning the words “the North”

and "the South". Again, nowhere has this volume published in 1979, mentioned the phrase "the New International Economic Order" (NIEO).

This study, in order to be comprehensive, does include a study on inter-regional co-operation but it is found more "convenient" to pick up the role of the Commonwealth and not the OECD. An explanation could be advanced that while the Commonwealth has acquired "observer status" and that it attempts to function within the United Nations system, the OECD has made no attempt to do so; yet, the fact remains that in the field of international economic relations OECD plays a crucial role, as NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers do in the field of peace and security. A study which keeps out of its purview OECD, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers on a theme like the one covered by this volume could well be compared to presenting *Hamlet* without the King of Denmark.

But then let us face the reality and not expect too much of UNITAR which has its own constraints. It has to pick its research fellows not by academic competence alone, but on recommendations by those who count *politically* in the United Nations system and who also contribute funds to UNITAR. On the other hand, we should express gratitude to UNITAR for providing us—the students/scholars and laymen—with authentic analytical information which would not have been easily available from any other source.

This collection of studies bears the point.

December 1980

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NOTES

- 1 For details, based on primary sources, see Ruth Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington D.C., 1958), pp. 92-122. Also Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations* (New York, 1953); and K.P. Saksena *The United Nations and Collective Security* (Delhi, 1975), pp. 28-36.
- 2 US Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945* (Washington D.C., 1950), p. 553.
- 3 Cited in Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organizations and the United Nations" *International Organization* (Madison) VIII, May 1954, p. 2.
- 4 Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.) VIII, January 1956, p. 239.
- 5 Cited in K.P. Saksena, n. 1, p. 34.
- 6 For details see *Ibid.*, pp. 121-134 and Inis L. Claude, "The OAS, the UN and the United States," *International Conciliation* (New York), March 1964.
- 7 The most objectionable point is that this UNITAR study, in justifying exclusion of such institutional arrangements as NATO, Warsaw Pact, etc., from its purview, refers to them as "Collective Security arrangements" and goes on to argue (p. 4) that:

Even though these arrangements do have a regional core, they have been established as defence alliances or ideologically homogeneous groups rather than as regional bodies; they are thus linked to the United Nations either through Article 51 of the UN Charter (NATO), or the exception to Article 53 concerning defence against the resurgence of aggression by enemy states of World War II (Warsaw Pact), both of these collective measures independently of the Security Council, subject to the requirement of subsequent reporting. In practice, these collective security arrangements have had hardly any direct contact with the Security Council, though the significant impact of their policies and actions upon the functioning of the Council might be regarded as a form of indirect relationship.

- 8 *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts* (New York, 1975).
- 9 *The OAU and the UN : Relations between the Organization of African States and the United Nations* (New York/London, 1976).
- 10 The Brandt Commission Report bears the point. Also see, in particular, K.P. Saksena, "The North-South Conflict and the United Nations" in M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguli, (Eds.), *Great Power Relations and the Third World : Essays in Memory of Sisir Gupta* (New Delhi, 1980), and K.P. Saksena, "The EEC and the Third World : Interactions at the United Nations," in K.B. Lall and H.S. Chopra, (Eds.), *The EEC and the Third World* (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 62-81.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

SHRIDATH RAMPHAL : Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary General, 1975-79. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xxxiv, 444p., Rs. 80.

THIS is a volume of selected speeches, statements, and writings of the Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath S. Ramphal from January 1975, when he became Commonwealth Secretary General, until March 1979. There is an introduction by Barbara Ward, the distinguished economist and outstanding writer on development issues and international co-operation.

Dr. Ramphal, now serving his second term as Secretary General, was formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice of Guyana. He has a rich background of involvement in the affairs of third world countries; his most recent being as a member of the Brandt Commission, whose report is currently the subject of a good deal of discussion and debate.

Ramphal's speeches delivered to a variety of audiences in far flung areas of the world, dwell on matters which are of great importance to the developed and developing world, including India.

The chapter headings give some indication of the sweep of his thinking—

- (a) Redressing Human Disparities: Global Need for a New Order.
- (b) An Agenda for the South.
- (c) Serving a wider Commonwealth.
- (d) Dismantling Racism in Africa.
- (e) The New Dynamic of Regionalism.
- (f) The Professions as Agents of Change—Science, Law, the Press, Management and the Universities.

In surveying the situation existing in both the rich and poor countries, the Secretary General emphasizes the need for collective thinking and for an approach which makes inter-dependence imperative. It was this consideration that made the United Nations call for a new International Economic Order in 1974, setting in motion a whole series of debates and negotiations that is the North-South dialogue. The Commonwealth, because of its composition and geographical distribution had, of necessity, to get involved in these discussions which were not only about development but about human conditions the world over. The mutual interest of all countries is involved in the creation of a less unequal and less unstable world.

Two of the speeches included in the first part reflect the broad purpose of his message. One was a statement made in Bonn when the Brandt Commission was inaugurated in December 1977. He put his finger on the nub of the

problem when he stated:

As we approach the end of the 20th Century we need no special insights to warn us if our global society cannot save the many who are wretched, it is unlikely to protect the few who prosper—or itself to survive.

Another important presentation was made by Ramphal to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. In this, the Secretary General argues that in the new order sought by the Third World there would be no losers. A new order in all the principal areas under negotiation—commodities, credit, industrialization, aid and debt relief—would yield benefits both to the rich and the poor.

The second set of speeches includes one which Ramphal delivered to the Indian Council of World Affairs in December 1977, under the title "What Next?" The main burden of these speeches is a call to the South to assume its specific responsibility for resolving imbalances. The dialogue between North and South, he says is, one about change in attitudes, in mechanisms and in systems. While the South demands various changes in the North, the South has to take action in regard to its own conditions—a point also forcibly canvassed by the Brandt Commission. These changes, Ramphal goes on to add, revolve around taking action in individual countries to advance *real* development, to remove inequality, to enlarge the area of co-operation between developing countries, to sustain the unity of the South so that it strengthens its capacity to negotiate with the North. He echoes what has been emphasized by the Non-Aligned Conference since the 1970 Lusaka meeting—self-reliance for individual countries and collective self-reliance for the Third World.

The third collection of speeches relate to the Commonwealth which, in spite of pessimism and gloomy forebodings, has continued not only to survive but to grow from strength to strength and to expand its activity. This indefinable institution has puzzled many who are outside its pale and has meant different things to different people. This reviewer recalls two such reactions. At a function in Peking in April 1956, to celebrate the First Anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai toasted the British *Charge d'Affaires* on the advantages of the English language which was a unifying factor in the Commonwealth. In 1971, during the Bangladesh crisis, the Head of an Arab State suggested that "India was a member of a military Pact," because we were in the Commonwealth.

In his speeches, Ramphal explains the mystique of the institution and the factors that bind such disparate countries—rich and poor, big and small with differing ideologies, members of NATO and the Non-Aligned movement, the goals these widely differing nations hold in common, and what brings about their collective commitment, and wherein lies the Commonwealth's validity and its role.

The fourth Chapter contains speeches dealing with racism in Southern

Africa and the denial of self determination which threatens the peace and security of the world. Apartheid in South Africa forms one of the main themes and there is unambiguous condemnation of this inhuman method of governing a country. What he calls Western passivity is criticized. Apart from hurting all the oppressed people of Africa, it also hurts the people of the West "whose credentials not just of goodness but of civilization it impugns." Dr. Ramphal forcibly advocates the freedom of such countries as Namibia and Zimbabwe. [The latter, since independent].

The fifth Chapter of the book deals with the growing dynamics of regionalism. The basis of Ramphal's thinking is his own effort towards regional integration in the Caribbean as is exemplified in the formation of CARICOM, which now constitutes "an important element of the progressive forces in Latin America." In this context he expresses his pride in being a West Indian. He suggests that regionalism is a move towards internationalism and discusses the many issues which regionalism poses. He is not unaware of the tensions which develop between nationalism and regionalism. Scattered as it is over many continents, the Commonwealth also is moving towards an awareness of the value of regional arrangements.

The speeches in the final chapter remind us that to effect the changes which must take place today, both nationally and internationally, the participation of all segments of society is needed. Talking to scientists, he highlights the disparity in the world of the distribution of scientific and technological resources and the need to harness these in the service of rich and poor alike. Lawyers, normally associated with upholding the status quo, are requested not to forget their commitment to justice and equity. Journalists and other media people should use their tools of trade to facilitate enlightenment and change. Managers have a special responsibility for the right kind of economic change, and educators, particularly in the universities, should be more constructively involved in development.

This collection of speeches written in very forceful and elegant language is bristling with ideas on a wide variety of subjects of contemporary interest. It is indispensable reading for all those interested in the problems of change and development.

Barbara Ward, in the Introduction, gives an admirable summing up of what the volume is all about. "Varied as are the subjects and occasions of these addresses, they have, without exception, an underlying sense of direction." Indeed, the phrase "sense of direction" conveys too cool an impression. What they express with urgency and eloquence is a dedication, a personal commitment, a passionate concern for what Ramphal calls our "inseparable humanity."

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D.P. SINGH: *American Attitudes Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement*. Munshi Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1974, xiv, 362p., Rs. 55.

THE present work makes an important contribution to the growing literature on Indo-American relations. The book has grown out of a doctoral dissertation originally presented to the University of Hawaii. The use of the words "American attitude" in the title leads one to expect much more than is actually the case. The author himself would like to delineate the word "American" to "official American" and the term "attitude" to imply a settled mode of thinking, whereas what the study does is to give American official "opinion" on significant developments in the Indian National Movement during the period 1905-1929. The work also includes in its scope the struggle the Indian nationalists waged in the United States for the freedom of their motherland, thus bringing into the limelight new information on the Ghadar Movement and the activities of Lajpat Rai.

The sources consulted by the author are fairly extensive. The materials of the United States Department of State available in the American National Archives and other materials in the Library of Congress in Washington have been read. He has relied mainly on the despatches and reports sent to the United States Government by American consuls resident in Bombay and Calcutta and these cover mainly political and economic questions. Though these reports are a valuable source, they are exposed to the risk of reflecting the local bias of the consuls. They were in close touch with British officials and the European commercial community in India on a social level and this and the opinion of the pro-British Press in India could not but influence their views. The author is aware of this risk and is careful to make his own assessment. But what comes out strikingly is the fact that these consuls had maintained a balanced outlook on the Indian National Movement and indeed helped to correct some mistaken notions formed in the United States on the basis of prejudiced reports emanating from the American Embassy in Britain. One glaring instance was the suspicion created in the American official mind by British sources that there was a growing Bolshevik menace to India during 1917-22 and was strengthened by the utterances of some Indian revolutionary emigres in the United States and Europe. On being requested by the United States Secretary of State, the American consuls in India sent reports which helped to dispel doubts about it as they said that there were no signs of Bolshevik adherence in nationalist circles in India. We know from other sources that the consuls were correct.

But the question is what weight did the rulers in Washington attach to the consular despatches from India? We know that more often than not they shut their eyes to them and seldom replied even on issues raised by such important movements as Swadeshi, Boycott and Non-co-operation.

Here and there the author has done well to compare the official view and the non-official view (for instance on pages 123-24). It is significant that the impact of non-official opinion on American policy towards Indian aspirations

for Swaraj was neither deep nor far-reaching. Whereas, by and large, the official view tended to appreciate British policy in India, may be from their own economic point of view rather than the Anglo-Saxon race considerations, the non-official view, on the whole, tended to sympathize with Indian national aspirations. The section on President Theodore Roosevelt in the book shows how he had the "White man's Burden" approach to British rule in India. Even in the Wilsonian days of high idealism, American opinion did not prove very vocal—even far less effective. Sir Subramania Aiyar wrote to President Wilson in 1917 but his letter was ignored. Later, B.G. Tilak wrote to him appealing to him to apply the principle of national self-determination to India. The reply from Wilson's Secretary assured that the matter of self-determination for India would be taken up in due course by the proper authorities. (p. 225) That was perhaps the more appropriate expression of the United States Government's attitude towards India. In subsequent years also, American policy on British imperialism was one of lip sympathy but without effecting action or intervention.

The volume includes within its compass several significant aspects of the Indian National Movement, namely, the Swadeshi and Boycott movements, revolutionary activities of the Indians in America and Europe, efforts of other Indian emigres in America, and American response to them, Gandhi and the non-cooperation movement. The story is brought down to 1929 when, in the opinion of the author, there was a definite capitalization of American attitude and policy as regards the early realization of India's destiny within the British empire as a self-governing dominion. Thus the principle of self-determination was to go hand in hand with Montagu's declaration of progressive realization of self-government within the Empire.

Unfortunately the book has a number of spelling mistakes of names, etc., which could have been avoided.

The book is undoubtedly based on painstaking research and is full of copious footnote references. Further, it is a good contribution, not only in respect of American opinion and policy on Indian questions during the formative phase of the national moment but also on various aspects of the movement itself.

New Delhi

AMBA PRASAD

R.R. SHARMA: *A Marxist Model of Social Change: Soviet Central Asia 1914-40*. The Macmillan Co., New Delhi, 1979, ix, 256p., Rs. 60.

THE purpose of Dr. Sharma's study, to quote him, was his "sincere endeavour not merely to record the socio-economic history of modern Soviet Central Asia but rather to attempt a sociological interpretation of it." (p. viii) The reader will have no doubt that he has been quite successful in this attempt.

The author begins with an account of the socio-economic conditions of what was known as "Turkestan" of the days before the October Revolution and which later became known as Soviet Central Asia, comprising the republics of Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan and Tadzikistan. He explains how in the 19th century, Russian capitalism resorted to the policy of horizontal expansion and annexed Turkestan linking the Fergana Valley, the rich cotton growing area with Central Russia in the process. In this period "money economy" replaced the natural economy. On the eve of the October Revolution, "Turkestan" had become a "Cotton Colony" of Russian capitalism. The relations of production used to be dominated by the *Beiys* or the landlords. On the cultural scene, the traditional elites known as *Khadimists* were the all powerful group and were allowed to remain predominant as that satisfied the criterion of dependence of this region to the Russian centre.

The author then embarks on an evaluation of the strategy of development of Soviet Central Asia after the revolution. The "non-capitalist path of development," inunciated by Lenin as a solution to overcome the social and economic backwardness of the region, as the "least painful" form of transition from primitive condition to the socialist mode is explained in detail. While translating this doctrine into reality, as the author explains, the aim of the Soviet policy was to do away with the feudal capitalist structure and substitute it by a socialist system of management of the economy and social forces.

The problems of the region, mainly in the economic arena during the war of communism, that resulted in total instability in the economy and disaffection among people, comprises the content of the next phase of the study. In this connection, the author has narrated clearly how practical steps were taken during the NEP period to combat these distortions both at the base and at the superstructural level. But, as is well known, NEP created increasing differentiation among peasants not only in the Russian mainland but also in this region with *Beiys* and *Kulaks* becoming all powerful.

While discussing the issue of agrarian reforms, the author has shown clearly that its first phase was over by the end of 1925 with the creation of the land fund and completion of land distribution. Hired labour was also totally liquidated by this time. According to the author, these steps helped in "sharpening the 'social consciousness' of the people." (p. 109) The most important phase of transformation of agriculture came next with collectivisation. This policy was put into effect in 1929 and the decision was to complete its implementation by the end of 1933-34. The most important feature of collectivisation, as the author points out, was to "eliminate *Kulaks* and *Beiys* as a class." (p. 132)

In his account of industrial reorganization, the author shows that by 1922-23 the state sector started to assume the "commanding heights." (p. 148) There was a conscious effort in the next phase for levelling the differences between Central Russia and Central Asia in the levels of development.

That is why the policy of the "eastward movement" was given so much prominence. The author has also proved, supported by data, that in the absence of a comprehensive central economic plan the development of the region during 1917-40 of the order actually achieved would not have been possible.

Finally, the author has tried to provide a sociological balance sheet of the overall development in the region in the period under review. This development was instrumental in crushing the dominant role of the traditional elite (*Khadimists*) and also the other influential minority group (*Jadidists*) with regional bourgeois aspirations. In the task of transformation at the superstructural plane the author has made a very interesting point. Not only a minority among the intelligentsia with nationalist and leftist leanings but also a section of the small trading community and even some from among priests assumed leading roles in "initiating socio-cultural, political and economic change." (p. 192) One of the instruments of this change was a massive educational programme to help in the creation of a socialist intelligentsia. (p. 201) Through the emergence of this intelligentsia during 1917-40, as the author points out, a new cultural climate was created resulting in a changed attitude to patterns of family and structure of society that could get rid of the objective basis of the social inertia of the past. (p. 218)

There is no doubt that the present study is not only one of the most comprehensive accounts of social change of Soviet Central Asia in the English language, but it is also an extremely valuable document for students and researchers in the field. Questions however may arise in the minds of readers to which the author has not given adequate answers. Firstly, the author has talked about "coercion, pressure and force" in implementing the collectivisation programme. But he has not mentioned the behaviour of *Kulaks* and *Beiy*s as a class vis-a-vis the peasants on the eve of collectivisation. Was there intense class struggle in the villages in this period? Secondly, the author is of the opinion that revolution reached "Turkestan" on a barren socio-economic soil "by cable" only. (p. 194) Does the author mean that revolution and then Socialism came to "Turkestan" by annexation alone? Then this action of Soviet power could only be supported if one believes in the truth in the aphorism of Lukacs, "the worst of socialism is better than the best of capitalism."

An extremely important point in the study that the reader is advised to note in connection with the author's examination of the theory of the "non-capitalist path of development" is his contention that this theory would have remained theory alone if the fourteenth congress of CPSU had not dismissed Preobrazhenskii's plan of socialist accumulation through an exploitation of Soviet Central Asia by Soviet Central Russia for making the socialist state mightier so as to enable it to thwart any evil design of world capitalism. (p. 142)

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K. K. DASGUPTA

Society and International Law

HERMANN MOSLER : *The International Society As a Legal Community*.
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1980,
xix, 327p.

GENERALLY titles of books need explanation. Certainly this needs one otherwise readers would not know what is intended in a book entitled—"The International Society as a Legal Community." The author, Hermann Mosler, a distinguished German international lawyer and currently a judge of the International Court of Justice, knew too well that he owed to his readers an explanation of this title, for, he says, "International Society is a legal community to the extent that it is able to live according to legal rules." (p. xvii) Having set out such a hypothesis, the author proceeds to examine on the basis of classical rules, state practice and judicial dicta to what extent international law rules govern the conduct of state in transnational relations. Herein, he seems to be influenced by the classic works of Charles de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*. (Translated by P.E. Corbett)

The author, no doubt, conceives of international law as a product of historical development, but his history dates from medieval Europe, and does not relate to the ancient civilizations of the East. Such an approach is bound to deny modern international law its pedigree in terms of the contributions of the East. International lawyers of India may recall here the pioneering contribution of Prof. C.H. Alexandrowicz to universal historiography.

Even so, this is a work worthy to be studied and pondered over by Indian international lawyers. Where does one find international law? The author discusses this question in two chapters under the headings of "Formation of International Law" and "Evidence of International Law." Between them they deal with treaties, customs, general principles of international law, judicial decisions, and teachings of publicists, in other words, the Art. 38 sources. He finds that the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases on custom as "inflexibly worded." His criticism is particularly directed against the way the Court sought to identify the *opinio juris* in the North Sea Cases. He is of the view "that the acts of governments and their agents in relation to an evolving rule are indicative of that State's conviction that it must comply with a legal duty. But the existence of such a conviction cannot be expected in the early stages of evolution of a custom. To require otherwise would be to insist upon the paradoxical need for a belief of a legal obligation as a prerequisite for its actual creation." (p. 113) This criticism of Judge Mosler suffers from the same deficiency which he discerns in the Court's reasoning. For his reasoning that *opinio juris* cannot be expected in the early stages calls for explanation—what is meant by "early stages"?

The author legally analyzes the role of the United Nations in the making of international law and its contribution to its progressive development in various sections under several chapters. But being a positivist as he is, he doubts whether resolutions of the General Assembly can be an independent source of international law. In his words, "they can contribute to the emergence of new rules by providing *evidence* that the general consensus is about to emerge or they may *state existing law* by defining and interpreting it." (Italics that of the author, p. 90) This is rather taking a limited view of the potential of the General Assembly resolutions as a source of international law. Not that this viewer holds every resolution of the General Assembly as a source of international law.

It is interesting to note that the author regards the doctrine of *acta jure imperii* as a minimum international standard guaranteeing immunity from jurisdiction to states. So conceived, *acta jure gestionis* becomes merely optional. This interpretation avoids the absolutist or restrictive theory of sovereign immunities of foreign states.

The author's treatment of the chapter on economic relations reflects his general predisposition towards classical legal framework that has little use for the bold new approach of the modernists. Economic factors, he regards are not enough for the creation of legal obligation. Article 38, he finds as inadequate for generating norms relevant to international economic issues. Indeed, he concludes that the changes which have so far been made in the international economic order have not centrally replaced the traditional rules in this field. Given the author's frame of reference, one could hardly join issue with the author on these points.

International lawyers the world over now, know too well that there is little scope for extending contentious jurisdiction of the International Court for Justice. It is reassuring to take note that Judge Mosler holds a similar view. This reviewer agrees, though, with his plea for extending the Court's advisory jurisdiction. The principal judicial organ of the United Nations must be more effectively used. Finally, the author in taking note of the usefulness of national digests of international law expresses that so far no digest of digests has been produced. It's an idea whose time has come!

Bangalore

M.K. NAWAZ

Nuclear Technology Growth

P.B. SINHA AND R.R. SUBRAMANIAM : Nuclear Pakistan : Atomic Threat to South Asia. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 164p., Rs. 55.

BRIJ MOHAN KAUSHIK AND O.N. MEHROTRA : Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb. Sopan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 228p., Rs. 75.

THE subject of these two studies by scholars of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses—namely acquisition by Pakistan of nuclear-weapons capability—has to be viewed in the perspective of two developments which have taken place after their publication. They are, one, the tripartite report submitted by the United States, USSR and Britain to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 31 July 1980, saying that “significant new ground” had been broken “in international arms limitation efforts” with particular reference to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; secondly, a *New York Times* report on 20 July 1980, quoting Soviet officials, that Moscow shared Washington’s “interest in preventing any further growth in the world’s nuclear club.”

These would dispel the impression that while the United States is hell bent on preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons states the Soviet Union might not be so concerned about it. Reports appear periodically in the Indian Press, that the Soviet Union has offered heavy water or enriched uranium, or both, without insisting on IAEA safeguards, which are not true. There is nothing to choose in this respect between one member and another of the so-called London Club with its comprehensive trigger list, barring perhaps France which has had commercial dealings involving nuclear material—fuel, equipment as well as know how—with Pakistan and Iraq, both of which are said to be engaged in making the bomb. When it comes to the crunch, France too, will fall in line with the rest.

The prospect of Pakistan arming itself with nuclear weapons has been engaging the attention of politicians, policy-makers and publicists in several countries, including our own. The danger of Pakistan embarking on a weapons programme was foreseen by a Hudson Institute study of 1974 which visualised a kind of domino phenomenon with country after country, starting with India, followed by Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, going nuclear. That some of these countries like Iran and Iraq are signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty proves that the NPT is no serious impediment to horizontal proliferation also, once capabilities match intentions and the circumstances demand it.

Of the two publications, the second is a more balanced assessment of the problem, and it studies in some depth the geo-political and security aspects of the larger issue of nuclear weaponry. But for the cogently argued Foreword by P.R. Chari, the then Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the former would read like an *expose* of Pakistan’s

cussedness in going nuclear on the sly, hoodwinking the rest of the world. The authors also contend that Pakistan's policy in this respect is independent of developments in India like the Pokhran blast.

Chari, on the other hand, unemotionally examines the Pakistan situation, sifting intentions from capabilities, and concludes that it is the elite perception that nuclear weapons enhance national security and/or prestige which propels countries towards the weapons option. He also concedes that the Pokhran blast "added another dimension" to Pakistan's threat perception. For the rest, the book is a narration of the steps taken and progress achieved by Pakistan for fulfilling its nuclear ambitions, supplemented by technical data on uranium reprocessing and enrichment processes. For an academic study, the book exudes value judgements not all of which can pass muster.

It is also difficult to agree with the authors that the Western Powers could be creating the bogey of a nuclear Pakistan to make India subscribe to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in the light of the limitations of the NPT explained earlier and the shared interest of both Western and non-Western Powers to prevent more countries from going nuclear. Chari has a more plausible explanation when he sees in it a Pakistani ruse to secure military and economic aid from outside.

Kaushik and Mehrotra, on the other hand, have rightly traced Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to Field Marshal Ayub Khan's attitude of treating the West as "friends, not masters." Contrary to what the authors have surmised, Z.A. Bhutto was then a comparatively junior minister handling oil and natural resources. His contribution to Pakistan's foreign policy in those days was largely declaratory because there was no love lost between Bhutto and Manzur Qadir who headed the Foreign Ministry. The same was the case subsequently when Mohammed Ali Bogra was the Foreign Minister.

The review of Pakistan's voting behaviour at the United Nations on the nuclear issue, made by the authors, is interesting. It brings out the diverse motivations behind Pakistan's gamble with weapons capability. The authors lucidly explain the qualitative difference between the positions of India and Pakistan. The latter still belongs to the category of "static" threshold nuclear Powers, i.e. a country without technological thrust to go nuclear, while India remains a "dynamic" threshold nuclear Power, with the technological capacity to acquire weapons capability.

In this context, the authors significantly stress "the thrust of technology" as a factor driving countries to go nuclear. They add: "When a country has developed an adequate technological and industrial base that can sustain a meaningful civilian nuclear programme, there is bound to be the temptation for and demand on the decision-makers to go in for nuclear weapons."

After describing the development of a political "will" in Pakistan to go nuclear, the authors voice their scepticism about Pakistan's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. While taking the plutonium route to a bomb option, Pakistan has obtained French technical assistance for its reprocess-

sing plant, though it entailed stringent IAEA safeguards. The authors explain this "contradiction" by pointing out that to reduce the time-technological lag between India and Pakistan "the latter had no (other) choice but to borrow the technology, even if it necessarily entailed international safeguards. Perhaps the decision-makers in Islamabad had deliberately decided on a path that had the contingency plan of coming out of the safeguards agreements after Pakistan had developed a real technological option to make the bomb...."

Nevertheless, the authors point out that the Pakistani nuclear programme "suffers from many 'ifs' and 'buts' ... If the Pakistani effort is to have a 'bang' like the one India had in 1974 it might well succeed. But the Pokhran explosion did not make India a nuclear-weapon Power. A similar effort on the part of Pakistan would fail to graduate Pakistan to the nuclear status. In both the cases it is nothing more than squandering of the limited resources on wrongly determined priorities."

Finally, Kaushik and Mehrotra candidly say "the theme of Pakistan's bomb has been blown up by the bomb lobbyists in India..., who forced Mrs. Gandhi to go in for the Pokhran explosion.... They were having a tough time during Morarji Desai's regime." Their plea to the Government is to avoid succumbing to such pressure but to take the initiative for a *modus vivendi* with Pakistan.

Very few Indian writers on the nuclear issue have shown themselves capable of such an unemotional and rational approach as the two above authors. It is, therefore, odd to find a statement in the book that the "origin" of the problem of nuclear proliferation was the development and use of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1945. It is like tracing all the ills of mankind to the eating of the forbidden fruit by Adam. Can it be claimed similarly that if the Soviet Union had not obtained the weapons technology through espionage—to which, incidentally, there is no mention at all in the book—there would have been no proliferation because technically the United States would have been the only nuclear Power?

With or without the Hiroshima bomb, the technology would have spread, just as with or without the NPT the number of nuclear weapons Powers would not stay frozen at five!

New Delhi

G.S. BHARGAVA

Foreign Policy

BISHESHWAR PRASAD : Foundations of India's Foreign Policy: Imperial Era, 1882-1914. Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 1979, x, 596p., Rs. 125.

WHEN it became independent in 1947, New Delhi was heir to a long, and not undistinguished, legacy of friendly intercourse with its neighbouring lands. A decade earlier, Burma had been separated and was now

well on its way to a sovereign, independent statehood. Relations with Tibet were cordial and the 14th Dalai Lama (still a boy) and his government looked up to its powerful, and populous, neighbour to the south for friendly advice, with favour but without fear. Nepal albeit securely within the Indian orbit, functioned well-nigh completely independently of any overt or covert control, much less interference in its affairs. The King of Kabul was supreme over the land he ruled and even though he had his small quarrels over guns and gold, relations with New Delhi were far from unfriendly. That, in broad outline, was the shape of things and all said and done, it was as good a start as any one could have wished.

The time-worn adage that a nation, or an individual for that matter, can ignore the past only at its peril is nowhere more apt than in the domain of foreign policy. It is therefore of the utmost importance for the mandarins in South Block, as for the lay observer outside, that the origins as also the evolution of our external relations are studied with the utmost care. It is here that every detail, however minor, in our past dealings becomes relevant; all data, however cumbersome, grist to the mill.

With this laudable objective before it, the Indian Council of World Affairs sponsored a four-volume study of "The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy." The first in the series bearing that title, and spanning the years 1861-1882, came out almost a quarter century ago, in 1955, to be exact. It was written by Professor Bisheshwar Prasad and appears to have made a good impact. To be authored "jointly" by him and S.C. Desikachar, the remaining three volumes were to follow "at yearly intervals;" they were to cover the years 1882-1907 (Vol II), 1908-30 (Vol III) and 1930-1947 (Vol IV). Even though the sponsorship has now changed and the ICWA's place taken by the ICHR (Indian Council of Historical Research), the volume under review would appear to be the second in the series.

The principal topics with which the study deals are relations with Afghanistan—they take up nearly two thirds of its bulk—Persia (Iran) and the Gulf, Tibet, the Pamirs and Burma, the last under the high-sounding "British Imperial Interests is South East Asia."

However tempted one may feel to go into a detailed treatment of individual subjects, more so when there are many a bone to pick, one has to resist the temptation; it would, in the present compass, be impractical to say the least. A word on the conceptual framework however, may be in order. To start with, while the Introductory Chapter on the "European Diplomatic Scene" is not strictly relevant, what is has been completely ignored. And this is the contemporary Asian scene. The emergence of Japan for instance and the gradual decline of Manchu China, the conflict over Korea, and Mongolia, are of first-rate diplomatic importance not to say of utmost relevance to any worthwhile discussion of Imperial India's legacy in the domain of foreign relations.

Another factor that appears to have escaped the author is a broad conspectus of the post-Lytton scenario in India. The dominant personalities

here—and not only in the domestic sphere—are those of Dufferin and Curzon. For a proper perspective in Afghanistan and Tibet, not to say Persia and the Gulf, Curzon even more than Dufferin bestrides the political stage like a Colossus. An understanding of the man and his political and social mores—and there is no dearth of good literature on the subject including his own, not inconsiderable yet perceptive writings—would have helped immensely in providing the necessary framework of reference for most of what is germane in delineating the foreign policy contours during these thirty odd years. He is the indispensable touchstone; and there is always the temptation, and indeed the necessity, to refer to the pre- as to the post-Curzon facet of a problem.

To be more specific, a large bulk of the “Problem of the North West Frontier” (Chapter V), “Fresh Tensions in Indo-Afghan Relations” (Chapter VII), “The Re-orientation of Forward Policy” (Chapter VIII), “The Treaty with Habibullah” (Chapter IX), “British Imperialism in the Persian Gulf Region” (Chapter XII), “Clash of Imperialisms in the North” (Chapter XIII), lose meaning and content without an intimate understanding of the one man whose books, despatches and private papers hold the key to what has been retailed here. And without a fresh breath of life the detail itself appears somewhat fatuous if also devoid of meaning.

A sad lapse is the complete neglect of the serious clash of interests of imperialisms if you choose—between British India and the Chinese Empire. The latter’s penetration into the Assam Himalayas in the aftermath of the expedition to Lhasa led to a series of developments culminating in the tripartite Simla Conference. Barely mentioned, the treatment meted out to this important theme is scrappy and one hates to say, singularly superficial. Two recent studies on the subject: Alastair Lamb’s *The McMahon Line*, 2 Vols, 1966 and this reviewer’s *The McMahon Line and After*, 1974, appear to have escaped notice.

A serious omission has been the relative innocence which the narrative reveals of the excellent books and monographs on the subjects with which it deals. It may be useful to list just a few. Thus on Afghanistan, Ludwig W Adamec’s *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History* (Berkeley, 1967); Donald Wilber, *Afghanistan—Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, 1962); and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton, reprint, 1978), furnish fresh insights into Indo-Afghan relations. On Persia and the Gulf there are, among others, Rose Louise Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892* (London, 1959); F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914* (New Haven, 1968) and, for background J.B. Kelly’s *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1785-1880* (Oxford, 1968). On Tibet, apart from the reviewer’s *Tibetan Policy, 1904-37*, 1976, there is the slender yet authoritative Tokan Tada’s, *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama* (Tokyo, 1965), B.J. Gould’s *Jewel in the Lotus*, (London, 1957) and Peter Fleming’s extremely well-written account of the Younghusband expedition in *Bayonets to Lhasa* (London, 1961). On the Pamirs, no study of the conflict may be deemed

complete without reference to G.J. Alder's *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95* (London, 1963) and John Keay's much more recent, *The Gilgit Game* (London 1979).

Further, in the book under review, expression is sometimes involved and meaning hard to come by. Two instances picked up at random may suffice.

In his letter of 17 February 1893, the Amir explained the reasons for his inability to fix any date for the receipt of Robert's Mission and desired the mission to meet him. (p. 141)

Later on p. 221, we have:

Replying to the Amir's letter of 9 January 1889, in which Abdur Rahman had, with reference to Russian General Tremenoff, communication regarding the extension of railway line to Kushk, and expressing his grief at this development, asked for the Viceroy's advice regarding the reply which might be sent to the Russian officer. Curzon while advising the Amir not to reply to the letter, used this opportunity to ventilate his 'opinion as to the steps which should be taken in view of the completion of the Russian railway to Kushk and of the manner in which it may affect the relations of harmonious alliance that exist, between the British and Afghan governments.'

Printing errors are a legion. Kimberly (pp. 141-2, 540), for Kimberley; Turki (pp. 400-1), for Turkey; Broderik (p. 415), for Brodrick; Maskat (p. 416), for Muscat; Grey of Falloden (p. 520), for Grey of Fallodon; Jordon (p. 529), for Jordan; Linchen Shatra (p. 530), for Lonchen Shatra. Alstair Lamb (p. 467), should read Alastair Lamb; Tsapon, W.D. Shakabfa (p. 469), Shakabpa, Tsepon W.D.—the last word is Shakabpa, *not* Tsepon. Richardson's *A Short History of Tibet* (p. 467) is, in fact, *Tibet and its History*; Tieh-Tseng Li (p. 469), is more correctly rendered Tieh-tseng Li. McMahon has been mangled almost beyond recognition—there being such variants as MacMahon (p. 532), and McMohan (pp. 164-5, 244 and index, p. 593). Similarly Randolph (p. 540) is Randolph (Churchill).

And pray what does Grover *Sikkim India* (p. 455) signify? To be sure the author is B.S.K. Grover and the work, *Sikkim and India*, but in all fairness to Professor Prasad the dust jacket lists *Sikkim India* ! Horror of horrors, the same holds true in the case of the book under review. Is it, one wonders, *The Foundation of India's Foreign Policy* (dust jacket), or *Foundations of India's Foreign Policy* (title page)?

For a volume of this size, a little over six hundred pages (including the prelims), a good index is an important, indeed indispensable desideratum. And herein the present study leaves a lot to be desired. Such entries as "Anglo-Indian circles" (p. 587); "Minute", 4 September 1899 (p. 593) followed by three other such "Minute" (s); "Lumsden's Camp" (p. 592);

"Mansion House Speech" and "No Man's Land" (both on p. 593) leave the reader a-guessing.

Nor is that the end. We have, for sure, "Pan-Slav Circles," "Petala Agreement," "Russian Czarism" (all on p. 594), "Indo-British Government" and "Indo-British policy" (both on p. 591), exciting the reader's curiosity. Again, without specifying the dates or initials, what would "Anglo-Chinese Convention," "Anglo-Chinese War" (both on page 587), "Churchill" (p. 589) and "Jung Bahadur" (p. 592), stand for?

A grave, indeed crippling, handicap for the intelligent reader is the absence of a bibliography. Needless to say for any serious work of scholarship a comprehensive bibliographic note is not only not a luxury but an indispensable necessity; it enhances its value and furnishes the researcher necessary leads for a follow up. Apart from a general bibliography, what the present study calls for are well annotated reading lists appended to each chapter. A pity they are all conspicuous by their absence!

One is constrained to say all this more in sorrow than in anger; to bemoan the fact that a great opportunity has been missed. As the title spells out here is a daring, combative subject calling for great imagination. More, in execution, it demands breadth of vision and an indepth understanding; utmost care, meticulous supervision, scrupulous attention to detail. Much more in fact was called for than the volume under review appears to have received. This is all the more necessary where institutional sponsorship and its inevitable concomitants, a public image and public funds are involved. They are a sacred trust or ought to be. One would only hope that the remaining volumes, which may well be in the pipeline, find in the ICHR a more acute awareness of the doughty challenges that the task poses and, in their author, a more adequate response.

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PARSHOTAM MEHRA

VED PRATAP VEDIK : *Bharatiya Videsh Neeti, Naye Disha*. National Publishing House, New Delhi 1980, 187p., Rs. 40.

P.K. MISHRA : *India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh : India as a Factor in the Intra-Regional Interaction in South Asia*. Sundeep Prakashan, 1979, viii, 286p., Rs. 70.

THE titles of both these books are misleading to a certain extent. While claiming it to be "the first original work on India's foreign policy in Hindi," the central theme of the book by Dr. Vedik is a discussion of the Janata Government's foreign policy. One could however, concede the fact that the study is based on a wider perspective of India's foreign policy rather than limited to the period of the Janata Government's rule, and that it displays a fair and impartial analysis of the Janata Government's declared

policy of "genuine" non-alignment, and also makes a comparison between the "genuine" and "fake" non-alignment policies pursued by the Janata Party and the Congress governments preceding the Janata Party's coming to power.

The title of P.K. Mishra's *India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh*, carrying the sub-title "India as a Factor in the Intra-Regional Inter-action in South Asia" is misleading in the sense that it is basically a study of Pakistan-Nepal relations from 1947 to 1978 in which India is brought in only occasionally. To be more precise, it is the author's M. Phil thesis on "Pakistan-Nepal Relations" submitted to the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1972, which he has retained *verbatim*, only adding two chapters on Pakistan-Nepal relations from 1972-78 and Nepal-Bangladesh relations from 1972-78. Even the wordings of the first sentence of the introduction of this earlier M.Phil dissertation have been retained in the published work. His justification for that is that the concluding observations which he had made in his M.Phil dissertation had not been disturbed "because some of the predictions about the future scenario in South Asia have been found to be correct in the alignments and re-alignments in the region." This is much too tall a claim. To say that the intra-regional relations between the countries of South Asia during 1972-78 were merely a continuation of the relations between Nepal and Pakistan before 1971 would mean ignoring the sea-change that took place within these countries, on the one side, and in the international system, on the other, deeply affecting these relations during the period.

Vedik has devoted separate chapters to the study of India's policy towards neighbouring countries, Southeast Asia, West Asia, Super Powers, non-alignment, China, nuclear policy, etc. Using *cliches*, he describes the Janata Government's foreign policy towards the neighbouring countries as a kind of "sweet illusiveness," towards Southeast Asia as one of "indifference," towards West Asia as one of "too great a dependence," towards China as one of "complete surrender," and towards nuclear weapons as "double-faced." He has tried to support his description of these policies by facts and figures picked up from the time that the Janata Government was in power; his main thesis being that the claim of "continuity and change" in the country's foreign policy made by Atal Behari Vajpayee was correct only in the sense that it indicated "continuity" with the policies pursued by the Congress governments earlier but that it was wrong so far as any basic "change" was concerned.

The competition with Pakistan, according to him, continued, with the result that Pakistan tried to make the atom bomb secretly, purchased larger and more powerful weapons from the United States, raised the Kashmir question in several Islamic Conferences and entered into an agreement with China for the construction of the Karakoram road. While Pakistan was bent on strengthening itself against India, the latter was so deeply absorbed in its attitude of faith in Pakistan that it did its best to secure the latter's admission in the group of non-aligned countries. In the case of Nepal,

Vedik thinks that India's policy was that of aligning itself with the King of Nepal rather than with its own national interests, with the result that Nepal was able to pursue a policy which was not quite in tune with that of India—and illustrates it by the fact of Nepal declaring itself as a zone of peace. The Janata Government's policy towards Bangladesh has been described by the writer as one of "sterile liberalism," towards Sri Lanka as one in which "fears and misunderstandings continued," towards Bhutan as one of "exclusiveness," towards Burma as one of "ineffectiveness," towards Afghanistan as one of complete "loss of balance" and towards Iran as one of "short-sightedness."

Vedik has discussed in details Indo-Soviet and Indo-U.S. relations. While making some "genuine" effort to steer the policy of non-alignment on "correct" lines in the earlier months, the Janata Government started swearing by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1979 within four or five months of its coming to power. Prime Minister Desai, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Vajpayee all went to Moscow and discussed with Russian leaders the question of developing co-operation in the field of defence. While the American Government welcomed the installation of the Janata Government at Delhi and talks took place a number of times between Vajpayee and Cyrus Vance, the differences between the two governments continued to remain. Vedik is particularly critical of India's China policy as verging towards "complete surrender." The failure of India's policy towards China became clear when China attacked Vietnam during the period when Vajpayee was on a visit to Beijing. Vajpayee had been a strong critic of Nehru's policy with regard to Tibet, but during his foreign ministership, he never did anything to raise the question of Tibet with China.

To put it briefly, Vedik has examined India's foreign policy during the Janata Government term from a particular viewpoint, which he has made clear in Chapter IX, where he has tried to work out an alternative foreign policy. The attempt, however, is subjective rather than one based on the contemporary political scene nationally and internationally. Vedik thinks that non-alignment, whether "genuine" or "fake", is not enough for a country. It has a very limited field of action. It does not envisage the concept of carrying on any activity outside the Super Power politics, with the result that it continues to react to the foreign policies of the Super Powers and is not able to take any initiative. He thinks that non-alignment has no roots in the country's national interests; it is quite another thing that it might be able to secure national interests on occasions. He compares India's policy of non-alignment to a male peacock's dance. The peacock has weak and dirty feet, but it spreads its beautiful wings and dances—in sheer showmanship. In short, Vedik has failed to understand the genesis of India's policy of non-alignment. Belonging to a generation for which Nehru is a figure fading out into past history, he is critical of Nehru's policy as one of trying to build moral power and ruling out the necessity of military power. This is certainly a very short-sighted view of Nehru's foreign policy which could be regarded

as extremely successful in securing India's national interests between 1947 and 1957.

A brief chapter on "Cultural Foreign Policy"—a refreshing contrast to the routine discussions of foreign policies—expresses the writer's deep concern with the lack of a cultural approach in India's foreign policy as a whole, including the foreign policy of the Janata Government, even though it was steered by Vajpayee who was the first person to raise his voice in favour of India's developing cultural relations with other countries. He is correct in saying that India's External Affairs Ministry has limitations in its understanding of the actual situation in the non-English-speaking countries, since the information it receives about them is sifted through English newspapers. This leads to its inability to fully grasp the foreign policies of three-fourths of the countries of the world which are not English-speaking. He illustrates it by such facts as our inability to anticipate the revolution in Peru in 1968, which led Indira Gandhi to cancel her Latin American tour in the middle, our inability to understand how weak Daud's hold was in Kabul, with the result that while we received him with great grandeur in India in March 1978, he was forced to give up power in April. Vajpayee had to cut short his visit to China because he had no idea that China's attack on Vietnam was imminent and could have been anticipated only on the basis of a deep study of Chinese literature. Iran was our close neighbour, but even after an intensive public agitation lasting for a year we had no idea that Khomeini would come to power. He is also correct in thinking that we can establish better relations with the Third World countries only if our foreign policy is not restricted to our study of world affairs through English newspapers published largely in the United States and Britain.

One might come to the conclusion that while Vedic's foreign policy analysis, directly of the Janata Party and indirectly of the previous Congress governments, is basically correct, he has been somewhat hasty and rash—guided, one might say, by a journalistic fervour—in drawing his conclusions. He takes pride in the fact that he has examined India's foreign policy from Kautilya's, or for that matter Morgenthau's, so-called "realistic" point of view which, after all, has a limited validity in the contemporary world situation (even though Morgenthau jumped in his chair in an international seminar held at Jaipur in 1966 when someone compared him to Kautilya and said, 'I was waiting for someone in India to make that remark').

As regards P.K. Mishra's book, one may not challenge the commonly held view, which he has adopted, namely, that the relations of Pakistan and Nepal in the pre-1971 period and those of Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh in the post-1971 period had been governed by an obsession with India, but to say that there was absolutely no other strand in the foreign policies of these countries, or that the foreign policies of these countries were absolutely limited to their relations with India would hardly be a tenable thesis. Pakistan's efforts in the early years to build close ties with the Islamic world, however futile those efforts might have been, were, based on the conception of

Pakistan's leaders that they had a special role to play in the Islamic world—envisioned by the poet Iqbal—and not so much on the fact that they wanted to use solidarity with the Islamic world as a defensive weapon against India. Pakistan's relations with USA, USSR and China also, though *partly* due to what the author describes as its "obsession" with India, cannot be *wholly* attributed to this factor. Nepal, in its efforts to seek closer ties with Communist China was not merely thinking of balancing its relations with India but also of building for itself an individualistic existence in the international system—the one craved by every nation-state, however small it may be in size. The same would apply to the foreign policy of Bangladesh during its post-independence period. Bangladesh, like Pakistan and Nepal, suffers from an obsession of India but that alone cannot explain the entire gamut of Bangladesh's relationship with the other countries of the region like Pakistan and Nepal. India being the dominant power does influence the foreign policy—thinking of its smaller neighbours but that cannot be taken as a complete analysis of the foreign policies of these countries.

The claim that India has been included in the book as a factor too is misleading because the book has been written completely from the points of view of Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh and the changes in India's policies towards these countries under the pressure of domestic political forces or the international system have not been discussed with any thoroughness. It might, therefore, have been better if the author had retained the title of his M. Phil dissertation "Pakistan-Nepal Relations" for this book. One also notes that the book is journalistic rather than scholarly. The dissertation as well as the two chapters in the postscript are based, more or less, on newspaper articles and reports and the author has not cared to distinguish between the views of a newspaper in the editorial columns, or of writers in their articles, from the views of governments. The book certainly gives a detailed account, in a strictly chronological order, of the intra-regional relations between Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, and as such would be useful to anyone who wishes to have a broad look at these relations, but the writer has nowhere tried to analyze these relations in depth or given his considered views on where these relations went wrong or what could be done to put them on the right path.

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ESCOTT REID: *Envoy to Nehru*. Oxford University Press, 1981, x, 301p.
Rs. 100.

THE author of this work served in India during 1952-1957 as High Commissioner for Canada and has since visited the country three times. His last visit during 1978-79 extended over several months and was devoted

wholly to research and to a review and re-examination of his earlier assumptions and conclusions. During his tenure he was widely regarded as a keen and well-informed student of India's problems who took interest in many aspects of our national life and was in tune with Indian aspirations and attitudes towards democracy, development and peace. In preparing his book, Escott Reid has had the advantage of drawing on official documents, including correspondence and his own reports to his government and specially to such outstanding persons as Mr. Pearson and Mr. St. Laurent who held office at the time respectively as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Canada. Then, as now, the author's choice of words was careful and his analysis penetrating and, whether one might agree or disagree with him on a particular point, there is no question that his writing derives its quality from conviction and concern.

The central theme of the book is the "special relationship" between India and Canada which seemed to be blossoming in the early fifties and how, through events not wholly within the control of either country, this relationship came to be gradually "eroded" until the two countries were drawn far apart from each other.

Several circumstances had strengthened understanding between India and Canada: many shared attitudes on world affairs, mutual respect and consideration among the leaders of the two countries, membership of the Commonwealth, a measure of detachment on the part of Canada from extreme views which tended to gain sway from time to time in the United States, co-operation in relation to the armistice in Korea and, for a period, common service on the International Control Commission in Vietnam. Gradually, the "special relationship" weakened under the shadow of American arms for Pakistan, differences of outlook on Kashmir, Canadian reservations on Indo-Soviet co-operation, marked differences on Hungary and in lesser degree, on Suez and, above all, clearly different perceptions in relation to many of the international policies of the United States. More recently, the nuclear explosion in India in 1974 added to the distance. If India was too far, Canada was perhaps too near, to take a sufficiently dispassionate view of the dominant foreign policy urges of the United States.

There is room here for two passing thoughts. First, outstanding individuals may sometimes serve as bridges and sometimes widen the gap that separates nations. In either case, in retrospect, as one tries to understand the deeper forces at work, their role turns out to be smaller than had appeared either to themselves or to their contemporaries. Secondly, one may ask whether, in the absence of close and continuing links across the board (as in arrangements for regional co-operation based on mutual need), "special relationships" between sovereign nations, which are far removed from one another and inevitably respond to different impulses, challenges and opportunities, are not themselves products of circumstances which cannot but change over the years.

The author has presented his own point of view in a degree of detail which

adds to our insights in the period, but he would be the last to suggest that he has made a complete or final evaluation and that there may not be a number of other considerations which must be put side by side with those he has advanced before we can come to a just view either of the policies or of the attitudes expressed directly or by Krishna Menon and others on behalf of Jawaharlal Nehru. Here, we must note a limitation. None of the leading officials on the Indian side, who are still with us and with whom the author had his main contacts, will either be able to draw on the kind of official materials that he has had at his disposal or have the inclination to enter into minute rebuttals on numerous matters touched upon in the book. Therefore, it is fair to say that while the book is a significant commentary on the period covered, nevertheless, it remains a partial account. On important issues of international policy, many a decision is taken by statesmen on incomplete information and on the surmises and judgements of the day. To get at the whole truth we have to be willing to wait longer for historians to fathom deeply and question one another at some length. Yet, Escott Reid's account of his period in India should suggest to Indian scholars several issues which they too have a duty to examine and re-examine more thoroughly than they have yet attempted to do. On many vital aspects of post-independence history, Indian scholars can no longer afford to be content with expository studies.

Several reviews of Reid's book published in India have focused less on his main theme and more on his pen portraits of Krishna Menon, Panikkar and some others. These are interesting and well-written but, necessarily, those who have known the various individuals personally would have something to add and also something to subtract. Nevertheless, it is useful to learn how they appeared to an observer who listened intently and could sketch their expressions in his mind's eye.

The author's very genuine interest in the economic and social well-being and progress of India is apparent from the Epilogue of the book under the title "Reconsideration." He makes pertinent observations on a variety of general topics: poverty, population and production, social advance, administration, domestic politics, comparison between India and China, and future prospects. One does not have to agree with them in detail, for these are vast themes on which there is a great deal to say. Yet, Reid has done well to point to several problems like land reform, the rural poor, and the quality of administration, to which as a nation, we have not yet given adequate answers. This is not because the answers are beyond our capacity or the capacity of our social and political system, but because we have not been completely honest with ourselves and have not yet tried hard enough to turn *directions* of change into the *substance* of change in the lives of vast numbers among our fellow-citizens.

New Delhi

TARLOK SINGH

H.S. BHATIA: *Portrait of a Political Murder*. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1979, 176p., Rs. 35.

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO was one of the most colourful but complex personalities of the Third World during the past two decades. As a man as well as a statesman he remained a controversial figure. As a person, while he was suspicious, capricious, intolerant, arrogant, temperamental, indulgent, vindictive and unpredictable, he possessed several qualities which elevated him to the highest offices in Pakistan. Bhutto was a highly ambitious, intelligent, diligent and determined person possessing a wonderful knack of public speaking which enabled him to become a man of the masses. As a politician, if he has been branded as a ruthless dictator who ruined the country, caused the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and brought the remaining half to the brink of disaster, then there would also not be few who would acclaim him as the saviour of a broken and demoralised country who, inspite of coming from a rich aristocratic land-owning family, was inspired by socialist ideals and determined against all odds to create a modern industrial society. By his astute diplomacy and statesmanship Bhutto helped Pakistan and himself in securing a respectable position in the Third World, especially among the Islamic countries.

As Bhutto's whole political career so also the manner in which he met his end, has been highly controversial. His deposition in July 1977, his trial in the Lahore High Court on charges of having ordered a political murder, his appeal to the Supreme Court against the conviction, the petition to the Supreme Court for a review of his appeal and, finally, his execution in April 1979 have been hotly debated issues. Thereafter, there was understandably a furious spurt of literature on Bhutto. One category of such publications is biographical (which includes Bhutto's autobiographical statements—*If I am Assassinated*—) and the other is where attention is focused on Bhutto's trial and execution—*Bhutto's Trial and Execution* by J.C. Batra, *Bhutto Trial and Execution* by Victoria Schofield, and the present book.

Bhatia has chosen the judicial proceedings starting with Bhutto's trial in the Lahore High Court and ending with his hanging as the main theme of this book. The first six chapters however, form an introduction wherein the author has attempted, albeit through quotations, from Piloo Mody's *Zulfi—My Friend* and Bhutto's own writings, including *If I am Assassinated*, to present a portrait of Bhutto as a man and a politician.

Bhatia has rightly asserted that "for the first time in the history of Pakistan," Bhutto "made the visible support of the people a source of legitimate power." (p. 12) Bhutto, in the first three years of assuming power in December 1971, "did a job of mass healing which has few parallels. A country which could have died of the shock of amputation became a whole person once more." (p. 12) Highlighting the other side of Bhutto's contradictory personality, the author correctly remarks that the late Pak Premier used the coercive authority of the State "to silence and suppress the dissenting opinions of

people." (p. 40) "Apart from murder, the machinery of government and the instruments of State power were used extensively for the abduction, arbitrary detention and wrongful confinement of refractory political dissidents." (p. 40) But this otherwise interesting portion of Bhatia's book is marred by several inaccuracies which reduce its value. The date "December 77" (p. 10), when the PPP is claimed to have done well in elections in West Punjab and the Sind Provinces is, obviously, a serious printing error. Further, one fails to comprehend how *Zulfi—My Friend* can be called Piloo Mody's "autobiography." (p. 10) Referring to the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the statement that "General J.S. Aurora captured General Tikka Khan in Bangladesh with two million soldiers in a single sweeping attack," (p. 23) is patently inaccurate. But, then, it can be said in defence of the author that these chapters do not constitute the main part of the book.

The Bhutto case, even before it was finally disposed off, had aroused keen interest and lively controversy because the principal accused happened to be the top executive of his country not long before, and because of the motives, real as against the professed ones, for putting Bhutto in the dock. It has been said that once Gen Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto from power, the General had no options left. It was either his neck or Bhutto's. Some, including Bhutto himself, saw the hands of CIA behind all this, while those in authority took refuge in the sanctity of the "rule of law." Analysts have however pointed out more deep-rooted socio-economic and personal factors which, in their views, made Bhutto's sudden fall inevitable.

From a purely juristic angle, too, the legality, justness, propriety and fairness of Bhutto's trial has been questioned to the extent that the whole process is dubbed by many to be a "judicial murder." The manner in which the case was proceeded with through various stages really does give the appearance of a suspect or unfair trial. Why was it necessary that the Bhutto Case should have been tried in the Lahore High Court by a particular bench against whom Bhutto and his counsels had strongly levelled the charge of bias and prejudice against the principal accused? The hearing of the prosecution case in the open and that of the defence in camera was prima facie unfair though it could have been justified on extra-judicial considerations. The Bhutto trial was clearly in violation of the maxim—Justice should not only be done but it should also appear to have been done.

Then, the whole prosecution case was based on principally hearsay and circumstantial evidence. The principal accused, Bhutto, was at best the prime abettor. He neither committed the murder nor was he actually present at the site of the occurrence. The person who died as a result of the conspiracy was not the targeted man. Is it always necessary for a convict to specifically pray for commutation of his sentence while proffering an appeal? Should not an appellate court, of its own, take into account the question of reduction of punishment on the basis of attenuating circumstances, if any?

These and several other points cast doubt, if not on the technical legality of the trial and judgment, then of their propriety and justness at least. But a

reader vainly looks for illumination on these vital issues in the presentation of the Bhutto case in the book under review. The author has reproduced extracts from judgments of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court without caring to make interpretative or analytical comments. The net result is that while it fails to satisfy the requirements of men in the legal profession, it remains largely incomprehensible to a layman because of its legal terminological verbiage.

The central figure in the book is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But the title of the book is *Portrait of a Political Murder*; the political murder which had been the cause of action was of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan, father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri. In that sense, centrality of Bhutto in the theme and the title are not connected with one another unless we believe that the author means Bhutto's execution to be taken as "a political murder" which, obviously, does not seem to be his intention. A misleading and confusing title would not have however mattered much had the contents of the book been otherwise substantial and useful. Nevertheless, the book under review, may prove helpful to those who want to have some idea about the developments which led to the execution of Bhutto.

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ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN: *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*. Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, 295p., Price not mentioned.

RUBINSTEIN is among the most eminent of the vast army of American Kremlinologists, with a prodigious academic output on various facets of Soviet foreign policy, both at micro and macro levels. A new book by him qualifies immediate academic attention. His latest book, under review, bears the characteristic stamp of his erudition, scholarship and painstaking research with a mastery over facts in a terrain of over two decades' familiarity.

The book is "intended to provide a concise, comprehensive account of the evolution, aims and impact of Soviet foreign policy, primarily in the period since 1945; and to establish a foundation for in-depth exploration of the rich specialised literature that has been published over the past generation. . . . The approach is eclectic, historical, policy-oriented and analytical. It focusses on the USSR's actual behaviour and on the external consequence of its policies, and not on the possible motivations and decisional inputs that produced the behaviour. It pleads no theory, no fashionable model. . . ." Rubinstein defends his methodology and deliberate absence of a theoretical framework: "...inevitably interpretative evaluations have been made, where

it is not feasible to examine in detail the domestic determinants of policy and all possible options available to Soviet leaders at any crucial period. No doubt policy differences and conflicting perceptions of unfolding situations exist; yet once a policy is adopted, it acquires a life of its own and is the proper unit for examination...."

Some of Rubinstein's generalisations emerging from the study—which also form the basis of the author's projections of Soviet behaviour in the eighties—though logically viable, appear somewhat trite; an unavoidable limitation of the application of behavioural methodology to the realm of policy sciences. "Sterile empiricism"—as some uncharitable critics might overstate their scepticism of the explanatory, and hence prescriptive, potentials of this methodology. For example, when Rubinstein asserts that "...Russian nationalism is egocentric, exclusivist, intolerant" (p. 285), he is at best describing the typical characteristics of all nationalism, Russian or otherwise. Similarly, the author's assertion that "the Soviet leadership believes in the utility of force as a means of preserving or promoting strategic interests," or, "the Kremlin is not embarrassed by its power" and "Soviet leaders respect power and correlate power with diplomatic moves; they disdain weakness or equivocation. They are not captivated by appeals to friendship and humanitarian ideals. What motivates Moscow is a restless search for strategic advantages;" such characteristics have more general validity than what Rubinstein implies by imputing them exclusively to the Soviet leadership. A whole school of Western scholarship—from Clauswitz to Morgenthau—is based on this general assumption.

But unlike many other western scholars who implicitly or explicitly accept the "convergence" theory—whether a Bell with his *End of Ideology* or Galbraith with his *Post-Industrial State*—Rubinstein concedes that "the Soviets have a different set of values which feeds the all-pervasive political and strategic rivalry." If so, one would have expected the author to pursue his characteristically competent empirical investigations of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of the "set of values" emerging from its socialist ideology; or by a more direct approach to the evolution of the ideological perspective in the context of Soviet *realpolitik* than what the author has opted for by his implicit, but tangential, approach to the problem. If foreign policy, as Rubinstein rightly asserts, "is a function of domestic politics," Soviet Socialist ideology has an important bearing on its foreign policy. In any case, "Socialist" domestic politics has more dimensions to it than merely grappling with the problem of shortages in consumer-durables or even of food, high technology and energy sources, notwithstanding their undoubted importance; and, foreign policy of a socialist state is shaped by more important factors than merely the subjective perceptions of the policy-makers (*a-la* "Decision-Making Theorists") and their court intrigues, or their age-group and educational qualifications. This is hardly true even of the non-socialist countries.

Besides, since the author concedes that "...ideologically derived perceptions shaped the behaviour of Western leaders to a greater extent than they

did Soviet policy," his empirical researches would perhaps have enabled more meaningful conclusions if they were conducted within the overall theoretical perspective of their divergent ideologies. This may have thrown more light on his "facts", and depth to his conclusions, particularly with regard to the chapter on "Soviet-American Relations," in a way that would have been different from the conventional Cold War historiography on the subject. In which case, he may have persuaded himself to reconsider repeating such terms as the "Brezhnev oligarchy" or "Soviet imperial system in East Europe" (p. 283), to his own academic advantage. Such avoidable legacies of Western Cold War historiography, which have crept into Rubinstein's undoubted scholarship—perhaps unwittingly—are a pointer to the limitations of his empirical approach based on the "rich specialised literature published over the last generation." This point is made here only to underscore that even the best products reveal the limitations of a purely empirical approach; and the validity of a methodology has to be judged from among its best specimens, like the present volume.

The author approvingly cites the "fallacies" of Western scholarship (p. 286), on the Soviet Union as enumerated by Raymond A. Garthoff: "When in doubt assume the worst;" "never assume intentions, only capabilities;" "assume that Soviets always (or never) have the same perception and aims as their Western counterparts;" "assume that they never (or always) mean what they say;" "consider Soviet capabilities to be larger than are needed—or than they believe are needed—for deterrence;" "assert a Soviet intention to seek military superiority;" "believe that the 'facts' speak for themselves ignoring selection and definition of data." While Rubinstein refreshingly avoids most of these stereotype "conceptual traps" of western scholarship on the Soviet Union, he willingly renounces an explicit theoretical framework by opting for an approach where "facts" "speak for themselves;" he even makes a virtue of this, which is not entirely convincing. In the process, his scholarship is vindicated, but not his methodology.

Some of the author's most perceptive comments relate to his search for the roots of Soviet behaviour, in a hostile world, beset with a sense of insecurity; such comments have enduring relevance. He dismisses the Bolshevik commitment to peace—which they "neither desired nor dared to break"—as part of "demonstrative diplomacy" without making any moral judgement on the relative merits of the commitment to "peace" and to "global military containment." Do these two commitments reflect the social milieu of their respective "set of values", shaped by their varying political economy?

Since "the Bolsheviks had to face up to the realities of an international system of which they were inextricably a part," the Brest-Litovsk crisis, according to the author, convinced Lenin that "a revolutionary outlook was not incompatible with *realpolitik*." Out of this crisis emerged the main contours of Soviet foreign policy: a strong Red Army to resist foreign aggression and the inevitable attempt of the capitalist world to undermine its security; and to view the success of the Soviet revolution and the advancement

of world revolution in a dialectical relationship. According to Rubinstein, "this dualism—the furthering of revolution abroad and the quest for national security—has remained a salient feature of Soviet foreign policy." Rubinstein provides sound reasons for the Soviet assumption of capitalist hostility. Allied "interventionist adventure" (1918) ; Churchill's call to "strangle the infant Bolshevism in its cradle;" the forged (by British intelligence), Zinoviev Letter (1924) leading to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain; American withdrawal from the League of Nations despite Soviet commitment to collective security; unsuccessful Soviet attempts to invoke collective sanction to resist aggression in Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia; "suspicion of Moscow running (sic) too deep in the West;" "Stalin watched Hitler's success, the West's surrender, and the Soviet Union's growing isolation," till his hopes disappeared after Munich; "twice within a generation Soviet leaders were engaged in a struggle for survival."

"Lenin sought to strengthen the Soviet state and safeguard it from a feared coalition of capitalist Powers bent on its overthrow. In the diplomatic field, the end of isolation was a key objective. This was accomplished first in Europe, then in Asia." "For Soviet leaders... there has always been a discernible relationship between security in Europe and security in Asia. Fear of attack from both directions had been a Soviet nightmare ever since the Allied intervention of 1918-1919." Even after the Second World War, the Soviet Union continues to be haunted by this gnawing sense of insecurity, made worse by the American nuclear monopoly, the ending of the Lend-Lease Agreement, refusal of soft loans for post-war reconstruction, continued American presence in Europe, Churchill's Fulton speech, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the officially-inspired domestic cult of "anti-communism" in the United States in the form of "McCarthyism."

The "roots of Cold War," according to Rubinstein, lay in the "fundamental conflict between incompatible conceptions of security, and in the worst-case assessments that each side made of the other's moves and intentions." This surely was the consequence; the cause being the more fundamental conflict between the two ideologies; which makes it more imperative to study their foreign policies within the respective ideological framework, without which, like all researches based on behavioural approach one can describe, perhaps interpret, but never explain. The validity of the historical approach lies in answering the "whys" as much as the "whats", which is where the behavioural methodology remains short of the requirements of policy sciences.

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HERBERT PASSIN, *Ed.*: *A Season of Voting: The Japanese Elections of 1976 and 1977*. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1979, 199p.

THE continuance of conservative rule in Japan since World War II, except for a brief one year Socialist-Conservative Coalition rule in 1947-48, and since 1955, the one party rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, might present a very unexciting and uninteresting picture of the Japanese political scene. The people's mandate for conservative rule might also seem to give evidence of the innate "conservatism" of the Japanese people. Why does the dynamism of the Japanese people and their penchant for change not get reflected in their political behaviour? There is no dearth of reports about the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people on the inability of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to solve the various problems brought about by a policy of rapid economic development. The indignation of the people about the "structural corruption" in the ruling party is also expressed in various ways. Yet, these do not get reflected in election results. Why is it so? A deeper study of the elections reveals the gradual changes in the people's attitudes, the realignment of various political forces and also gives an insight into the working of the Japanese political system. Herbert Passin and his associates have undertaken this task of presenting the underlying complex pattern of the Japanese political system, which is not visible through a glance of the neat figures of seats and percentages of votes gained by the political parties. The study is limited to an analysis of two national elections, namely, that of the House of Representatives of 1976 and that of the House of Councillors of 1977. However, the analysis based on the classification of the electoral districts by the degree of urbanization or through a five-point classification based upon the percentage of the labour force engaged in the primary industrial sector brings out clearly the effect of rapid industrialisation on the electoral behaviour of the Japanese people. The conclusions are based on a wealth of statistics which makes this a good source book. An index to the tables in the book would have been helpful.

The operation of "money politics" in Japan, which intrigues any student of the Japanese political scene is discussed in a separate chapter. However, it is limited to the ways of funding parties and the legislations in this regard. A discussion of the various methods adopted for utilisation of the money to enhance the influence and support of individual political leaders, as well as the power which this gives to a faction leader, would have given more interesting insights into the working of Japanese politics.

In the introduction, Passin points out that the October 1979 Election results were found to be entirely consistent with the general directions in the book. Although it was not possible for Passin to have foreseen the fall of the LDP Cabinet through a no-confidence resolution in the Diet a few months after the formation of a new government, the intensity of the factional struggle within the LDP and the inability to achieve a consensus revealed in the

nomination of two candidates by the ruling party as Prime Minister, merited some discussion. The double elections held in June 1980 both for the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors reveal that the Japanese voted back the Liberal Democratic Party with absolute majority in the interests of political stability. The hope that the 1980s would bring in an era of a coalition government formed by the LPD has not materialized. The present international situation seems to have given a sense of crisis to the Japanese people and they have shown their reluctance to try out a new experiment of a coalition government.

As pointed out by Passin, the lack of sensation and drama through the absence of radical changes, should not lull us into a state of disinterest about the Japanese political scene. In fact, a continuous analysis of the Japanese political system is necessary to keep us abreast of the underlying changes, so that we would be prepared for the cumulative effect they would have on the policies of Japan. From this point of view, the book is a valuable addition to the library of those who are doing research on Japan. A suitable bibliography of Japanese language sources could have been included. The lucid style of the book would also appeal to any general reader interested in Japanese politics.

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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN INDIA

Profiles of Social Change

BIMAL GHOSH: *Profiles of Social Change*. Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, viii, 198 p., Rs. 75.

THE Second Development Decade of the United Nations was not far advanced when the oil-producing countries made their unexpected and seemingly irresistible attack on the West. The crisis was given a constructive turn through the combined efforts of the less developed countries and the more far-sighted among the developed when the United Nations Assembly made its declaration at the end of 1973 for a New International Economic Order. The series of international conferences which followed—on employment, on food, on population, and others—created a mood of hope and optimism that a new era was possible and the world community was developing the earnestness needed to achieve it. The essays which Bimal Ghosh has brought together in *Profiles of Social Change* have been prepared against this world view and the author's own deep conviction that the future for the rich and the poor alike can only be secured by co-operation between the more

and the less developed nations and social change within nations, especially the poorer nations.

The book consists of sixteen essays covering a wide range of subjects. A few of them derive from the primary concerns over many years of the ILO, with which the author has been long associated, such as those in humanisation of work and occupational and other hazards associated with modern technology, workers' participation in industry, management and education. These advance sound propositions which will bear cogent restatement. However, the more significant parts of the book centre on the issue of international equity, the problems of poverty in Asia and specially in India, and the place of basic needs in national and international development strategy. On these questions, the author stays close to the accepted line of the agencies of the United Nations. He builds his main argument around the notion of interdependence between rich and poor countries based on the need of the rich for ever larger markets and of the poor for better flows of resources and technology. The case for greater justice and assurance of basic needs within countries is founded on the same essential considerations as are urged by the less developed countries in relation to the more developed. The author drives home both aspects of the case with equal conviction and consistency. There are, however, some difficult questions which might have been pursued, or whose solutions cannot be taken for granted.

At the international level, partly because of inflation and oil and continued unemployment, nations endowed with resources and technology, the more developed countries seem now to have little heart in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor and in preparing for a more equal world. Therefore, they stop short at polite gestures and go on raising procedural difficulties, while the distance between word and action even tends to increase. Ghosh's essays do not discuss the implications of this harsh reality of the present-day world. But, within the poorer countries also, through the seventies, the political will to bring about fundamental changes has weakened compared to the sixties and the earlier years of freedom. The author is conscious of this and clear enough about what needs to be done. Yet, perhaps as an international civil servant, he has felt constrained to speak lightly of our own self-created impediments to rapid economic and social changes. For this reason, his pleas for assuring basic needs, full employment and manpower utilization, and organization of the poor, do not gain the force inherently due to them as an integral part of a well-conceived national development strategy. Nevertheless, both at the national and international level, the book offers perceptive approaches presented in the spirit of world citizenship alongside a genuine concern for Asian and Indian dilemmas, on which a great deal of new thought and action has become more urgent than ever.

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J.R. KAMBLE: *Rise and Awakening of Depressed Classes in India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xii, 327 p., Rs. 75.

THIS is the first comprehensive work in a historical perspective on a subject that has been a matter of concern for social scientists, public leaders and administrators in recent times. The author seeks to combine his skill as a historian and experience as an activist in this context. This is, indeed, a most difficult combination. However, in the treatment of the subject it is seen that it is the historian who scores over the activist.

The title of the book, however, is somewhat of a misnomer. If we look at the contents we find that it is about the rise in the consciousness of the Scheduled Castes in India. Depressed Classes, on the other hand, comprehend a much wider entity and include, besides Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the denotified communities and certain other very poor and backward castes which do not figure in the schedule. In addition to this, the term "class" assumes a possibility of upward or downward mobility. This is not true for the Scheduled Castes as such. Located at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, their position is more or less fixed and so long as they are within the bounds of the Hindu system there is no possibility of a change. Even if a particular group is no longer considered untouchable, the stigma remains and the social distance between that group and other castes continues. It is a pity that some present-day social scientists are still carrying on with the term initially used by some British administrators.

The author begins with the sad plight of the Untouchables under British rule. He deals thereafter with the impact of western ideas and the Indian renaissance movement in the 19th century, which subsumed both religious movement and the impact of social reform. In this connection, the author brings out the controversy between those thinkers who held social reform to be more important than the struggle for freedom. To Tilak, it was the political injustice of foreign domination that had to be tackled first while to Agarkar, the primary task was to break the chains of social injustice and tyranny. However, in other parts of India, particularly among the radical leaders at the time of the Congress split in 1907 this question of priority was not too important. Bipin Chandra Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai advocated social reforms along with radical politics.

It was under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, that the political entity of the Depressed Castes was first recognized and provision was made for their representation in the Central and Provincial legislatures through nomination. When the Simon Commission came, Dr. Ambedkar submitted a classical memorandum to it for safeguarding and protecting the Scheduled Castes. A number of other representations were also made on their behalf from different parts of India. At that time, Ambedkar demanded joint electorates with reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes; he rejected nomination as a method of representation. The discussions then ushered in a new awakening among the Scheduled Castes; it was believed that political power was

associated with the development of political consciousness. Ambedkar did not wish to perpetuate untouchability by conferring upon it a separate inferiority complex.

The Round Table Conference ushered in a bitter controversy between Mahatma Gandhi and Ambedkar on the issue of the representation of scheduled castes. Ambedkar's strong advocacy and valiant fight projected in bold relief in the conditions of the Untouchables in India. It was also made clear that no future Constitution of India could ignore the claims of the Untouchables. Among the Untouchables themselves, it led to the rise of political consciousness on an unprecedented scale. The basic difference between Gandhi and Ambedkar was that while to Gandhi freedom came first and the uplift of the Untouchables later, for Ambedkar, the emancipation of the Scheduled Castes came first and the freedom of the country next. The Communal Award announced in August 1932, provided for separate electorates for the Scheduled Castes. This came as a great shock to Mahatma Gandhi who undertook a fast unto death on this issue. Ultimately the Government had to relent and towards the end of September 1932, the Poona Pact was signed setting aside the Communal Award and separate electorates, instead, more seats were reserved for the Scheduled Castes. Although Ambedkar signed the Pact, he was not at all happy with it; from then on both the Congress through the Harijan Sevak Sangh and Ambedkar through the Scheduled Castes Federation carried on the movement for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes.

Ambedkar made it absolutely clear, that as between the country and himself, the country would have precedence, so also between the country and the Depressed Classes, the latter would have precedence. He did not view the problem of scheduled castes merely as a social problem; to him it was fundamentally a political problem of the minority versus the majority groups. When he became the Labour Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council in July 1942, he got the unique opportunity of organizing the Scheduled Castes all over the country. Year after year the Depressed Classes Conference was held bringing together large numbers of scheduled caste leaders and workers. He advised his followers to educate, agitate and organise; to him it was a battle for freedom for the reclamation of human personality. In all his statements, Ambedkar demanded separate electorates, since it was only through these that the Untouchable could elect true representatives of his community. However, the influence of Ambedkar was largely confined to Maharashtra and more particularly to the Mahar community to which he himself belonged. The result was that his party was badly defeated in the 1946 and in the 1952 Elections.

Mahatma Gandhi in his own way made a significant contribution to the awakening of Scheduled Castes in India and also to rousing the conscience of caste Hindus against the injustice done to the former. His tours all over the country brought out the inequities of the social system. Even without giving up the *Chatur Varna* system, he decried untouchability as

an excrescence of Hinduism. He completely identified himself with the oppressed. The great concern that he showed for the Scheduled Castes whom he gave a new name—"Harijan"—had a lasting impression upon the fathers of the Constitution. The conscience of the Hindu was challenged by leaders like Ambedkar who put the Untouchables on the political and social map of India while the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi weakened the defence of Hindu orthodoxy.

The author deals in some detail with the mass conversion of lakhs of scheduled caste people to Buddhism under the leadership of Ambedkar. However, recent studies have shown that Ambedkar's hopes were not fulfilled as the neo-Buddhists still meet the same treatment by society as before. The stigma of untouchability continues, self-respect has eroded and the community has to depend upon government aid as before.

The Constitution of India, of which Ambedkar was a founding father, provided a number of safeguards for the Scheduled Castes. Later untouchability was abolished and its practice made an offence. Enormous sums of money have been provided for their welfare. Reservations have been made for them in services, legislature and educational institutions. Although political democracy has been established in the country, social democracy is still a far cry. The Scheduled Castes have not emerged as a political force in India since they are divided into many national parties and they have not been able to come together on a single issue. The political party founded by Ambedkar is scourged by splits and has rapidly lost influence. The influence of the Dalit Panthers, a militant body of educated scheduled castes, is largely confined to the Maharashtra area.

The author is of the view that reservation in the legislatures made for the Scheduled Castes should be abolished as it perpetuates class divisions and promotes hatred between one community and the other. Reservations in legislatures on caste basis and democracy are untenable. The major task therefore is to help these people to raise their economic levels so that they would be able to stand on their own feet. However, the question has a psychological aspect too. The inferiority complex long ingrained in them has to be wiped out. Among the caste Hindus, at the same time, the prejudice against the Scheduled Castes must be systematically removed through special in-built methods in the educational system. The ultimate solution is in their merging with other poverty stricken people and organizing themselves on class lines rather than on caste. So long as they cling to caste for privileges they would never be able to muster courage and strength to counter exploitation and oppression.

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SACHCHIDANANDA

Y.C. SIMHADRI : *Ex-Criminal Tribes of India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xiv, 185p., Rs. 55.

THE Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 is one of the little known black acts of the British Indian Government. In a speech at Nellore in 1936, Nehru condemned this act as "out of consonance with all civilized principles of criminal justice and treatment of offenders." For the reason that certain communities had a somewhat high percentage of habitual criminals, the whole lot of them, irrespective of whether they were criminal or not were branded as criminals and subjected to the indignity of registering themselves with the police and reporting their movements to the latter. Not all the people so stigmatised were tribes. Some of them, such as the Kallars of Tamil Nadu, were middle level Hindu castes. The Rajah of Pudukkottai and several rich Zamindars of Southern Tamil Nadu belong to the Kallar caste.

The literature on the so-called criminal tribes of India is vast, but most of the writers were British police officers who generally were incapable of going beyond the law and order aspect of the problem and oblivious of the human angle. Perhaps under the conditions prevailing in the country in the mid-nineteenth century, steam-roller methods of dealing with hardened criminals reared in a sub-culture of crime was necessary to control their anti-social activities. Such groups as the Thugs were indeed a tough lot. When it was found that crime rates did not go down, the Criminal Tribes Act (C.T. Act) of 1871 was amended in 1897 and 1908. Under the Act of 1908, settlement of the criminals in colonies and their reclamation was begun. Indian public opinion was against the harshness of the C.T. Acts. The harshness of the Acts was made still worse by the corrupt police who were administering them and it was but natural that soon after independence, the C.T. Acts were all repealed and the stigma of general criminality removed forever from about 136 so-called criminal castes and tribes numbering over 4,000,000.

The book under review is misleadingly titled. It does not deal with the ex-criminal tribes of India as a whole, but only touches on them summarily in the first two chapters on the theoretical and historical perspectives. It is in fact only a study of one of the many ex-criminal tribes of India, namely the Yerukulas of Andhra Pradesh and that too, of a small number of them at a settlement in a village—Dharmapur (a pseudonym) in Andhra Pradesh. The interesting general problems of the cultures of crime and how crime became a way of life for groups among these people have been discussed briefly but unsystematically.

When we come to the remaining chapters of the book we find them to be of absorbing interest. In the first place it is difficult to gather data about crime from the criminals and their relatives and friends. The frankness with which they spoke about themselves to the researcher is a measure of his success and skill in establishing rapport with the people he studied. A word

of appreciation is due to him especially on this point. The reviewer knows from his own personal experience how close and refractory criminals usually can be in a researcher-subject situation.

The criminal tribe settlement studied here is one of the three such in Andhra Pradesh. It is the largest one of its kind and was set up exclusively for the Yerukulas in 1914 by the Salvation Army. The latter got employment for a good number of Yerukulas in the Indian Leaf Tobacco Depot. The number of Yerukulas settled here in 1914 was about 400. About 2023 acres of land was assigned to the settlement by the Government. The ownership of 883 acres was made over to the settlers in 1943, the rest remained in the possession of the Salvation Army but was tilled by the Yerukulas. (p. 70) The Salvation Army opened schools for the children of the Yerukulas, provided medical facilities and in conformity with their evangelising goals, converted most of the settlers to Christianity. After 1952 the Salvation Army is no longer responsible for law and order, but works as a social welfare agency.

The social structure and the demography of the Dharmapur village are discussed in Chapter IV. Among the usual compliment of castes, there were in this village four families of Yerukulas who, unlike the settler Yerukulas who were brought to the village in 1914, were free from any criminal taint and had basket-making as their chief occupation. Now the settlers numbering over 2000 are as prosperous as the Reddis of the village and they lead in literacy and in the high percentage of men with white-collar and blue-collar jobs. The settlers though Christians still maintain their identity as Yerukulas and in their interactions with the rest of the village behave as a caste, served by the washerman, barbers, Malas and Madigas. Their transition from a tribe to a caste is explained in Chapter VI.

A reliable history of the Yerukulas is yet to be reconstructed. I have not come across any detailed study of the Yerukula language though it is vaguely said it resembles Tamil. We are not sure how long back in time their history of criminality can be traced. In southern Tamil Nadu they are known as Koravas, and in North Arcot they are known as Koracha. The name Yerukula has reference to their women's occupation of fortune-telling. According to some reports, the Yerukulas were engaged in carrying salt and rice from the plains to the interior. There were four sections of Yerukulas named: 1. Yeddu Yerukulas who used bullocks for transport of goods; 2. Gadida Yerukulas who used asses as pack animals; 3. Kothula Yerukulas who gained a living with performing monkeys and 4. Eata Yerukulas who made mats with palmyra and date leaves. They lost their occupation as carriers when road and rail transport was established. It is likely that they turned to crime when more honourable means of earning a livelihood went off their hands.

The life of crime must have been a hard choice for the Yerukulas and once the choice was made, it must have been even harder to give it up. Help to change and reform came late and that too in dribblets. In Chapter

VI, the author describes the types of crime and analyses changes that took place in recent years. It is a pity that both blue and white collar crimes persist among them. Modern politicization and the low level of morale of the local police contribute to the malaise of the situation. It is reassuring to know that non-criminal families in the settlement have done better than criminal families.

Though interesting in many ways, the book could have been made more readable if the presentation had been better organized and a little more attention paid to avoid crudities of language. Howlers such as "limbs of purushasukta" (p. 98), are avoidable.

Madras

A. AIYAPPAN

Studies in Rural Development

G. THIMMAIAH, *Ed.* : *Studies in Rural Development*. Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1979, vii, 223p., Rs. 65.

IN a country like India where the rural population accounts for close to 80 per cent of the total population, rural development acquires special significance and urgency, especially when planning efforts over a quarter of a century have not changed this proportion. The theory of growth failed in this major respect. Development of rural areas was assumed to be linked with the development of the economy as a whole; concern was therefore shown for overall capital/output ratio, the investment/income ratio, profit/capital ratio and the like. Preoccupation with zero marginal productivity of labour, abundance of labour that could be transferred out of agriculture, once again focused attention on growth outside agriculture and hence outside rural areas. Raging scarcity of food coupled with "Libes-tenian type of food-related increasing returns" enlarged the focus of the economic theory to include food and hence growth of agriculture. But till then little was known about the behaviour of agriculture and much less was understood regarding responses of peasants to economic stimuli. This accounts for near neglect of direct attention, in theory of sectoral development. Input-output tables used for planning changed little the basic position in theory. The policy options were viewed in absence of specific guidance from the theory, in terms of institutional reforms. While the goal of such reforms directly was growth, their impact on income distribution was accepted as a useful by-product. The search for direct action to combat the malaise of unemployment and poverty was actively undertaken after the findings of "Poverty in India" became known. The subsequent policy measures like SFDA, MFAL and "Food for Work" reflect this concern.

The book under review is to be viewed in the above background. The publication brings together empirical findings that relate to varied aspects,

mainly of agriculture. Behaviour of marketed (and marketable) surplus (M.V. Nadakarni), impact of irrigation (A.R. Rajpurohit, Mabel Koipillai and Abdul Azil), role of cropping pattern (M. Prahlad Char) and distributional effects of rural development strategies (G.P. Mishra), the last one dealing mainly with dairy industry, discuss in broader context the behavioural aspects of agriculture. They form Part I of the book, which is devoted to micro level studies. Part II, titled "Macro-Studies" is devoted to development issues. Of them "Dimensions of Rural Poverty in India" (H.G. Hanuappa), and "Employment Planning for the Rural Poor" (P. Hanumantha Rayappa and Deepak Grover) concern the measurement. "Some Reflections on Inter-area migration" (N.D. Kambale) deals with an emerging phenomenon, mainly analyzing the behavioural aspect.

Thus the bulk of the contributions to the book relate to behavioural analysis. These contributions though, valuable in themselves, belong to the periphery of the need to develop a theoretical construct dealing with rural development in the context of economic growth of a nation. The contributions of V.M. Rao and G. Thimmaiah however, are in a different category. They need to be considered individually. Contribution of social overheads (known alternatively as infrastructure, which overlaps in part with basic needs) to economic growth is well acknowledged. The theory allots a critical role to minimum level of a key input to propel the economy to growth. Rao pursues further that idea, without claiming its theoretical linkages. Couched in theoretical context, questions he raises would be : What is the key input in rural infrastructure? Where and in what form can it be injected? His search leads him to develop what he terms "primary groups" (of villages) which may vary in size and internal homogeneity. "Primary groups" have only a generic link with the "growth center" concept, borrowed from the discipline of geography. Rao goes beyond spatial location and imparts development content to the concept. Economic distance, rather than space, should be the target of development strategy, providing propelling power to the rural habitats. Rao puts it thus: "they (villages) share the common fate of being mere recipients of development, lacking initiative and weighed down by a sense of utter dependence and helplessness in relation to the wider world." Behind this descriptive statement is the strong economic logic, viz "minimum degree of inhabitability" (Rao's own expression), i.e. the economic force, that not only holds them together through famines and other calamities, but in the changed context of development, puts them on the path of growth (with equality). Whereas the force that helps them to survive can be identified on the basis of historic facts, the force that pushes them forward needs to be identified, with equal care but meagre facts. The known infrastructure of communication links, services etc, identified by Rao in Tumkur district is only a starting point. Whether we admit it or not, the development stimuli will not always be inside the "primary group." The efforts of an economy would be to develop links between the local initiative and vaster (outside) surges, so that no one

location with sufficient potentiality to grow is bypassed by the processes of growth. While individual effort to adapt and that of the community to evolve adaptive technology, have a role, the central effort to evolve a new technology common for use in a vaster area has a larger contribution to make to the process of growth. The concept and logic developed by Rao needs to be pursued. In a dynamic context many non-market decision-making processes and their institutional links will have to be accommodated within the model. Empirically, a powerful variable of inter-area migration in rural areas and away from it, will have to be studied to explore its behaviour. Migration would shift and reshape the infrastructural strategies.* G. Thimmaiah's views on the Gandhian approach to growth with decentralization, stress the complex situation of inter-dependence that inevitably arises consequent to economic development. The unequal resource-base would lead to unequal growth and unequal economic benefits. Rural-urban tiers, would make the latter non-development identity dependent for existence on the former if rural development through self reliance is aimed at. Both the views of the author are well taken, but they are partial. Gandhiji's views on mechanisation are known. Functioning of transactional economy (in a limited sense market economy) is not un-Gandhian. The stress on subsistence or self reliance by Gandhi was on basic needs, and was in the context of political and economic independence, what may be called in the present context, inner economic strength to have a stronger bargaining power. What Rao has in view for "primary groups" is in line with decentralisation, viz. local initiative, and not populist politics, to be a substitute of economic independence of initiative and achievement as a part of a bigger policy.

The publication has varied contributions with a common theme which makes it germane to the present phase of economic thinking. Its publication therefore is a welcome addition to the literature on rural development.

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C.H. SHAH

DAN A. CHEKKI, *Ed.*, : Participatory Democracy in Action : International Profiles of Community Development. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 306p., Rs. 125.

THIS is a collection of papers related to community development edited by Professor Dan A. Chekki of the University of Winnipeg. There

*Working on an allied theme, though viewed from the political angle, Guttman develops a theory, to explain the economics of providing public goods at micro-level. Joel M. Guttman, *Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free-Rider Problem?* The Center for Agricultural Economic Research (Rehovat. Israel, 1980) Mimeo.

is an introductory chapter by Professor Chekki on Participatory Democracy in the context of community development, which gives an excellent overview of the various issues connected with participatory democracy and community development. This is followed by five sections in which papers have been grouped and presented. These sections are Planning and Development, Innovations and Mass Media, Self Help in Community Problem Solving, Towards Citizen Participation and Issues and Future Trends. The Epilogue consists of a paper by Chekki on Community Development and Social Research.

The context in which most of the contributors have written is that of advanced industrial countries of the West having small pockets of rural/tribal populations. Though the book purports to present, what the subtitle calls, International Profiles of Community Development, the experiences documented in the papers brought together in this volume relate almost entirely to the United States and Canada. There is one paper on Australia and another on India. It is clear that community development programmes are closely linked with socio-economic conditions, cultural ethos and the level of technological development of people. It is, therefore, unlikely that experiences of industrially advanced countries of the West can provide any guidance to those engaged in community development work in developing countries. These experiences can at best be of some academic interest. However, even from the academic points of view the articles are of limited significance, since they are descriptive rather than critical. There is little attempt to state the problems and difficulties encountered in the course of community development efforts and to evaluate their strength and limitations.

There seems to be an underlying assumption that community development and participatory democracy are one and the same thing. The paper on Community Development in India by Dr. K.D. Gangrade mentions the Panchayati Raj institutions set up for promoting community development. It is debatable if these institutions could be regarded as ushering in the era of participatory democracy in rural India. It is well-known that power in panchayats is vested in a few persons and the community, by and large, remains quite uninvolved in either planning or execution of schemes effecting its development and welfare. Dr. Gangrade's article makes no reference to "Gaon Sabhas" which could become focal points for the growth of participatory democracy but which have remained ineffective so far.

The book suffers from poor editing and contains many printing errors.

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S.N. RANADE

M.P. PANDEY : The Impact of Irrigation on Rural Development : A Case Study. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1979, 191p., Rs. 40.

IRRIGATION has been practised in India from times immemorial. Since independence a number of projects have been taken up in different parts of the country. However, there are very few studies indicating their impact. The case study by M.P. Pandey, Registrar, A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna is, therefore, timely and useful.

The book contains a lot of data and analysis about the socio-economic conditions in six villages under the command of Kuil-Chandan-Badna Projects in Bihar. An indepth study has been carried out about the size of holdings, types of crops grown, yields, inputs of fertilizers, credit and various other data including agricultural labour, particularly landless labour. The book also analyzes the types of irrigation projects, their reliability and their shortcomings.

Of considerable interest to readers is the fact that inspite of the projects being executed by a government department, there is considerably faulty construction of distributaries and field channels. It also brings out that there are practically no extension services available to the farmers; institutional credit is almost absent.

The author has rightly laid great stress on the importance of the consolidation of holdings for greater efficiency. He has also drawn attention to the lack of communication and marketing facilities.

Another interesting fact got out in this book is that small and marginal farmers have proved as good, if not better, as the big land owners in yield rates, inspite of their obvious limitations of finance, input and other difficulties. It has highlighted that people remain more employed in irrigated villages than in unirrigated villages.

The book has also brought out the fact that land holdings of bigger farmers should be scaled down as the bigger farmers do not show interest in developing all their lands.

A good index plan of the three project areas would have made the book more interesting and useful. The selection of villages should have been done by the author and this would have led to a better appreciation of the true situation. But even as it is, the study is very detailed, systematic and analytical. The book should, therefore, prove of great interest and useful to all those associated with irrigation development.

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K.S.S. MURTHY

P.T. GEORGE and V.B.R.S. SOMASEKHARA RAO: Land Reforms, Production-Productivity : A Study in Andhra Pradesh. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 82p., Rs. 12.

“**L**AND REFORM” is no longer considered so irrelevant to-day as it was in the mid-sixties. The limited success attained by the new agricultural production technology in bringing the entire cropped area within its fold and raising farm output and employment, has prompted many social scientists to renew their short, suppressed interest in land reforms in recent years. In fact, the unfinished task of accelerated agricultural growth is now thought to be hopefully completed with the help of progressive land reform measures that could step up agricultural productivity and prove to be a friend rather than foe of any agricultural development programme. This exploratory study of land reforms by George and Rao has excellently brought out this fact and made a pioneering effort to measure the impact of land reforms on farm production, productivity and employment quantitatively, although by using less sophisticated tools and techniques.

The study pertains to one of those areas (Miryalguda and Devarkonda blocks of Nalgonda district) in Andhra Pradesh, where a large number of tenants were conferred ownership rights and surplus land above ceiling (although of relatively inferior quality), was redistributed among small and marginal farmers. The farms were classified and studied in five groups, viz., (i) Large Farms Above Ceiling (LFAC); (ii) Large Farms Below Ceiling (LFBC); (iii) Farms of Tenants who were conferred ownership right under 38E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Labour Act (TCOR); (vi) Farms where tenants were cultivating on oral contract and not subject to Protection (TOOC) and (v) Small Farms arising from the distribution of land (SFDL). Since Miryalguda and Devarkonda represented wet and dry areas respectively, the authors could also compare the results obtained under two different types of agricultural situations. Furthermore, the authors have provided details about land ownership and operation, asset formation, credit utilization, cost and return in crop production, employment and productivity under each category of farms in both the zones.

In both wet and dry zones, the average size of holding was highest for LFAC, followed by LFBC, TCOR, TOOR and SFDL respectively. While TOOC had highest intensity of cropping in both the zones, the SFDL in dry zone and LFBC in wet zone were only next to TOOC in this respect. The high intensity of cropping for TOOC has been attributed to the fact that these farms were under pressure to exert more, so that they could pay the high rent to the landowners and that the land owners had a good say in influencing the cropping pattern on such farms. The small farms had relatively higher cropping intensity than the large farms above ceiling in both the zones. Similarly, the value of farm implements and machinery was found to be more in the case of TOOC as compared to TCOR and

SFDL in both the situations. This, however, looks absurd, as according to the economic theory of risk and uncertainty, protected tenants (TCOR) should have shown higher values than that of TOOC because of the relatively more stable position of the TCOR in the agricultural occupation. Besides, the authors have ignored giving any satisfactory explanation for such an unexpected result. It is also significant to note that TOOC had also to depend mainly on money lenders rather than on institutional sources for any borrowed capital and paid high interest charges. As far as investment on more durable items was concerned, the TCOR and SFDL gave a better account of themselves than the other categories. Considering all fixed and variable costs, in the dry land zone, the net returns per-hectare of area held and cropped were highest in the case of LFAC, followed by TCOR and TOOR, mainly because of higher profitability of extensive cultivation under un-irrigated conditions. In the wet land zone however, the net returns per hectare held and cropped were highest for large farms below ceiling. The TCOR had shown relatively higher net returns per hectare cropped than TOOC under both dry and wet conditions. Also, the TCOR farms had an edge over TOOC in terms of net returns per rupee invested in both wet and dry land zones and even SFDL reaped higher profit than LFAC under wet conditions. The productivity per labour manday was highest in TCOR farms in the wet land zone, followed by LFBC.

Thus, the study reveals that TCOR and SFDL farms which represent the main beneficiaries of tenancy reform and land distribution measures, performed better in many respects under both irrigated and unirrigated conditions, indicating thereby the positive effects of land reforms on agricultural production and productivity. However, since the study covered only a small area and the data collected and used were limited to a single year, the authors were careful enough not to draw any bold conclusions on the basis of the results obtained. On the whole, the study appears to be more informative than conclusive.

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T. HAQUE

B.C. MUTHAYYA, K. KRISNAMA NAIDU and M. ANEESUDDIN: *Behavioural Dimensions of Rural Leaders*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 72p., Rs. 20.

THE book under review is a study of psycho-social characteristics of elected leaders of Panchayats in relation to informal leaders and non-leaders in elected villages of two blocks each in two districts—Thanjavur and Ramanathapuram of Tamilnadu—the first selected for its intensive agriculture development programme, and the second for being an under-developed drought-prone district. The purpose is to understand the nature

and style of village leadership as a help in predicting their behaviour in the implementation of development programmes. The study covers a total of 275 respondents consisting of 112 elected leaders, 81 informal leaders and 82 non-leaders from eight villages and two town panchayats.

Chapter 3 of the book details the personal and socio-economic characteristics of these respondents while Chapter 4 describes their attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. Both chapters together contain 25 tables which give further quantitative details.

Since involvement of the people in various development programmes is the main method of rural development, an understanding of their (leaders') disposition and behaviour can be of great help to local planners in devising strategies in such areas of development in which securing people's participation is a must. Similar periodic studies of leaders in different socio-economic regions and at different levels can facilitate this task. This book can serve as a guide to teams undertaking such studies.

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SATISH CHANDRA

ABDUL AZIZ: *Organizing Agricultural Labourers in India—A Proposal*.
Minerva Associates (Publications) Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1979, 72p., Rs. 30.

IN recent years, quite a few economic and sociological studies have emphasized the need for organizing agricultural labourers in India. While some of these studies are based on empirical investigation, Dr. Aziz, assuming that any organized effort generally improves the working conditions of agricultural labourers, has aimed mainly at identifying a suitable type of labour organization for rural India. According to him, since our social and political workers could effectively form agricultural labour organisations only in a few pockets of the country and since there may be a possible collusion between the bureaucrats and the landed gentry against trade union activities in general, there is need for Rural Labour Co-operatives (RLC) as an alternative. "These co-operatives are to put in a low key the trade union philosophy but are expected to serve more effectively the purpose that a conventional trade union might serve." Also because "our agricultural labourers are illiterate and lacking in class consciousness, the chief initiative for organizing such labour co-operatives should come from the state."

Aziz has long experience of working on various aspects of labour economics, but the present work seems to have been influenced more by his strong imagination than by practical knowledge. Knowing well that labour unions in Kerala have played a significant role in improving the working conditions of rural workers in the state, the author disapproves any further move for organizing agricultural labourers on trade union lines on the grounds that social

and political workers who could successfully establish agricultural labour unions are found inactive in states other than Kerala and that landed gentry and bureaucrats might indulge in acts of reprisals on the unionised workers. The author could as well have suggested to our social and political workers to become more active in other areas and thus avoided talking about the formation of labour co-operatives which in the absence of any binding thread like ideologically propelled class-consciousness on the part of the workers, would only be a poor substitute for trade unions. Besides, in the existing socio-political system of India and particularly when our labourers lack education and class-consciousness, the State represents at best the landed gentry and certainly not the agricultural labourers in rural areas. In such a situation, organization of labour co-operatives by the Government would only act against the interest of the labourers. Of course, if any government stands on the support of the rural labourers and organizes them along class or co-operative lines, such an association might work as efficiently as any other trade union. But in that case the difference between labour co-operatives and labour unions becomes more a matter of nomenclature than otherwise. Thus we may be left with the same product, although under a different label. Moreover, the author's contention that there may be a possible collusion between the bureaucrats and the vested interests against trade union activities may be true more in the case of labour co-operatives than labour unions. The author's assumption that RLC being a government patronised institution, "would take much of the wind out of the sails of the landlords and the bureaucrats," is highly unrealistic in as much as it overlooks the fact of intimate relationship between government bureaucracy and the landed gentry. No doubt the author likes the co-operatives not to be run by the government and once these are started by the government, labourers should take over charge. But in reality this would remain only a good piece of the author's imagination.

However, the chief merit of labour co-operatives, according to the author, is that it would "take up contracts of work from government and semi-government agencies to employ its members during lean seasons for wages. In the process, it is also expected to eliminate the private contractors. When its members have exhausted all avenues of employment and would be sitting idle, the co-operative is expected to create self-employment by engaging them in productive work, the product of which is to be sold later and proceeds distributed among the members who produced it." This is certainly a wise proposition and may help the labourers to solve the problems of unemployment in an organized manner. But before initiating any such new programme on a large scale, the Institute for Social and Economic Change, in which the author works, may select a local village or block and organize the agricultural labourers there as an operational unit for the purpose. If successful, it would have its spread effect elsewhere. However, leaving aside some of these points, the book is well written. Various problems that arise in the process of organizing agricultural labourers have been duly highlighted. Besides,

the bibliography contains a long list of books and papers on different problems of agricultural labourers in India.

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T. HAQUE

District Administration

S.S. KHERA: *District Administration in India*. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, xx, 359p., Rs. 100.

COLONIAL rule in India was primarily interested in revenue collection; to achieve this basic goal the colonizer had created an administrative chain in which the District was the most important unit. The District Collector was the kingpin of colonial administration and the traditions developed in that phase have survived in spite of many transformations in post-independence India. In fact, the Collector's office has assumed many more functions after independence.

The author, Mr. Khera was a practitioner of administration, and he has ventured to reflect on the actual functioning of Indian administration in the framework of "continuity and change."

A book of nineteen chapters is divided into four parts—public administration, district administration, law and order, and revenue, economic and social administration. This second revised edition of Khera's earlier attempt is very exhaustive. His approach is descriptive as well as prescriptive. He provides details of the system, and makes suggestions to improve its functioning with a view to adaptation of the system to new demands. The author is a believer in the role of administrative leadership and co-operation between politicians and administrators at the district level. As a product of the British administrative culture in India, he refers to the British practices also.

Khera's satisfaction with the system is reflected in the following statement:

By and large, however, it will appear that the particular overall pattern of district administration as it has evolved to the present is probably the most convenient one for our circumstances. It has the great merit of containing within itself certain built-in safeguards against too much disruption, or too much adventurism; it has provided a vehicle, a mode of government in the field, which has enabled in the past, and will probably enable in the future, different political textures within which the country's governance is contained to operate in the field viably and coherently.

Like many volumes written by former civil servants, Khera's book lacks in analysis, and he is reticent in questioning the basic premises of the system.

Once the system is accepted, modifications are marginal. However, this revised edition is a marked improvement over the first edition.

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New Delhi.

C.P. BHAMBHRI

M. SHIVIAH, L.S.N. MURTY, K.B. SRIVASTAVA and A.C. JENA: Block Level Administration: An Analysis of Salient Dimensions. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1979, 185p., Rs. 40.

THE monograph consists of commentaries on various aspects of block-level administration in India, followed by extracts from various central and state reports. Apart from a historical narration of the evolution of block administration, the themes covered include organizational dynamics, personnel, special programmes, planning and finances.

It is not quite clear how such a compilation would be useful to practical administrators; the study is insufficiently analytical and overtly pedantic, it is unlikely to illuminate any of the critical issues of contemporary rural administration, nor provide any clue to its future developments. To mention just one: since the development block has no historical antecedent, its perpetuation could be justified on the basis of scalar economy of the various functions that are considered critical at that level. No such study has been attempted before justifying the suitability of block as a viable unit of administration. Secondly, the jurisdictional hiatus between the block administration and the proposed *mandal panchayat* might force the panchayati raj institutions to be self-contained in terms of personnel and finances. In such an eventuality, reducing the block to its size may not be quite a disaster, as it has been made out. Thirdly, the artificial distinction between regulatory and development administration, which heralded the birth of the block, may not have been really useful in the long run and the present attempt to relate these at the district and *mandal* levels through the panchayati raj institutions leaves the option of either relating the block administration, closer to the sub-district administration at the sub-division or the tehsil level or else to reduce its size so as to function as an auxiliary support system to the *mandal* panchayats. The third option for the block is to wither away. Which of these options would be relevant in the post-Mehta II era remains an open question; unfortunately, Shiviah and others are silent on these eventualities.

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ABHIJIT DATTA

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—*Managing Editor*).

ALI, Rahman: *Art and Architecture of the Kalacuris*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1980, xiv, 207p., Rs. 170.

Ph. D. thesis discusses the contributions made by the rulers of the Kalacuri Dynasty to early mediaeval art and architecture in Northern India. Contains figures and plates.

DATTA, Aswini Kumar: *Bhakti Yoga*. Tr. from Bengali by Gunada Charan Sen (Bhavan's Book University, 59). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, xix, 217p. Rs. 20. (Paper) Third revised edition.

EMINENT CONTRIBUTORS, (*Pseud*): *How Goa Came Into My Life*. (Bhavan's Book University, 204). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, vi, 104p, Rs. 8. (Paper)

Collection from the writings of saints and seers. They describe how God transformed their entire being and oriented it to Himself.

GHOSH, S.K.: *Protection of Minorities and Scheduled Castes*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 181p., Rs. 50.

The author discusses the handicaps of the weaker section, the suppression of minorities especially religious and linguistic, the exploitation of the lower segments, socio-economic backwardness and hierarchical and stratified nature of our polity. In the light of the grievances of the minority groups about the dual standards of enforcement, police prejudices and apathy, the author deals with the question of equal justice under the law to the minority groups. Constitutional Safeguards (for minorities and weaker sections), Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, The Untouchability (offences) Amendment And Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1973 and the Criminal and Election Laws Amendment Act, 1969, are given in the appendices.

GOPALAKRISHNAN, S.: *Political Movements in South India 1914-1929*. New Era, Madras, 1981, vii, 289p., Rs. 80.

Deals with the contribution of South India—directly administered, extensive British territory of the Madras Presidency, excluding the princely states of Travancore, Cochin, Mysore and Hyderabad—to the growth of nationalism in the country in the period 1914-1929. The author discusses the rebellion of the Mappillas in Kerala and that of Alluri Sitaramaraju in Andhra Pradesh, role of Justice Party in non-Brahmin politics and role of South Indian liberals in the national movement. A chapter is devoted to "Swaraj Constitution."

GYAN, Satish Chandra: *Sivananda and His Ashram*. (Series on Religion, 23). Christian Literature Society (On behalf of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society), Madras, 1980, xii, 172p., Rs. 17. (Paper)

Abridged version of Ph.D. thesis. Traces the growth and development of the Divine Life Society from its inception in 1936 to the present, and examines the life and teachings of Swami Sivananda, the founder of the Society. It explains the Society's ideology, spirituality and ideals as a religious movement within the Hindu Community. The thesis treats the Divine Life Society as a revitalization movement within the context of the Hindu tradition. It is a significant contribution to the study of modern or neo-Hinduism.

IYENGAR, A.V.K.: *Inventory Management*. (Institute for Financial Management and Research Publication, 27). Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiv, 137p., Rs. 40. (Paper)

Based mainly on a survey of inventory practices of companies in India.

JAIN, Naresh Kumar (Ed.): *Muslims in India : A Biographical Dictionary* vi. (A.J.). Manohar, New Delhi, 1979, xliii 256p., Rs. 150.

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PATEL, Vallabhbhai: *Sardar's Letters—Mostly Unknown: Pt. 2 : Years 1947-48*. (Post-Centenary, VI). (Ed.) by G.M. Nandurkar. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Bhavan, Ahmedabad, 1980, xxx, 296p., Rs. 30.

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Philosophical exhortation to achieve a world without barriers of race, creed, culture, nation or state. The great Indian philosopher and statesman explains the ideology of peaceful co-existence of man with man—i.e. the concept of "one earth one family."

RAJENDRAPRASAD, B.: *Art of South India Vol. 1: Andhra Pradesh*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1980, xi, 239 p., Rs. 200.

Replete with illustrations, drawings and photographs, it introduces the art and architecture of Andhra Pradesh. It discusses the political, religious and architectural developments till the 3rd century B.C. The emergence of the Satavahanas as a major political power, the rise of Buddhism and the growth of internal and external trade ushered in the finest expression of stupa architecture and art. These are clearly defined and explained. The rock-cut temples of Buddhist and Brahmanical affiliation are also studied in detail.

RAMACHANDRAN, Challa: *East India Company and South Indian Economy*. New Era, Madras, 1980, x, 215p., Rs. 80.

Analyses the economic policy of the Company in the fields of land revenue, agriculture, irrigation, currency, banking, communications and industry during the period 1784-1858 in the Madras Presidency. The author establishes that the real reasons for the failure of the Company to promote Indian economic development was not due to the belief of the Indian Officials in the 19th century economic doctrines and the resultant theory of so-called drain, but due to the "indifferentism" or lack of interest on the part of the administrators (who were also the policy-makers of India), in promoting economic development.

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SEN, Sunil Kumar: *An Economic History of Modern India: 1848-1939*. Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1981, 368p., Rs. 75.

Documented survey deals with government policy, forms of economic organization and economic changes which occurred between the two world wars. It is divided into four parts. The first part discusses economic policy during 1848-1926. Economic change during 1926-1939 is discussed in the second part. Third and fourth parts are devoted to agriculture and labour during 1848-1939, respectively. Some of the subjects discussed in this book were treated by the author in his previous book *Economic Policy and Development of India. 1848-1939*.

SHARIF KHAN, Mohd. and SALEEM KHAN, Mohd.: *Educational Administration*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xi, 107p., Rs. 35.

Text book useful for B. Ed., M. Ed. and M.A. (Education) students.

SHASHI, S.S.: *The Nomads of the Himalayas*. Sundeep, Delhi, 1979, vi, 213p., Rs. 125.

The well-known social anthropologist analyses and depicts the tribal life of nomadic people, particularly the Gujjars, the Bhotiyas, the Gaddis and other sheep or cattle rearing tribes of the Himalayan region. The author also refers to the nomadic tribes of the world, like Romas (Gypsies) of Central Europe and USSR in one chapter. Description of the Western Himalayan region, Mussoorie and Chakrata, the Simla Hills, Dalhousie and Chamba, and Kashmir is given in the appendices.

SHIVIAH, M. etc.: *Panchayati Raj : Elections in West Bengal 1978: A Study in Institution-Building for Rural Development*. National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, 1980, 145p., Rs. 35.

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
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